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Dorothy E. Roberts∗ 
Slavery has been fruitful in giving itself names . . . and you and I and 
all of us had better wait and see what new form this old monster will 
assume, in what new skin this old snake will come forth next. 
 
 — Frederick Douglass1 
 
You have to act as if it were possible to radically transform the world.  
And you have to do it all the time. 
 
 — Angela Y. Davis2 
INTRODUCTION 
n 1997, Curtis Flowers was charged with murdering four employees 
of the Tardy Furniture store in the small Mississippi town of Winona.3  
Flowers is black.4  Three of the victims, including the store’s owner, 
Bertha Tardy, were white, and one was black.5  Flowers was tried for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
∗ George A. Weiss University Professor of Law and Sociology, University of Pennsylvania;  
Raymond Pace and Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander Professor of Civil Rights, University of  
Pennsylvania Law School; Professor of Africana Studies and Professor of Sociology, University of 
Pennsylvania School of Arts & Sciences.  The author thanks Mitchell Berman, Maggie Blackhawk, 
Jean Galbraith, Paul Heaton, Seth Kreimer, Serena Mayeri, Donald Moore, Shaun Ossei-Owusu, 
James Pope, Andrea Ritchie, and Tobias Wolff for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
Foreword.  The author is indebted to University of Pennsylvania Law School students Madison 
Gray, Bridget Lavender, Anthony Sacco, and James Thompson for outstanding and dedicated re-
search assistance, to Timothy Von Dulm and the Biddle Law Library staff for excellent research 
services, and to the editors of the Harvard Law Review for rigorous editorial support. 
1 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Need for Continuing Anti-Slavery Work, in FREDERICK 
DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 577, 579 (Philip S. Foner & Yuval Taylor 
eds., Lawrence Hill Books 1999) (1950–75). 
 2 Angela Y. Davis, Distinguished Professor Emerita, Univ. of Cal., Santa Cruz, Lecture at 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale (Feb. 13, 2014). 
 3 Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2236 (2019). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See In the Dark: July 16, 1996, at 5:43–6:20, APM REP. (May 1, 2018), https://podcasts. 
apple.com/us/podcast/id1148175292 [https://perma.cc/H44A-SDJK]. 
I 
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capital murder six times by the same white prosecutor, Doug Evans.6  
More than two decades after Flowers was first sentenced to death, his 
case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on one issue: whether Evans’s jury 
selection tactics in the sixth trial violated Flowers’s Fourteenth  
Amendment rights.7  By that point, the prosecutor’s scheme for getting 
a capital conviction of a black man was crystal clear: Evans “relent-
less[ly]” sought to try Flowers before an all-white jury.8  Over the course 
of six trials, Evans used peremptory challenges to strike forty-one of 
forty-two prospective black jurors.9 
On June 21, 2019, the Court overturned Flowers’s conviction.10  In 
a 7-2 decision, written by Justice Kavanaugh,11 the Court held that the 
prosecutor’s blatant pattern of racial discrimination was so “extraordi-
nary” that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.12  In dissent, Justice Thomas, who excused Evans’s strikes 
of black jurors as “race-neutral,”13 found solace in one aspect of the ma-
jority’s decision: “The State is perfectly free to convict Curtis Flowers 
again.”14  Flowers remains incarcerated; upon his release from death 
row, he will be taken into local custody again, awaiting a decision from 
the State regarding the possibility of a seventh trial.15 
As Flowers v. Mississippi16 indicates, criminal procedure and pun-
ishment in the United States still function to maintain forms of racial 
subordination that originated in the institution of slavery — despite the 
dominant constitutional narrative that those forms of subordination 
were abolished.  Key aspects of carceral law enforcement — police, pris-
ons, and the death penalty — can be traced back to slavery and the 
white supremacist regime that replaced slavery after white terror nulli-
fied Reconstruction.  Criminal punishment has been instrumental in re-
instating the subjugated status of black people and preserving a racial 
capitalist power structure. 
Many individuals have therefore concluded that the answer to per-
sistent injustice in criminal law enforcement is not reform; it is prison 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 See id.; Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 7 See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2234–35, 2238. 
 8 Id. at 2246. 
 9 See id. at 2235. 
 10 See id. at 2228, 2251. 
 11 Id. at 2229. 
 12 Id. at 2251; see id. at 2242 (“Equal justice under law requires a criminal trial free of racial 
discrimination in the jury selection process.”). 
 13 Id. at 2253 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 14 Id. at 2274. 
 15 See Alissa Zhu, Supreme Court Sided with Curtis Flowers.  He Remains in Prison.  What’s 
Next?, MISS. CLARION LEDGER (June 27, 2019), https://www.clarionledger.com/ 
story/news/2019/06/27/supreme-court-sided-curtis-flowers-he-still-prison-whats-next-forwinona-
mississippi-man/1552081001 [https://perma.cc/HLN7-TMTS]. 
 16 139 S. Ct. 2228. 
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abolition.17  Incarcerated people have rebelled against prisons through 
spontaneous uprisings, organized protests, and legal claims since the 
1960s.18  Some activists mark the launch of the current prison abolition 
movement as occurring at an international conference and strategy ses-
sion, Critical Resistance: Beyond the Prison Industrial Complex, held 
at the University of California, Berkeley, in September 1998.19  Formed 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 See, e.g., ABOLISHING CARCERAL SOCIETY 4 (Abolition Collective ed., 2018) (laying out a 
manifesto for “abolish[ing] a number of seemingly immortal institutions and drawing inspiration 
from those who have sought the abolition of all systems of domination, exploitation, and  
oppression — from Jim Crow laws and prisons to patriarchy and capitalism”); ABOLITION NOW!, 
at xii (CR10 Publ’ns Collective ed., 2008) (collecting works that further the “struggl[e] to tear down 
the cages of the [prison industrial complex]”); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY  
35–37 (2005) [hereinafter DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY] (noting the connections between the 
prison industrial complex and the persistence of structural racism); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRIS-
ONS OBSOLETE? 15–21 (2003) [hereinafter DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?] (questioning why 
society takes prison for granted); RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SUR-
PLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 242 (2007) [hereinafter  
GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG] (noting the “proliferation of antiprison groups” during the early 
2000s); STATES OF CONFINEMENT: POLICING, DETENTION, AND PRISONS, at xiii (Joy James 
ed., 2000) (“Prisons . . . exist as a central dilemma for a racially constructed and class-stratified de-
mocracy.”); Introduction, in Developments in the Law — Prison Abolition, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 
1568 (2019) (noting the “calls for urgent and drastic change” of the carceral system); End the War 
on Black People, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/end-war-on-black- 
people [https://perma.cc/PPA4-VY43] (demanding “an end to all jails, detention centers, youth fa-
cilities and prisons as we know them”). 
 18 See DAN BERGER, CAPTIVE NATION: BLACK PRISON ORGANIZING IN THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ERA 11 (2014) [hereinafter BERGER, CAPTIVE NATION] (providing a “critical history of 
racial justice activism and the prison between 1955 and 1980”); RONALD BERKMAN, OPENING 
THE GATES: THE RISE OF THE PRISONERS’ MOVEMENT 1–3 (1979) (tracing the rise of the pris-
oners’ movement in the 1960s); JAMIE BISSONETTE, WHEN THE PRISONERS RAN WALPOLE: 
A TRUE STORY IN THE MOVEMENT FOR PRISON ABOLITION 9–12 (2008) (chronicling the 
struggle for prison reform at MCI Walpole in Massachusetts); ERIC CUMMINS, THE RISE AND 
FALL OF CALIFORNIA’S RADICAL PRISON MOVEMENT, at vii (1994) (chronicling the history of 
California prisoners between 1950 and 1980 and the “emergence of a highly developed radical con-
vict resistance movement”); GEORGE JACKSON, SOLEDAD BROTHER: THE PRISON LETTERS 
OF GEORGE JACKSON, at ix (1970) (presenting the “testament” of George Jackson, an incarcerated 
man “who transformed himself into the leading theoretician of the prison movement”); HEATHER 
ANN THOMPSON, BLOOD IN THE WATER: THE ATTICA PRISON UPRISING OF 1971 AND ITS 
LEGACY, at xiii (2016) (providing a “comprehensive history of the Attica prison uprising”);  
DONALD F. TIBBS, FROM BLACK POWER TO PRISON POWER: THE MAKING OF JONES V. 
NORTH CAROLINA PRISONERS’ LABOR UNION (2012) (narrating a historic victory for prisoners’ 
rights that emerged from the struggle for black liberation); see also LEE BERNSTEIN, AMERICA IS 
THE PRISON: ARTS AND POLITICS IN PRISON IN THE 1970S 1–17 (2010) (tracing the ways in which 
cultural expression in prisons allowed prisoners to participate in “American public life,” id. at 16). 
 19 See ABOLITION NOW!, supra note 17, at xi; Rose Braz et al., The History of Critical Re-
sistance, 27 SOC. JUST., Fall 2000, at 6, 6; Angela Y. Davis & Dylan Rodríguez, The Challenge of 
Prison Abolition: A Conversation, 27 SOC. JUST., Fall 2000, at 212, 216–17; Critical Resistance: 
Beyond the Prison Industrial Complex 1998 Conference, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http:// 
criticalresistance.org/critical-resistance-beyond-the-prison-industrial-complex-1998-conference 
[https://perma.cc/2AF5-A2ET]; Critical Resistance, The Hard Road to Abolition//Strategies to Win, 
Profiles in Abolition Event at 14:00, VIMEO (Sept. 19, 2016), https://vimeo.com/196237369 
[https://perma.cc/HHK9-VT7U] [hereinafter Profiles in Abolition].  The prison abolition movement 
should be distinguished from the movement to abolish prostitution.  See, e.g., Laura Agustín, The 
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in 1997, the Critical Resistance organizing collective gathered more than 
3500 activists, former prisoners, lawyers, and scholars over three days 
“to address the alarming growth of the prison system, popularize the 
idea of the ‘prison industrial complex’ (PIC), and make ‘abolition’ a 
practical theory of change.”20  Critical Resistance founders developed 
the concept of the “prison industrial complex” to name the expanding 
apparatus of surveillance, policing, and incarceration the state increas-
ingly employs to solve problems caused by social inequality, stifle polit-
ical resistance by oppressed communities, and serve the interests of cor-
porations that profit from prisons and police forces.21  Along with 
Critical Resistance, which is now a national chapter-based organization 
working with various grassroots campaigns, a nationwide network of 
activists is organizing to abolish the prison industrial complex and to 
build a society that has no need for prisons.22 
It is hard to pin down what prison abolition means.  Activists en-
gaged in the movement have resisted “closed definitions of prison aboli-
tionism”23 and have instead suggested a variety of terms to capture what 
prison abolitionists think and do — abolition is “a form of conscious-
ness,”24 “a theory of change,”25 “a long-term political vision,”26 and “a 
spiritual journey.”27  Professor Dylan Rodríguez, a founding member of 
Critical Resistance,28 lyrically describes abolition as “a practice, an an-
alytical method, a present-tense visioning, an infrastructure in the mak-
ing, a creative project, a performance, a counterwar, an ideological 
struggle, a pedagogy and curriculum, an alleged impossibility that is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
New Abolitionist Model, JACOBIN (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/12/sex-work-
the-pimping-of-prostitution-review [https://perma.cc/566V-CCQ2]. 
 20 Critical Resistance: Beyond the Prison Industrial Complex 1998 Conference, supra note 19. 
 21 See What Is the PIC? What Is Abolition?, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http:// 
criticalresistance.org/about/not-so-common-language [https://perma.cc/75BC-NGHP]. 
 22 See CR Structure & Background, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance. 
org/about/cr-structure-background [https://perma.cc/67R3-TC8Z].  In this Foreword, I will use the 
term “prison abolition” to encompass the claim that various aspects of the criminal punishment system, 
including prisons, jails, detention centers, policing, surveillance, and the death penalty, should be abol-
ished.  Moreover, this Foreword focuses on abolition of carceral punishment, though abolition theory 
extends beyond the criminal punishment system to include other aspects of the carceral state, including 
the foster care and deportation systems.  See infra section I.A, pp. 12–19. 
 23 Overview: Critical Resistance to the Prison-Industrial Complex, 27 SOC. JUST., Fall 2000, at 1, 5. 
 24 Profiles in Abolition, supra note 19, at 1:27. 
 25 Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might Change Your Mind, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (April 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-
ruth-wilson-gilmore.html [https://perma.cc/4GZZ-NFM6] (quoting Michelle Alexander). 
 26 CHARLENE A. CARRUTHERS, UNAPOLOGETIC: A BLACK, QUEER, AND FEMINIST 
MANDATE FOR RADICAL MOVEMENTS, at x (2018). 
 27 Spirituality and Abolition — Call for Submissions, ABOLITION (Aug. 2, 2018), https:// 
abolitionjournal.org/spirituality-and-abolition-call-for-submissions [https://perma.cc/8SS4-8KAT]. 
 28 Critical Resistance: Beyond the Prison Industrial Complex 1998 Conference, supra note 19. 
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furtively present.”29  Moreover, movements that refer to themselves as 
abolitionist are working to dismantle a wide range of systems, institu-
tions, and practices beyond criminal punishment (such as “the wage sys-
tem, animal and earth exploitation, [and] racialized, gendered, and sex-
ualized violence”)30 and forms of oppression beyond white supremacy 
(such as “patriarchy, capitalism, heteronormativity, ableism, colonial-
ism,” imperialism, and militarism).31  While I recognize that all of these 
oppressive systems and the movements for their eradication are inter-
connected,32 this Foreword will focus specifically on the movement to 
abolish the prison industrial complex, conceived of as rooted in chattel 
slavery in the United States, as a starting point to examine the potential 
for a new abolition constitutionalism. 
For purposes of my analysis, I find especially useful three central 
tenets that are common to formulations of abolitionist philosophy.  First, 
today’s carceral punishment system can be traced back to slavery and 
the racial capitalist regime it relied on and sustained.33  Second, the ex-
panding criminal punishment system functions to oppress black people 
and other politically marginalized groups in order to maintain a racial 
capitalist regime.34  Third, we can imagine and build a more humane 
and democratic society that no longer relies on caging people to meet 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition as Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword, in Developments in the 
Law — Prison Abolition, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1578 (2019). 
 30 Manifesto for Abolition, ABOLITION, https://abolitionjournal.org/frontpage  
[https://perma.cc/5P3V-JMHK]; see Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, in  
Developments in the Law — Prison Abolition, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (2019) [hereinafter 
McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy] (“Abolitionist organizers understand their work to be 
related to the historical struggles against slavery and its afterlives, against imperialism and its leg-
acies in more recent practices of racial capitalism, and against immigration enforcement and border 
fortification.”). 
 31 Manifesto for Abolition, supra note 30 (referring to “all revolutionary movements, insofar as 
they have abolitionist elements”); see Rodríguez, supra note 29, at 1578 (placing abolition within a 
“(feminist, queer) Black liberation and (feminist, queer) Indigenous anticolonialism/decolonization” 
tradition); Michael Hames-Garcia, Abolition Is a Goal that I Use to Orient My Thinking and Action: 
Michael Hames-Garcia on Abolition, ABOLITION (June 26, 2015), https://abolitionjournal.org/ 
michael-hames-garcia-abolition-statement [https://perma.cc/66JS-VXHR] (positing that abolition is 
antiracist, antisexist, antihomophobic, and so forth). 
 32 See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS & SIRMA BILGE, INTERSECTIONALITY 55 (2016) (discuss-
ing how “forms of violence within separate systems might in fact be interconnected”); HOW WE 
GET FREE: BLACK FEMINISM AND THE COMBAHEE RIVER COLLECTIVE 4 (Keeanga-
Yamahtta Taylor ed., 2017) [hereinafter HOW WE GET FREE] (describing “oppressions as ‘inter-
locking’ or happening ‘simultaneously,’ thus creating new measures of oppression and inequality”); 
Dorothy Roberts & Sujatha Jesudason, Movement Intersectionality: The Case of Race, Gender,  
Disability, and Genetic Technologies, 10 DU BOIS REV. 313, 318–24 (2013) (exploring the phenom-
enon of “coalitions across movements where political organizations focused on different causes, 
often rooted in differing identity categories, engage in collective action to achieve shared goals,” id. 
at 318); see generally PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (1990). 
 33 See infra section I.B.1, pp. 19–42; see also Rodríguez, supra note 29, at 1580–84. 
 34 See infra section I.B.2, pp. 42–43; see also Rodríguez, supra note 29, at 1584–87. 
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human needs and solve social problems.35  These tenets lead to the con-
clusion that the only way to transform our society from a slavery-based 
one to a free one is to abolish the prison industrial complex. 
To date, there has been no sustained analysis of the relationship be-
tween the prison abolition movement and the U.S. Constitution.  Prison 
abolition activists and scholars rarely seek support for their claims in 
constitutional law.36  Nor have they included an abolitionist interpreta-
tion of the Constitution in their vision of a transformed society without 
prisons.  Some not only have eschewed constitutional law as a means to 
achieve prison abolition but also have argued that constitutional law 
serves to facilitate and legitimate state violence against black and other 
marginalized people.37  This oppositional approach to the Constitution 
is understandable given that so much of the Supreme Court’s constitu-
tional jurisprudence since its inception in the slavery era has been anti-
abolitionist.38  Yet the Constitution was interpreted by past freedom ac-
tivists as an abolitionist document: many antislavery activists viewed 
the Constitution as a foundation for their arguments and for developing 
an alternative reading that called for freedom and democracy.  Even 
after the Civil War, a Radical Republican Congress amended the text 
explicitly to end slavery and extend citizenship to black people based on 
the ideas and advocacy of an abolitionist movement.39  At the same time, 
the Reconstruction Amendments contained compromises that blocked 
their potential for dismantling the racial capitalist structure.40  By 1900, a 
campaign of white supremacist terror, laws, and policies had effectively 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 See infra section I.B.3, pp. 43–48; see also, e.g., Profiles in Abolition, supra note 19. 
 36 Abolitionist theorizing and activism have largely occurred separately from lawyers and the 
legal academy.  Introduction, supra note 17, at 1568–69. 
 37 Joy James, Introduction, Democracy and Captivity, in THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS: 
(NEO)SLAVE NARRATIVES AND CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS, at xxii, xxv–xxx (Joy 
James ed., 2005) [hereinafter James, Democracy and Captivity]; see also Jalil A. Muntaqim, Musings 
on US Judicial Repression, THE ABOLITIONIST, Summer 2008, at 7, https:// 
abolitionistpaper.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/abolitionist-issue-9-summer-2008-english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/783Y-T9JV]; Erica Meiners, Notes Against & Beyond Our Carceral Regime: Erica 
Meiners on Abolition, ABOLITION (Aug. 12, 2015), https://abolitionjournal.org/erica-meiners-on-
abolition [https://perma.cc/8D76-JE74]. 
 38 See infra section II.D, pp. 71–93.  In response to Professor Jack Balkin’s observation that 
“[w]ithin our legal culture the idea of fidelity to the Constitution is seen as pretty much an unques-
tioned good,” J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1703, 1704 (1997), I once argued that “[i]n light of all the indignities showered upon blacks . . . 
under color of the Constitution, I would think the presumption would be that blacks should repu-
diate the document and all the injustice for which it has stood.”  Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning 
of Blacks’ Fidelity to the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1761 (1997) [hereinafter  
Roberts, Blacks’ Fidelity]. 
 39 See infra pp. 62–64.  
 40 See infra pp. 65–67. 
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nullified the Amendments and replaced abolition with Jim Crow as the 
constitutional regime.41 
Engaging the relationship between past abolition constitutionalism 
and the current prison abolition movement raises a number of provoca-
tive questions.  Can legal scholars help to revive the abolitionist values 
in the Reconstruction Constitution to support contemporary abolitionist 
claims?  Can prison abolitionists strategically use an abolitionist reading 
of the Constitution to defend their radical vision and implement steps 
toward achieving it?  Might prison abolitionists craft a new abolition 
constitutionalism that serves as a charter for a society without prisons? 
In this Foreword, I make the case for an abolition constitutionalism 
that attends to the theorizing of prison abolitionists.  Although there are 
many grounds for prison abolition and many venues for abolitionist ad-
vocacy, my purpose here is to examine prison abolitionist theory and 
organizing as it relates to the U.S. Constitution in particular.  There are 
two paths this interrogation might take.  One uses prison abolition the-
ory to evaluate the Constitution’s provisions and the jurisprudence that 
has interpreted them in order to rebuke their failure to abolish slavery-
like systems and install a democratic society.  The other goes further to 
propose a constitutional paradigm that supports prison abolitionists’ 
goals, strategies, and vision.  The first path is resigned to the futility of 
employing U.S. constitutional law to dismantle the prison industrial 
complex and other aspects of the carceral state.  The second path  
finds utility in applying the abolitionist history and logic of the  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 
1863–1877, at 443 (1988) [hereinafter FONER, RECONSTRUCTION] (recounting the violence per-
petrated by the Ku Klux Klan and the ways in which it “raised in its starkest form the question of 
legitimacy that haunted the Reconstruction state”); HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., STONY THE 
ROAD: RECONSTRUCTION, WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF JIM CROW 29–35 (2019) 
(tracing the political, economic, and legal forces that led to dismantling Reconstruction legislation 
and “solidif[ying] Southern states as governed by legal segregation and discrimination,” id. at 35); 
CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 5 (2008) (discussing President Ulysses 
Grant’s struggle to end Klan terror in the 1870s and stating that it “simply underscored the fact 
that Reconstruction, for all its initial promise, had turned into a long, violent slog”); id. at 251 
(claiming that Reconstruction “ended amid bloodshed”); RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL 
OF THE NEGRO: FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES TO WOODROW WILSON 116–17 (1965) (claim-
ing that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases, decided in 1883, 
“virtually assured the subsequent development of Jim Crow laws,” id. at 117); GEORGE  
RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: THE CONSTITUTION, COM-
MON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, at 39 (2013) (arguing that the Reconstruction 
Amendments “were inadequate to prevent the regime of . . . Jim Crow”); RICHARD M. VALELLY, 
THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 115–16 
(2004) (discussing the “white revolution” that spread from Louisiana to Mississippi and South  
Carolina, id. at 115); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 8 (1955) 
(“The new Southern system [under Jim Crow] was regarded as the ‘final settlement,’ the ‘return to 
sanity,’ the ‘permanent system.’”). 
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Reconstruction Amendments to today’s political conditions in the ser-
vice of prison abolition. 
I believe both approaches are worthy of consideration, and consider-
ing both is essential to developing a theoretically and pragmatically useful 
legal framework to advance prison abolition.  Neither is based on a naïve 
faith in U.S. law or the judges who apply it to radically change carceral 
society.  Indeed, it is the realization that white supremacy is deeply woven 
into the fabric of every legal institution in the United States and upheld by 
U.S. constitutional law that made me an abolitionist in the first place.  The 
tension between recognizing the relentless antiblack violence of constitu-
tional doctrine, on one hand, and demanding the legal recognition of black 
people’s freedom and equal citizenship, on the other, animates this  
Foreword as it has long animated abolitionist debates on the U.S.  
Constitution.42  Despite my disgust with the perpetual defense of oppres-
sion in the name of constitutional principles, I am inspired by the possi-
bility of an abolition constitutionalism emerging from the struggle to 
demolish prisons and create a society where they are obsolete. 
This Foreword analyzes the potential for a new abolition constitu-
tionalism as follows.  In Part I, I provide a summary of prison abolition 
theory and highlight its foundational tenets that engage with the insti-
tution of slavery and its eradication.  I discuss how abolition theorists 
view the current prison industrial complex as originating in, though dis-
tinct from, racialized chattel slavery and the racial capitalist regime that 
relied on and sustained it, and their movement as completing the “un-
finished liberation”43 sought by slavery abolitionists in the past.  Part II 
considers whether the U.S. Constitution is an abolitionist document.  I 
interrogate the historic abolition constitutionalism by examining ante-
bellum abolitionists’ readings of the Constitution and their partial in-
corporation into the Reconstruction Amendments, as well as the  
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence obstructing the Amendments’ trans-
formative potential.  I pay close attention to the Supreme Court’s most 
recent decision interpreting the relationship between the Fourteenth 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 See infra section II.B, pp. 54–62.  As a legal scholar who works in academia, I also write this 
Foreword with the constant sense of tension between wanting my scholarship to be useful to aboli-
tion activists and recognizing the tendency of academic enterprises to “filter[] professionalism and 
conformity into activism.”  Joy James, 7 Lessons in 1 Abolitionist Notebook: Joy James on  
Abolition, ABOLITION (June 25, 2015), https://abolitionjournal.org/joy-james-7-lessons-in-1- 
abolitionist-notebook [https://perma.cc/Q6NN-6NXA] [hereinafter James, 7 Lessons]; see HOW WE 
GET FREE, supra note 32, at 13 (“Political analysis outside of political movements and struggles 
becomes abstract, discourse driven, and disconnected from the radicalism that made it powerful in 
the first place.”).  From its inception, the prison abolition movement has included a mix of grassroots 
activists and former prisoners, as well as lawyers and scholars (and some who traverse these iden-
tities).  Abolition is both a practical and intellectual endeavor.  See Critical Resistance, Angela  
Davis, “We Need Intellectuals,” YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2018), https://youtu.be/edqwL0bytVI 
[https://perma.cc/L3ZE-CDQQ].  I approach this Foreword with the aim that my analysis will be 
productive without detracting from the radicalism of prison abolition. 
 43 See Profiles in Abolition, supra note 19, at 1:39. 
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Amendment and carceral punishment — Flowers v. Mississippi — to 
analyze the Justices’ rejection of an abolitionist approach in their ruling. 
Finally, Part III links Parts I and II by exploring the relationship 
between prison abolition and the U.S. Constitution.  I argue that, despite 
the ascendance of proslavery and anti-abolition constitutionalism, we 
should consider the abolitionist history of the Reconstruction  
Amendments as a usable past to help move toward a radical future.  I 
hope to show that the prison abolition movement can reinvigorate abo-
lition constitutionalism.  In turn, today’s activists can deploy the  
Reconstruction Amendments instrumentally to further their aims and, 
in the process, construct a new abolition constitutionalism on the path 
to building a society without prisons. 
I. THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS 
Since the Critical Resistance organizing collective formed in 1997, 
grassroots activists, prisoners and former prisoners, and scholars organ-
izing to end prisons have developed a coherent, though amorphous, set 
of theories, principles, and strategies that guides their abolition move-
ment.  They have articulated these ideas in numerous books,44 articles 
in scholarly journals and mass media,45 conference presentations,46 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 17. 
 45 See, e.g., Dan Berger, Social Movements and Mass Incarceration: What Is to Be Done?, 15 
SOULS 3, 10–16 (2013) (arguing that a new social movement toward decarceration is “on the [r]ise,” 
id. at 10); Kelly Lytle Hernández, Amnesty or Abolition? Felons, Illegals, and the Case for a New 
Abolition Movement, 1 BOOM: J. CAL. 54, 63–66 (2011) (discussing the relationship between mass 
incarceration and constitutional history and the importance of abolitionist critiques); Overview: 
Critical Resistance to the Prison-Industrial Complex, supra note 23, at 2 (highlighting the national 
abolition movement built by Critical Resistance and introducing a special issue of Social Justice 
featuring “system analyses” and “articles centered on organizing for change” with respect to aboli-
tion); Julia Chinyere Oparah (formerly known as Julia Sudbury), Reform or Abolition? Using Pop-
ular Mobilisations to Dismantle the “Prison-Industrial Complex,” 77 CRIM. JUST. MATTERS 17, 
17 (2009) (examining how prison abolitionist grassroots campaigning is “transform[ing] popular un-
derstandings of mass incarceration” and leading to “new political possibilities”); Introduction, supra 
note 17 (discussing scholarship and activism on prison abolition outside the legal community and 
introducing legal scholarship building on this work); Dan Berger, Mariame Kaba & David Stein, 
What Abolitionists Do, JACOBIN (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/prison-
abolition-reform-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/235V-6YEG] (describing the ways in which 
prison abolitionists organize for concrete reforms as part of a broader transformative vision); Ruth 
Wilson Gilmore, The Worrying State of the Anti-Prison Movement, SOC. JUST. (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/the-worrying-state-of-the-anti-prison-movement [https://perma. 
cc/QGV7-Z7JM] (calling attention to “areas of particular concern” for the prison abolition movement 
after an increase in the U.S. prison and jail population). 
 46 See, e.g., Claire Delisle et al., The International Conference on Penal Abolition (ICOPA):  
Exploring Dynamics and Controversies as Observed at ICOPA 15 on Algonquin Territory, 12 ABO-
LITIONISM 1, 3–14 (2015) (presenting areas of contention and proposed initiatives from ICOPA, an 
international conference bringing together prison abolitionists); Harvard Law Review Prison  
Abolition Symposium (Apr. 11–12, 2019) (presenting abolitionist scholars, organizers, and stake-
holders in conversation on the current and future intersections of abolitionist theory and praxis). 
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speeches,47 video interviews,48 and blogs,49 as well as on social media.50  
Their work is too voluminous for me to discuss comprehensively in this 
Foreword.51  In this Part, I will begin by summarizing abolitionist think-
ing about the prison industrial complex and expanding forms of carceral 
statecraft in order to describe the apparatus that abolitionists are seek-
ing to dismantle.  Then I will turn my attention to three central tenets 
of abolitionist philosophy that are especially useful to my analysis of 
abolition constitutionalism.  First, today’s carceral punishment system 
can be traced back to slavery and the racial capitalist regime it relied on 
and sustained.  Second, the expanding criminal punishment system 
functions to oppress black people and other politically marginalized 
groups in order to maintain a racial capitalist regime.  Third, we can 
imagine and build a more humane, free, and democratic society that no 
longer relies on caging people to meet human needs and solve social 
problems. 
A. The Prison Industrial Complex and the Carceral State 
The United States stands out from all nations on Earth for its  
reliance on caging human beings.52  In the last forty years, the U.S. in-
carcerated population exploded from about 500,000 to more than two  
million.53  The U.S. federal and state governments lock up more people 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 See, e.g., Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Conversation with Rachel Kushner at the Lensic Performing 
Arts Center (Apr. 17, 2019), https://lannan.org/events/ruth-wilson-gilmore-with-rachel-kushner 
[https://perma.cc/YPG4-MK42] (discussing Professor Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s work). 
 48 See, e.g., Breaking Down the Prison Industrial Complex Video Project, CRITICAL  
RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/videoproject [https://perma.cc/ZW8Y-E95H] (publishing 
series of videos discussing the prison industrial complex and the abolition movement). 
 49 See, e.g., ABOLITION BLOG, https://abolitionjournal.org [https://perma.cc/CR2T-74XX] 
(publishing a variety of voices reflecting on incarceration and abolition). 
 50 For instance, activist Mariame Kaba had more than 140,000 Twitter followers as of  
October 2019.  Mariame Kaba (@prisonculture), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/prisonculture? 
lang=en [https://perma.cc/N4GG-JZ2V]. 
 51 For a useful compilation of numerous abolitionist sources, see Prison Abolition Syllabus, AFR. 
AM. INTELL. HIST. SOC’Y (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.aaihs.org/prison-abolition-syllabus 
[https://perma.cc/9HSP-Q6BB]. 
 52 See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 4–5 (2015) (describing the United States as “the world’s warden,” id. at 5).  For 
discussions of different aspects of the prison system’s role within the United States, see generally 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR-
BLINDNESS (2010); GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG, supra note 17; ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE 
WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN 
AMEICA (2016); KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES: CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND 
THE RISE OF HUMAN CAGING IN LOS ANGELES, 1771–1965 (2017); NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE 
FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014); CHRISTIAN PARENTI, 
LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS (1999); and ROBERT  
PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S PRISON EMPIRE (2010). 
 53 SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 2 (2019), 
https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5PS4-2AT7] (noting that the United States has “2.2 million people currently in the nation’s 
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and at higher rates than do any other governments in the world, and 
they do so today more than they did at any other period in U.S. history.54  
Most people sentenced to prison in the United States today are from 
politically marginalized groups — poor, black, and brown.55  Not only 
are black people five times as likely to be incarcerated as white people,56 
but also the lifetime probability of incarceration for black boys born in 
2001 is estimated to be thirty-two percent compared to six percent for 
white boys.57  The female incarceration rate has grown twice as quickly 
as the male incarceration rate over the past few decades, and black 
women are twice as likely as white women to be behind bars.58  This 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
prisons and jails”); State Prisons, Local Jails and Federal Prisons, Incarceration Rates and Counts, 
1925–2016, linked within Data Toolbox, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www. 
prisonpolicy.org/data [https://perma.cc/45EK-QWX8] (showing a count of roughly 479,000 incar-
cerated people in 1980).  This change represents a 340% growth.  For comparison, the U.S. popula-
tion increased by only 43% during that same period.  Compare 1980 Decennial Census of Population 
and Housing, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial- 
census/decade.1980.html [https://perma.cc/AXV4-48KM], with Annual Estimates of the Resident 
Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, 
linked within National Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010–2018, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-national-total.html# 
par_textimage_2011805803 [https://perma.cc/M8YP-3Q97].     
 54 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (2014) [hereinaf-
ter THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION] (“The growth in incarceration rates in the United States 
over the past 40 years is historically unprecedented and internationally unique.”); Heather Ann 
Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar His-
tory, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703, 703–04 (2010) (describing the rise of mass incarceration in the United 
States as “something without international parallel or historical precedent,” id. at 703); Drew  
Kann, 5 Facts Behind America’s High Incarceration Rate, CNN (Apr. 21, 2019), https://www. 
cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/mass-incarceration-five-key-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/RBV3-
6A9K] (observing that the United States has the “highest incarceration rate in the world”); Michelle 
Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People Up at a Higher Rate than Any Other Country, WASH. POST 
(July 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks- 
people-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country [https://perma.cc/3JFC-8YTG]; Peter Wagner & 
Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 
2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html [https://perma.cc/WP57-AJWU] (“Compared to 
the rest of the world, every U.S. state relies too heavily on prisons and jails to respond to crime.”). 
 55 See SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 53, at 5; Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, 
https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/5VYN-KZHU]; Bernadette 
Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-Incarceration Incomes of the  
Imprisoned, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 9, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/ 
income.html [https://perma.cc/2J89-V69W].  For discussions of the implications of these trends, see 
generally ALEXANDER, supra note 52; and MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINU-
ING AMERICAN DILEMMA (2011). 
 56 Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, supra note 55. 
 57 Adam Tooze, Quantifying Incarceration, JACOBIN (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www. 
jacobinmag.com/2017/11/mass-incarceration-statistics-united-states [https://perma.cc/K4TM-JCFJ]. 
 58 Aleks Kajstura, Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON  
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018women.html  
[https://perma.cc/RMU8-5ERY]; Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, supra note 55.  On the growth and 
experience of women’s incarceration, see PAULA C. JOHNSON, INNER LIVES: VOICES OF AFRI-
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astounding amount of human confinement should not be seen as an un-
fortunate consequence of crime prevention policies or as an isolated 
blemish on America’s otherwise fair system of criminal justice.59  Rather, 
prisons are part of a larger system of carceral punishment that legitimizes 
state violence against the nation’s most disempowered people to maintain 
a racial capitalist order60 for the benefit of a wealthy white elite.61   
The prison industrial complex emerged in the second half of the 
twentieth century from the merger of social welfare programs and crime 
control policies.62  As Professor Elizabeth Hinton documents in From 
the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, Democrats and Republicans 
in the 1960s and 1970s paired federal assistance to urban neighborhoods 
of color with surveillance, militarized policing, harsh sentencing laws, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
CAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN PRISON (2003) (sharing narratives of currently and formerly incar-
cerated women, as well as criminal justice officials and support networks); VICTORIA LAW, RE-
SISTANCE BEHIND BARS: THE STRUGGLES OF INCARCERATED WOMEN (2009) (exploring expe-
riences of, and resistance by, incarcerated women); ANDREA J. RITCHIE & BETH E. RICHIE, THE 
CRISIS OF CRIMINALIZATION: A CALL FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PHILANTHROPIC RESPONSE 3 
(2017), http://bcrw.barnard.edu/wp-content/nfs/reports/NFS9-Challenging-Criminalization-Funding-
Perspectives.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C8Q-AWLW] (noting that one in two black trans women will be 
incarcerated in their lifetime); CAROLYN SUFRIN, JAILCARE: FINDING THE SAFETY NET FOR 
WOMEN BEHIND BARS (2017) (surveying experiences of incarcerated pregnant women and examin-
ing the conception of jail as a safety net for marginalized mothers); Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster 
Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1478–83, 1493–99 (2012) 
[hereinafter Roberts, Prison, Foster Care]; and Michele Goodwin, Invisible Women: Mass Incarcera-
tion’s Forgotten Casualties, 94 TEX. L. REV. 353, 358 (2015) (reviewing ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN 
(2014) and JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (2015)). 
 59 Cf. Rodríguez, supra note 29, at 1588–90 (describing incarceration as “a method of  
normalized . . . dominance and violence over particular people[]”).  See generally PAUL BUTLER, 
CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017) (describing systemic disparities between the treat-
ment of white men and black men as a result of race-based policing). 
 60 The term “racial capitalism” indicates that capital accumulation and labor expropriation in 
the United States have always relied on a racial hierarchy and the deep inequalities that hierarchy 
produces.  See CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADI-
CAL TRADITION 2 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2000) (1983) (describing how “[t]he development, organi-
zation, and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions . . . [and thus, how] 
racialism . . . inevitably permeate[d] the social structures emergent from capitalism”); Jodi Melamed, 
Racial Capitalism, 12 CRITICAL ETHNIC STUD. 76, 77 (2015) (“Capital can only be capital when 
it is accumulating, and it can only accumulate by producing and moving through relations of severe 
inequality among human groups . . . and racism enshrines the inequalities that capitalism re-
quires.”); Dan Berger, Opinion, Rise in White Prisoners Doesn’t Change Innate Racism of Prisons, 
TRUTHOUT (Apr. 28, 2019), https://truthout.org/articles/rise-in-white-prisoners-shows-prison- 
racism-goes-beyond-disparities [https://perma.cc/K8WG-G5UN] (“Prison is and always will be a 
tool to preserve capitalist inequalities, which are most acutely felt through racism (what a number of 
people call racial capitalism).”); see also Dan Berger, How Prisons Serve Capitalism, PUB. BOOKS (Aug. 
17, 2018), https://www.publicbooks.org/how-prisons-serve-capitalism [https://perma.cc/9NN7-HZM8] 
[hereinafter Berger, How Prisons Serve Capitalism]; Prisons and Class Warfare: Interview with Ruth 
Wilson Gilmore, HIST. MATERIALISM, http://www.historicalmaterialism.org/interviews/prisons-and-
class-warfare [https://perma.cc/9BTJ-VSKP] [hereinafter Prisons and Class Warfare]. 
 61 For studies of that system, see generally DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY, supra note 17; 
GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG, supra note 17; and Rodríguez, supra note 29. 
 62 See HINTON, supra note 52, at 10–11. 
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and prison expansion, based on shared assumptions of innate black 
criminality.63  Thus, “[t]he roots of mass incarceration had been firmly 
established by a bipartisan consensus of national policymakers in the 
two decades prior to Reagan’s War on Drugs in the 1980s.”64  The as-
tronomical expansion of prisons in the last forty years occurred during 
a process of government restructuring that transferred services from the 
welfare state to the private realm of market, family, and individual.  The 
United States set the global trend in cutting social programs while pro-
moting free-market conditions conducive to capital accumulation, re-
sulting in one of the slowest growth rates of spending on basic  
social needs.65  Beginning with “Reaganomics” — the Reagan  
Administration’s economic policy based on tax cuts, business deregula-
tion, and reductions in federal spending — and extending to the Clinton 
Administration’s restructuring of welfare, the United States underwent 
a period of intensified privatization.66  Government policymakers cou-
pled this neoliberal dismantling of the social safety net with intensified 
carceral intervention in poor communities of color.67  The consolidation 
of corporate power in recent decades depended not only on increased 
market-based privatization but also on increased punitive control of 
marginalized people who are excluded from the market economy  
because of racism.68   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 Id. at 3–4, 10–25; see JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISH-
MENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017) (exploring the “acts and attitudes of African American citizens 
and leaders,” id. at 14, with respect to the mass incarceration of black people). 
 64 HINTON, supra note 52, at 11. 
 65 See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 31, 88 (2005); LOÏC 
WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECU-
RITY 11 (Duke Univ. Press 2009) (2004) [hereinafter WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR]; Social 
Expenditure — Aggregated Data, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https:// 
stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG# [https://perma.cc/HWT8-D5XM]. 
 66 See, e.g., HARVEY, supra note 65, at 3 (charting the historical roots of this privatization trend 
and noting that “[d]eregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social 
provision have been all too common” among neoliberal states, including the United States); Angela 
P. Harris, Rotten Social Background and the Temper of the Times, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 131, 
138 (2011); see also GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE’S END (1998) (challenging the period’s wel-
fare reforms as an assault on poor single mothers). 
 67 See HENRY A. GIROUX, THE TERROR OF NEOLIBERALISM 58–80 (2004) (connecting ne-
oliberalism to both privatization and racism); GOTTSCHALK, supra note 52, at 10–14; BRETT 
STORY, PRISON LAND: MAPPING CARCERAL POWER ACROSS NEOLIBERAL AMERICA 12–19 
(2019); WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR, supra note 65, at 151–208 (tracing the expansion of 
the carceral government and its racial element); Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: A Brief 
Genealogy, 14 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 74 (2010); see also ANDREA J. RITCHIE, EPICEN-
TER: CHICAGO: RECLAIMING A CITY FROM NEOLIBERALISM (2019), https://www. 
politicalresearch.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/Epicenter%20Chicago%20-Ritchie%20-BLM-
Chicago%206.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZW2-LA95]. 
 68 See DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 41 (“[P]rison becomes a way of dis-
appearing people in the false hope of disappearing the underlying social problems they represent.”). 
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In sum, beginning in the 1960s, U.S. policymakers have supported 
elites by intensifying carceral measures in order to address the social 
problems and quell the unrest generated by racial capitalism.69  As  
Professor Dan Berger explains: “[C]arceral expansion is a form of polit-
ical as well as economic repression aimed at managing worklessness 
among the Black and Brown (and increasingly white) working class for 
whom global capitalism has limited need.”70  Thus, the relationship be-
tween racial capitalism and carceral punishment extends far beyond ex-
tracting profits from prison labor and private prisons, which does not 
characterize most of the prison industrial complex’s operation.71  Rather, 
prisons are the state’s response to social crises produced by racial capi-
talism, such as unemployment and unhealthy segregated housing, and 
to the rebellions waged by marginalized people who suffer most from 
these conditions.72    
The physical expansion of prisons is facilitated by criminalizing sub-
ordinated people so that caging them seems ordinary and natural.   
Indeed, Critical Resistance co-founder Provost Julia Chinyere Oparah 
identifies as a key “logic of incarceration”73 the “racialization of crime” 
so that crime is associated with dangerous and violent “black, indige-
nous, immigrant, or other minority populations.”74  Longstanding stere-
otypes of black criminality are marshalled to turn everyday black life 
into criminal activities.75  For example, order-maintenance policing re-
lies on an association between the identification of lawless people and 
racist notions of criminality to legitimize routine police harassment and 
arrest of black people.76  Likewise, during the “crack epidemic” of the 
Reagan era, the longstanding devaluation of black motherhood was cru-
cial to converting the “public health problem of drug use during preg-
nancy into a crime, addressed by [arresting and imprisoning] black 
women rather than providing them with needed health care.”77 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 69 Berger, How Prisons Serve Capitalism, supra note 60. 
 70 Id. 
 71 GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG, supra note 17, at 21 (noting that “very few prisoners work for 
anybody while they’re locked up” and, “[a]lthough the absolute number of private prisons has in-
deed grown, the fact is that 95 percent of all prisons and jails are publicly owned and operated”). 
 72 Id. at 26 (“In my view, prisons are partial geographical solutions to political economic crises, or-
ganized by the state, which is itself in crisis.”); Berger, How Prisons Serve Capitalism, supra note 60. 
 73 Julia Chinyere Oparah (formerly known as Julia Sudbury), Transatlantic Visions: Resisting 
the Globalization of Mass Incarceration, 27 SOC. JUST., Fall 2000, at 133, 147. 
 74 Id. at 135. 
 75 See BUTLER, supra note 59, at 21–28; KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNA-
TION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 88–
145 (2010). 
 76 Dorothy E. Roberts, Supreme Court Review, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social 
Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 806–08 (1999) 
[hereinafter Roberts, Race, Vagueness]. 
 77 Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1597, 1599 (2017) [hereinafter Roberts, Democratizing]; see DOROTHY E. ROBERTS,  
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Not only does the prison industrial complex serve as the state’s so-
lution to economic and social problems, but carceral approaches to these 
problems are also ever more common beyond prisons.  I described this 
carceral expansion in a recent issue of this law review: 
All institutions in the United States increasingly address social inequality 
by punishing the communities that are most marginalized by it.  Systems 
that ostensibly exist to serve people’s needs — health care, education, and 
public housing, as well as public assistance and child welfare — have be-
come behavior modification programs that regulate the people who rely on 
them, and these systems resort to a variety of punitive measures to enforce 
compliance.78 
Public welfare programs are increasingly entangled with criminal 
law enforcement.79  People who receive Medicaid or Temporary  
Assistance to Needy Families are subjected to intense surveillance by 
government agents as a condition of obtaining aid — and if they refuse 
aid, they are further subjected to child protective services investiga-
tions.80  Homelessness, public school misbehavior, and health problems 
are all criminalized by calling police officers as the first responders to 
deal with problems that arise in these contexts.81  The prison, foster 
care, and welfare systems operate together to form a cohesive punitive 
apparatus that punishes black mothers in particular.82  At the same time, 
repressive fetal protection laws and abortion restrictions coalesce to 
criminalize pregnancy itself;83 immigration law makes entering the 
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United States without documentation a crime;84 and militarized border 
security results in deportation, family separation, and detention in pris-
ons and squalid concentration camps.85 
As carceral logics take over ever-expanding aspects of our society, so 
does the cruelty that government agents visit on people who are the 
most vulnerable to state surveillance and confinement.  Torture has been 
accepted as a technique of racialized carceral control.86  The nation’s 
public schools, prisons, detention centers, and hospitals serving poor 
people of color are marked not only by stark inequalities but also by 
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tion: The Inside Story, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 16, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2GgLyQ9 
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dehumanizing bodily neglect and abuse committed by police officers and 
guards.87  Further, as Rodríguez explains, “incarceration as a logic and 
method of dominance is not reducible to the particular institutional form 
of jails, prisons, detention centers, and other such brick-and-mortar in-
carcerating facilities.”88  Although prison abolitionists work to end pris-
ons, their ultimate aspiration is to end carceral society — a society that 
is governed by a logic of incarceration. 
B. Abolition Praxis: Past, Present, Future 
Prison abolition theory has past, present, and future aspects, each of 
which animates activism simultaneously.89  Prison abolitionists look 
back to history to trace the roots of today’s carceral state to the racial 
order established by slavery and look forward to imagine a society with-
out carceral punishment.90  Both are critical motivations for abolishing 
the prison industrial complex.  The case for abolition that is grounded 
in history and politics provides a compelling framework for understand-
ing the need to eradicate the entire carceral punishment system as well 
as for identifying strategies to accomplish that goal.  Indeed, we can see 
the extreme cruelty and degradation that characterize today’s peniten-
tiaries, police forces, and executions as the inevitable result of a racially 
subordinating system.91 
1.  Slavery Origins. — Many prison abolitionists have found the roots 
of today’s criminal punishment system in the institution of chattel slav-
ery.92  Even before I thought of myself as a prison abolitionist, my anal-
ysis of current criminal justice issues consistently led me to a discussion 
of slavery.  Whether interrogating racism in the prosecution of black 
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women for pregnancy-related crimes,93 the disproportionately high 
placement of black children in foster care,94 the high rates of incarcera-
tion in black neighborhoods,95 police torture of black suspects,96 or 
gang-loitering policing,97 I found it essential to understand these prac-
tices as originating in the enslavement of black people.  That analysis 
helped me to see how these practices emanated from a carceral system 
that continues to perpetuate black people’s subjugated status and, ulti-
mately, to conclude the carceral system cannot be fixed — it must be 
abolished.98 
The pillars of the U.S. criminal punishment system — police, prisons, 
and capital punishment — all have roots in racialized chattel slavery.99  
After Emancipation, criminal control functioned as a means of legally 
restricting the freedoms of black people and preserving whites’ domi-
nant status.100  Through these institutions, law enforcement continued 
to implement the logic of slavery — which regarded black people as 
inherently enslaveable with no claim to legal rights101 — to keep them 
in their place in the racial capitalist hierarchy.102 
 (a)  Police. — The first police forces in the United States were slave 
patrols.103  Beginning in the early 1700s, southern white men formed 
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armed groups that entered slaveholding properties and roamed public 
roads to ensure that enslaved people did not escape or rebel against their 
enslavers.104  Slave patrols monitored enslaved people to prevent them 
from engaging in forbidden activities such as “harboring weapons or 
fugitives, conducting meetings, or learning to read or write.”105  They 
also used the threat of violence to intimidate enslaved workers into obe-
dience to enslavers.106  Enslaved people who were caught planning  
resistance, running away, or defying the slave codes enacted to restrict 
them were subjected to violent punishments such as beatings, whip-
pings, mutilation, and forced sale away from their families.107  Modern 
police forces are descendants of armed urban patrols like the Charleston 
City Guard and Watch, which was established as early as 1783 to con-
stantly monitor and inspect both enslaved and free black residents to 
“minimize Negro fraternizing and, more especially, to prevent the 
growth of an organized colored community.”108 
Enslaved people who worked on plantations and farms were under 
the “immediate control and discipline of their respective owners,” who 
were often aided by hired overseers.109  The overseers’ job was to en-
force enslaved workers’ total subjugation to enslavers by violently rep-
rimanding perceived disobedience and failures to meet productivity 
quotas.110  The violence overseers inflicted on enslaved workers  
reflected a fundamental aspect of carceral punishment that survives  
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today: the purpose of punishing black people was to reinforce their sub-
jugation to white domination.  Hence, enslaved people were punished 
for committing offenses defined as insubordination to enslavers, but 
were also punished regardless of their culpability for an offense.  The 
celebrated abolitionist Frederick Douglass, who escaped slavery in  
Maryland in 1838,111 emphasizes this point in his portrayal of the over-
seers he encountered while in captivity.  His description of Austin Gore, 
an overseer who served Colonel Edward Lloyd on a plantation where 
Douglass spent two years of his childhood, is especially illuminating.112  
Gore was an ideal overseer because he “was one of those who could 
torture the slightest look, word, or gesture, on the part of the slave, into 
impudence, and would treat it accordingly.”113  Douglass elaborates: 
There must be no answering back to him; no explanation was allowed a 
slave, showing himself to have been wrongfully accused.  Mr. Gore acted 
fully up to the maxim laid down by slaveholders, — “It is better that a 
dozen slaves suffer under the lash, than that the overseer should be con-
victed, in the presence of the slaves, of having been at fault.”  No matter 
how innocent a slave might be — it availed him nothing, when accused by 
Mr. Gore of any misdemeanor.  To be accused was to be convicted, and to 
be convicted was to be punished; the one always following the other with 
immutable certainty.114 
An enslaved man named Demby learned the price of refusing to sub-
mit to Gore’s rule.115  When Demby plunged into a creek to escape being 
beaten, Gore shot him dead with a musket.116  Although slave law oc-
casionally permitted the application of criminal homicide to convict 
slaveholders who killed their slaves, it exonerated those who killed 
slaves who resisted the slaveholders’ lawful authority.117  A “hostile at-
titude” or resistance to corporal punishment on the part of enslaved peo-
ple like Demby provided legal justification for killing them.118 
The status of enslaved Africans as the property of their white enslav-
ers meant that, from the enslavers’ perspective, black people were a per-
petual threat to white people’s property — a threat seen as so great it 
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necessitated employing armed forces to maintain order among the en-
slaved.119  In the aftermath of Emancipation, when slaveholders’ human 
property was no longer protected by slave law, “a new set of innovations 
and regulation[s] had to emerge, again under the rubric of policing.”120  
Like overseers and slave patrols, Jim Crow police and private citizens 
who abetted them used terror primarily to enforce racial subjugation, 
not to apprehend people culpable for crimes.121  Take, for example, co-
ercive interrogation techniques, now known as “the third degree,” that 
have become a staple of modern policing.122  The first stage of lynching, 
typically carried out with the participation or sanction of the police, was 
often “extract[ing] a confession by whipping or burning the accused.”123  
Prior to Miranda v. Arizona,124 which barred the admissibility of pre-
sumptively coerced confessions, southern police routinely used torture 
to force blacks to confess to crimes.125  For example, in Brown v.  
Mississippi,126 three black tenant farmers were convicted for murdering 
a white planter; the sole evidence before the jury consisted of their con-
fessions.127  Those confessions were obtained through police torture, in-
cluding the repeated hanging and whipping of one of the defendants 
until he confessed to a dictated statement.128  The other two defendants’ 
confessions were similarly coerced and tailored.129  When overturning the 
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convictions, the Supreme Court observed that “the signs of the rope on [one 
defendant’s] neck were plainly visible during the so-called trial.”130 
Even after the civil rights movement, “[p]olice torture of suspects 
continues to be a tolerated means of confirming the presumed criminal-
ity of blacks.”131  For example, from the 1970s to the 1990s, white police 
officers in Chicago engaged in systematic torture of black residents.132  
Under the command of Lieutenant Jon Burge, police coerced dozens of 
confessions from suspects by beating them, burning them with radiators 
and cigarettes, putting guns in their mouths, placing plastic bags over 
their heads, and delivering electric shocks to their ears, noses, fingers, 
and genitals.133  Burge’s reign of torture was known and condoned by 
police officers, the State’s Attorney’s office, judges, and doctors at Cook 
County Hospital.134  Racialized terror that bridged slave patrols, lynch-
ings, and police whippings remained a feature of policing in the post–
Civil Rights Era criminal punishment system.135 
Police also serve as an arm of the racial capitalist state by controlling 
black and other marginalized communities through everyday physical 
intimidation and by funneling those they arrest into jails, prisons, and 
detention centers.136  Numerous studies conducted throughout the  
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nation demonstrate that police engage in rampant racial profiling.137  
The increasing militarization of police forces accentuates their role as an 
occupying force in communities of color and on Indian reservations.138  
Police harassment and violence against residents in poor, nonwhite 
neighborhoods is routine.139  Police “brutality” is a misnomer because  
it suggests police violence is exceptional.  Mariame Kaba, the  
founding director of Project NIA,140 explains she “retired the term ‘police  
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[https://perma.cc/K6R9-WUFN] (describing police as “armed protection of state interests . . . [that] 
frequently clash with the communities targeted most aggressively by policing”). 
 137 See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 59, at 52–53, 59–61; Radley Balko, Opinion, There’s Over-
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ers continue to be stopped at far higher rates than white drivers and noting that this disparity has 
actually grown in Ferguson, Missouri, despite recent changes to laws). 
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note 52, at 184 (describing the “War on Crime” as “an actual violent conflict that involved the use 
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access.gpo.gov/gpo57170/248654.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VW3-EXN4])); Dian Million, Policing the 
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 139 See generally BUTLER, supra note 59 (examining police violence against black men); 
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brutality’” because “[i]t is meaningless, as violence is inherent to polic-
ing.”141  Similarly, Professor Micol Seigel calls policing “violence 
work.”142  Police normally treat residents in communities of color in an 
aggressive fashion — shouting commands, handcuffing even children, 
throwing people to the ground, and tasing, beating, and kicking them.143  
For young men of color, the risk of being killed by the police is shock-
ingly high and police use of force is among the leading causes of death.144  
Black women, women of color, and queer women are especially vulner-
able to gendered forms of sexual violence at the hands of police.145  
These violent tactics are not in response to violent crime.  Indeed, police 
officers actually spend a small fraction of time stopping violent  
offenders.146  Most of the time, officers are engaged in patrolling ordi-
nary people who are simply going about their everyday activities, gen-
erating high-volume arrests for petty infractions.147 
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ing cases of alleged police brutality and the millions of dollars the city has paid to settle lawsuits 
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cc/Y283-72TS]; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 113–20 (1983) (Marshall, J., 
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Like the Black Codes and the slave codes before them, order- 
maintenance policies give police wide discretion to control black peo-
ple’s presence on public streets.148  Law enforcement continues to  
enforce the logic of slave patrols, to view black people as a threat to the 
security of propertied whites, and to contain the possibility of black re-
bellion.149  To Professor Fred Moten, police officers killed Michael 
Brown and Eric Garner because these black men represented “insurgent 
black life,” which “constituted a threat to the order that [police] repre-
sent[] and . . . [are] sworn to protect.”150  There are numerous examples 
of state officials dispatching police to silence black protest, including the 
assassination of Black Panther Party leader Fred Hampton by the  
Chicago Police Department and the military-style assault on protesters 
in Ferguson, Missouri, after the killing of Michael Brown.151  The recent 
spate of “BBQ Beckys” — white residents who call 911 on black men, 
women, and children engaged in harmless public activities like barbe-
quing in a park or selling bottled water on a sidewalk152 — spotlights 
the role of police to keep black people in their place for the benefit of 
white citizens.153 
Abolitionists also include state surveillance — another descendant of 
the slave patrol154 — as a major component of carceral punishment.155  
Today’s computerized predictive policing is a high-tech version of vague 
loitering and vagrancy laws, which historically gave “‘license to police 
officers to arrest people purely on the basis of race-based suspicion’ [by] 
categorically identifying black people as lawless apart from their crimi-
nal conduct.”156  I previously described the situation in this law review 
as follows: 
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Law enforcement agencies nationwide collect and store vast amounts of 
data about past crimes, analyze these data using mathematical algorithms 
to predict future criminal activity, and incorporate these forecasts in their 
strategies for policing individuals, groups, and neighborhoods.  Judges use 
big-data predictive analytics to inform their decisions about pretrial deten-
tion, bail, sentencing, and parole.  Automated risk assessments help to de-
termine whether or not defendants go to prison, the type of facility to which 
they are assigned, how long they are incarcerated, and the conditions of 
their release.157   
 Some proponents of artificial intelligence claim these technologies 
help people make more objective decisions that are not tainted by hu-
man biases.158  However, predictive algorithms have been revealed to 
“disproportionately identify African Americans as likely to commit 
crimes in the future.”159  This is because “[c]rime data collection reflects 
discriminatory policing. . . . [P]olice routinely bias data collection against 
black residents by patrolling their neighborhoods with far greater  
intensity than white neighborhoods.”160  Risk assessment models that 
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503, 505–08 (2018); Ric Simmons, Big Data and Procedural Justice: Legitimizing Algorithms in the 
Criminal Justice System, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 573 (2018); Jason Tashea, Calculating Crime, 
103 A.B.A. J. 54, 56–57 (2017); Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Ben Casselman & Dana Goldstein, The 
New Science of Sentencing: Should Prison Sentences Be Based on Crimes That Haven’t Been Com-
mitted Yet?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://www. 
themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing [https://perma.cc/R6PG-GPTU].  
See generally Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977 
(2017) (describing how the Los Angeles Police Department’s access to big data impacts its surveil-
lance practices); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 327, 329–36 (2015) (discussing the Fourth Amendment implications of using big data in 
policing). 
 158 See, e.g., sources cited in Roberts, Digitizing, supra note 78, at 1718. 
 159 Id.; see Kelly Hannah-Moffat & Kelly Struthers Montford, Unpacking Sentencing Algorithms: 
Risk, Racial Accountability and Data Harms, in PREDICTIVE SENTENCING: NORMATIVE AND 
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 175, 187–88 (Jan W. de Keijser et al. eds., 2019); Malkia Amala Cyril, 
Black America’s State of Surveillance, THE PROGRESSIVE (Mar. 30, 2015), https:// 
progressive.org/magazine/black-america-s-state-surveillance-cyril [https://perma.cc/37CT-N3YH]; 
Karen Hao, AI Is Sending People to Jail — And Getting It Wrong, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 21, 
2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612775/algorithms-criminal-justice-ai [https://perma.cc/ 
3G9H-LMZ2]. 
 160 Roberts, Digitizing, supra note 78, at 1719; see RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOL-
OGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE 82–84 (2019); Nick Pinto, NYPD Disputes 
Gang Database Numbers — But Its Math Doesn’t Add Up, THE INTERCEPT (June 14,  
2018, 2:51 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/14/nypd-gang-database-city-council-dermot-shea 
[https://perma.cc/5TFH-JA9S]; see also CLARE GARVIE ET AL., CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. AT 
GEORGETOWN LAW, THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNI-
TION IN AMERICA 53–57 (2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/sites/default/files/2016-12/ 
The%20Perpetual%20Line-Up%20-%20Center%20on%20Privacy%20and%20Technology%20 
at%20Georgetown%20Law%20-%20121616.pdf [https://perma.cc/976X-2YYM]. 
2019] THE SUPREME COURT — FOREWORD 29 
import institutionally biased data become a “self-fulfilling feedback 
loop” where the prediction ensures future detection.161  The rise of com-
puterized risk assessments in the carceral punishment system reinforces 
the detachment of punishment from culpability and furthers the crimi-
nalization of whole communities.  Computerized predictions identify 
people for government agencies to regulate from the moment of birth, 
without any regard to their actual responsibility for causing social harm: 
police gang databases have included toddlers.162  Thus, the state uses 
artificial intelligence and predictive technologies to reproduce existing 
inequalities while creating new modes of carceral control and foreclosing 
imagination of a more democratic future.163 
 (b)  Prisons. — During the slavery era, prison populations were com-
posed almost exclusively of white people.164  When slavery was abol-
ished, the demographics of prisons shifted dramatically.165  Southern law 
enforcement began to charge formerly enslaved African Americans with 
crimes and incarcerate them in growing numbers.166  Imprisonment and 
the convict leasing system maintained black people’s status as a disen-
franchised and involuntary labor force for whites.167  In its 1871 decision 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 161 Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing, supra note 157, at 516; see also CATHY O’NEIL, 
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 27 (2016); William S. Isaac, Hope, Hype, and Fear: The 
Promise and Potential Pitfalls of Artificial Intelligence in Criminal Justice, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 543, 550–51 (2018) (describing a study finding a “dramatic increase in the predicted odds of 
targeting” areas already believed by law enforcement to be “high in crime,” id. at 550). 
 162 Beware of Gangster Babies: Calif. Database Slammed, CBS NEWS (Aug. 15, 2016, 9:31 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/calgang-california-gang-database-slammed-listing-babies-privacy-
concerns [https://perma.cc/XT9L-9EVP]; see also HINTON, supra note 52, at 218–49 (describing 
federal juvenile delinquency policies during the 1970s that regulated black children based on pre-
dictions that they would commit future crimes). 
 163 See BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 160; CAPTIVATING TECHNOL-
OGY, supra note 103; Roberts, Digitizing, supra note 78, at 1699, 1712–13.  See generally MAYA 
SCHENWAR & VICTORIA LAW, PRISON BY ANY OTHER NAME: THE HARMFUL CONSE-
QUENCES OF POPULAR REFORMS (forthcoming July 2020) (discussing data-driven and electronic 
forms of state control and surveillance that are characterized as progressive alternatives). 
 164 Roberts, Constructing, supra note 98, at 268. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISE-
MENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 57 (2006) (“In Alabama, for example, nonwhites made up 
just 2 percent of the prison population in 1850, but 74 percent by 1870.”); see also Angela Behrens 
et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Dis-
enfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 560 (2003) (drawing con-
nections between race, criminal punishment, and felon disenfranchisement laws in U.S. history). 
 167 See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT 
OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 5–6 (2009) (offering a history 
of convict leasing and “the centrality of its role in the web of restrictions put in place to suppress 
black citizenship”); id. at 9 (“By 1900, the South’s judicial system had been wholly reconfigured to 
make one of its primary purposes the coercion of African Americans to comply with the social 
customs and labor demands of whites.”); SARAH HALEY, NO MERCY HERE: GENDER, PUNISH-
MENT, AND THE MAKING OF JIM CROW MODERNITY 58–118 (2016) (comparing the experience 
of black females in the southern prison-labor system to the experience of slavery); TALITHA L. 
LEFLOURIA, CHAINED IN SILENCE: BLACK WOMEN AND CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW 
30 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 133:1 
Ruffin v. Commonwealth,168 the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals af-
firmed the similar status of slave and prisoner when it ruled that an 
incarcerated convict was “for the time being the slave of the State.  He 
is civiliter mortuus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like 
that of a dead man.”169  Likewise, black people convicted of petty  
offenses were “sold as punishment for crime” at public auctions as if 
they were still enslaved.170 
A key assertion of prison abolition theory is that criminalization of 
black people following Emancipation served to maintain the racial cap-
italist system that had been built on slavery.171  In an interview pub-
lished in 2005, Professor Angela Y. Davis explained her ideas on the link 
between slavery and prison abolition:  
Now I am trying to think about the ways that the prison reproduces forms 
of racism based on the traces of slavery that can still be discovered within 
the contemporary criminal justice system.  There is, I believe, a clear rela-
tionship between the rise of the prison-industrial-complex in the era of 
global capitalism and the persistence of structures in the punishment system 
that originated with slavery.172   
In other words, the criminalization and imprisonment of black people 
following the Civil War are a critical link in the historical chain that ties 
the prison industrial complex to slavery. 
Criminal punishment was a chief way the southern states nullified 
the Reconstruction Amendments, reinstated the white power regime, 
and made free blacks vulnerable to labor exploitation and disenfran-
chisement.  Following the formal abolition of slavery, southern states 
targeted black men, women, and children for imprisonment by passing 
criminal laws known as Black Codes, modeled after the slave codes, 
which prohibited their freedom of movement, contract, and family 
life.173  Between 1865 and 1866, legislatures “enacted harsh vagrancy 
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laws, apprenticeship laws, criminal penalties for breach of contract, and 
extreme punishments for blacks, all in an effort to control black la-
bor.”174  Black people who were out of work or simply present in public 
without adequate reason were routinely arrested for vagrancy, giving 
white officials license to jail them.175  Blacks were also arrested and 
given long sentences for petty offenses that whites engaged in without 
consequence.  Writing in 1893, journalist and activist Ida B. Wells gave 
the example of twelve black men who were imprisoned in South  
Carolina “on no other finding but a misdemeanor commonly atoned for 
by a fine of a few dollars, and which thousands of the state’s inhabitants 
[white] are constantly committing with impunity — the carrying of con-
cealed weapons.”176 
As the Court’s Timbs v. Indiana177 decision last Term discussed, 
Black Codes also employed economic sanctions to consign blacks to a 
form of debt slavery that coerced them into onerous involuntary labor.178  
In the decades after Reconstruction, fines kept many formerly enslaved 
people in forced servitude to white landowners.179  Activist Mary 
Church Terrell warned in 1907 that the peonage system kept black peo-
ple perpetually enslaved.  “[T]here are scores, hundreds perhaps, of col-
oured men in the South to-day who are vainly trying to repay fines and 
sentences imposed upon them five, six, or even ten years ago,” she 
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wrote.180  By compelling emancipated blacks to work for whites in pay-
ment of debts on threat of incarceration, the law substituted the uncon-
stitutional system of chattel slavery with a legal system of peonage.181 
Also adjoined to these forms of legally enforced servitude was the 
practice of systematically forcing black prisoners to toil on chain gangs 
and leasing black convicts as labor to planters and companies.  By mak-
ing free black people criminals, white authorities could compel them to 
work against their will in a system that not only constituted “slavery by 
another name,”182 but also was so violent that it was “worse than slav-
ery.”183  Between 1865 and 1880, every former Confederate state except 
Virginia established a system of leasing large numbers of black prisoners 
to railroads, coal mines, and other industries that were rebuilding infra-
structures devastated by the Civil War.184  Private lessees had complete 
custody and control of prisoners and were motivated to maximize their 
profits by extracting as much labor as possible with little incentive to 
preserve prisoners’ welfare or lives.185  The result was rampant punish-
ment, torture, and killing of prisoners with complete impunity.186 
State exploitation of prison labor reinforced a gendered and sexual-
ized form of white domination of black women.187  Black women were 
not protected by Victorian norms of femininity, which shielded most 
white women from the degradation of carceral violence and forced  
labor.188  To the contrary, black women were far more likely than white 
women to be arrested for violating racialized gender standards by  
engaging in behavior deemed to be masculine, like public quarreling.189  
The wildly disparate treatment of white women and black women ar-
rested for similar crimes is mind-boggling: for example, “[b]etween 1908 
and 1938, only four white women were ever sentenced to the chain gang 
in Georgia, compared with almost two thousand Black women.”190 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 180 Brief for Petitioners at 29, Timbs, 139 S. Ct. 682 (No. 17-1091) (quoting Mary Church Terrell, 
Peonage in the United States: The Convict Lease System and the Chain Gangs, 62 NINETEENTH 
CENTURY & AFTER 306, 313 (1907)). 
 181 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 981 (2002). 
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Recent investigations by Professors Sarah Haley and Talitha 
LeFlouria provide critical documentation of the previously unacknowl-
edged extent of black women’s involvement in convict leasing, chain 
gangs, and forced domestic labor, dramatically expanding our under-
standing of antiblack violence and carceral control during the Jim Crow 
era.191  Haley frames the common practice of chain-gang overseers 
whipping black female convict laborers as “sexualized gender- and race- 
specific rituals of violence mark[ing] the convict camp as a pornographic 
site” and producing a spectacle of gendered racial terror.192  Newspapers 
also routinely vilified black women accused of crimes.193  Black women 
resisted in multiple ways, including as organized club women, blues lyr-
icists, and incarcerated petitioners and saboteurs.194  Violence against 
enslaved and incarcerated black women was essential to preserving the 
racial capitalist state.195  This state, in turn, constructed an ideology of 
black female depravity and deviance,196 which undergirds black 
women’s higher rates of incarceration to this day.197 
I have emphasized how during the slavery and Jim Crow eras, state 
agents meted out punishment to black people without regard to their 
guilt or innocence.  Criminalizing black people entailed both defining 
crimes so as to make black people’s harmless, everyday activities legally 
punishable and punishing black people regardless of their culpability for 
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crimes.  Thus, for more than a century, vague vagrancy and antiloitering 
ordinances have given police officers license to arrest black people for 
standing in public streets — with no attention to whether or not their 
presence caused any harm to anyone.198  The purpose of carceral pun-
ishment was to maintain a racial capitalist order rather than to redress 
social harms — not to give black people what they deserved, but to keep 
them in their place.  Today, the state still aims to control populations 
rather than judge individual guilt or innocence, to “manage social  
inequalities” rather than remedy them.199  A large body of social science 
literature explains criminal punishment as a form of social control of 
marginalized people.200  Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann, for example, 
argues that New York City criminal courts that handle misdemeanors 
“have largely abandoned the adjudicative model of criminal law admin-
istration — concerned with deciding guilt and punishment in specific 
cases” — and instead follow a “managerial model — concerned with 
managing people through engagement with the criminal justice system 
over time.”201  By marking people for involvement in “misdemeanor-
land,” forcing them to engage in burdensome procedural hassles, and 
requiring them to engage in disciplinary activities,202 this gargantuan 
branch of the criminal punishment system exerts social control over the 
city’s black communities, with no real regard for residents’ culpability 
for crime. 
The explosion in imprisonment of African Americans at the end of 
the twentieth century represents the continuation of trends that origi-
nated even before the century’s start.  In describing the rise of convict 
leasing, W.E.B. Du Bois notes a fundamental feature of post-slavery 
carceral punishment: the disconnect between the rise of prisons and 
crime rates.  “The whole criminal system came to be used as a method 
of keeping Negroes at work and intimidating them,” Du Bois writes in 
Black Reconstruction.203  “Consequently there began to be a demand of 
jails and penitentiaries beyond the natural demand due to the rise in 
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crime.”204  In a complement to Du Bois’s observations about the eco-
nomic motivations for incarcerating black people, Professor Alex  
Lichtenstein argues that social and political forces also produce higher 
incarceration rates: 
Stable incarceration rates appear in periods of white racial hegemony and 
a stable racial order, such as that secured by slavery in the first half of the 
19th century or Jim Crow during the first half of the 20th.  Correspondingly, 
sudden rises in incarceration, especially of minorities, tend to appear one 
generation after this racial hegemony has been cracked, as in the first and 
second Reconstructions of emancipation and civil rights.205   
Thus, the skyrocketing prison population in the second half of the twen-
tieth century cannot be explained solely as a response to increases in 
crime.206  Prison expansion instead reflects a response to the needs of 
rising neoliberal racial capitalism that addresses growing socioeconomic 
inequality with punitive measures.207 
The disconnect between social harm and carceral punishment  
is evident not only in state regulation of marginalized people  
but also in the immunity granted to state agents who commit  
social harms.208  For reasons both legal and political, police,209  
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prosecutors,210 and corporate executives211 generally avoid criminal lia-
bility even for inflicting serious harm.  As I have explored previously, 
“[c]urrent legal doctrine condones police violence and makes individual 
acts of abuse — even homicides — appear isolated, aberrational, and 
acceptable rather than part of a systematic pattern of official vio-
lence.”212  Prosecutors who have used unconstitutional methods for ob-
taining wrongful convictions have not been criminally prosecuted them-
selves.213  Few corporate executives have been charged with crimes for 
actions that caused billions of dollars in losses during the financial crisis 
of 2008.214  Moreover, government officials responsible for devastating 
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environmental harms, such as lead-poisoned water in Flint, Michigan, 
typically escape criminal prosecution.215  In sum, criminal law treats 
prisons as essential to prevent or redress crimes committed by econom-
ically and racially marginalized people but unnecessary to address even 
greater social harms inflicted by the wealthy and powerful. 
The criminal punishment system extends its subordinating impact 
beyond prison walls by imposing collateral penalties that deny critical 
rights and resources to formerly incarcerated people.216  Felon disen-
franchisement laws, for example, restrict incarcerated people’s ability to 
vote during their sentences and after they are released,217 and  
significantly dilute black political power.218  The stigma of conviction, 
imposition of fines and fees, and exclusion from public benefits inflict a 
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nearly insurmountable burden on people caught in the carceral web.219  
The association between slavery and prison makes these deprivations 
seem natural — despite the injustice of punishing people beyond the 
sentence they served and in a way that bears no relation to the crimes 
they committed.  Just as it seemed unremarkable that enslaved people 
could not vote because they were not citizens, so today many people 
think: “Of course prisoners aren’t supposed to vote.  They aren’t really 
citizens any more.”220  Thus, the inherent denial of citizenship rights to 
enslaved people is mirrored in the unquestioned denial of those rights to 
incarcerated people. 
(c)  Death Penalty. — Capital punishment, like police and prisons, 
has its roots in slavery and the preservation of white supremacy.221  State 
executions have persisted in the United States because they function 
similarly to the extreme punishments inflicted on enslaved people and 
the state-sanctioned lynchings that replaced these punishments after 
Emancipation.222  As Davis points out, “the institution of slavery served 
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as a receptacle for those forms of punishment considered to be too un-
civilized to be inflicted on white citizens within a democratic society.”223  
Historically, race-based criminal codes imposed the death penalty on 
enslaved individuals for many more offenses than they did for whites.224  
Blacks were “commonly hanged” for “rape, slave revolt, attempted mur-
der, burglary, and arson.”225  Moreover, condemned slaves were sub-
jected to extra cruelty through what Professor Stuart Banner calls  
“super-capital punishment” — burning them alive at the stake.226  Exe-
cutions were also made especially degrading by displaying slaves’ sev-
ered heads on poles in front of the courthouse, or allowing their corpses 
to decompose in public view.227 
After Emancipation, white southerners began ritualistically kidnap-
ping and killing black people to publicly reinforce white supremacy.228  
In 1893, Ida B. Wells observed that “the Convict Lease System and 
Lynch Law are twin infamies which flourish hand in hand in many of 
the United States.”229  Public torture proclaimed white dominion over 
black people, repudiated blacks’ citizenship status,230 and “literally re-
instat[ed] black bodies as the property of whites that could be chopped 
to pieces for their entertainment.”231  Many lynchings were of black men 
accused of breaching racialized sexual boundaries by raping or disre-
specting white women.232  However, the majority of terroristic murders 
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people’s property.233  As Frederick Douglass observed in 1893, display-
ing insolence was sufficient excuse for lethal victimization: 
 The crime of insolence for which the Negro was formerly killed and for 
which his killing was justified, is as easily pleaded in excuse now, as it was 
in the old time and what is worse, it is sufficient to make the charge of 
insolence to provoke the knife or bullet.  This done, it is only necessary to 
say in the newspapers, that this dead Negro was impudent and about to 
raise an insurrection and kill all the white people, or that a white woman 
was insulted by a Negro, to lull the conscience of the north into indifference 
and reconcile its people to such murder.  No proof of guilt is required.  It is 
enough to accuse, to condemn and punish the accused with death.234 
Here, Douglass links his childhood observations of overseers’ pun-
ishment of enslaved blacks to the lynchings of emancipated blacks oc-
curring after the Civil War.  The same logic of slavery that called for 
punishment of black insubordination to enforce white supremacy, re-
gardless of culpability for a crime, was revived in lynching and persists 
in the modern prison industrial complex. 
The hundreds of “public torture lynchings” that were a feature of 
southern society until almost 1940235 call into question the dominant 
narrative that as civilizations have evolved, punishments have become 
more humane.236  Instead, southern whites sent a message through me-
dieval forms of punishment: 
[A]rchaic forms of execution involving torture, burning, and mutilation . . . 
show[ed] that “regular justice” was “too dignified” for black offenders.  The 
public torture of blacks accused of offending the racial order demonstrated 
whites’ unlimited power and blacks’ utter worthlessness.  This nation’s 
rights, liberties, and justice were meant for white people only; blacks meant 
nothing before the law.237 
Lynchings were the terrorist counterpart to state-supported debt peon-
age, convict leasing, disenfranchisement, and segregation laws that kept 
blacks subject to white domination.238  Lynching black people was not 
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an exception to the law; it was part of the administration of justice and 
the larger system of legally sanctioned racial control.239 
In the mid-twentieth century, the practice of lynching black people 
was replaced by the practice of subjecting them to the death penalty.240  
These legally sanctioned hangings, which deliberately resembled lynch-
ings of the past,241 purported to punish black men for raping white 
women.242   New methods of execution were also implemented: in the 
1950s in Mississippi, crowds of white onlookers gathered at southern 
courthouses to witness the electrocutions of black men in portable elec-
tric chairs that traveled from town to town.243  After one such killing in 
Mississippi in 1951, the crowd on the lawn outside the courthouse “burst 
into cheers, then crushed forward in an effort to glimpse the corpse as 
it was removed from the building.”244  There was a smooth transition 
from lynching to state execution because “[a] culture that carried out so 
much public unofficial capital punishment could hardly grow squeamish 
about the official variety.”245 
Capital punishment continues to function as it did in the slavery and 
Jim Crow eras to reinforce the subordinated status of black people.246  
Today, states primarily use lethal injection in an attempt to make capital 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 239 Roberts, Constructing, supra note 98, at 274. 
 240 See Bright, supra note 221, at 677–78; Jeffrey Toobin, The Legacy of Lynching, On Death 
Row, NEW YORKER (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/22/bryan- 
stevenson-and-the-legacy-of-lynching [https://perma.cc/78TT-9ABE]; Death Penalty, SOUTHERN 
CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., https://www.schr.org/our-work/death-penalty [https://perma.cc/L7W7-
SR85] (“The death penalty is a direct descendant of lynching and other forms of racial violence and 
racial oppression in the American South.”); Lena Glickman, State Sanctioned Murder: The Death 
Penalty and the Struggle for Racial Justice, NAT’L COALITION TO ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY 
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.ncadp.org/blog/entry/state-sanctioned-murder-the-death-penalty-and-
the-struggle-for-racial-justi [https://perma.cc/R4ZU-JDBS] (“The modern death penalty is rooted in 
slavery and lynching.”). 
 241 See IFILL, supra note 222, at 30; Bright, supra note 221, at 677–78. 
 242 See Banner, supra note 222, at 106. 
 243 See PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK 
AMERICA 403 (2002). 
 244 Id.; see also Banner, supra note 222, at 101–07 (describing public “[e]xecution [c]eremonies,” 
id. at 101); Liliana Segura, The Stepchild of Lynching, THE INTERCEPT (June 17, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/06/17/lynching-museum-alabama-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/ 
UAJ7-ESSH] (“In 1905, the first legal execution for ‘criminal assault’ in North Carolina’s Sampson 
County was attended by 25 people, who had bought tickets for the occasion.”). 
 245 Banner, supra note 222, at 107. 
 246 See Bryan Stevenson, Close to Death: Reflections on Race and Capital Punishment in  
America, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT? THE EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR BEST CASE 76, 76–93 (Hugo Adam  
Bedau & Paul G. Cassell eds., 2004) (discussing past and present discrimination in capital punish-
ment’s administration and concluding that “[t]he tolerance of racial bias in the modern death pen-
alty era . . . represents a serious threat to anti-discrimination reforms and equal justice in America,” 
id. at 92). 
42 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 133:1 
punishment “more palatable,”247 on the logic that this method bears less 
resemblance to lynching than electrocution or hanging.248  The fact that 
lethal injection carries its own risks of inflicting pain249 has not under-
mined its constitutional status: last Term, in Bucklew v.  
Precythe,250 a divided Court was unmoved by evidence that Missouri’s 
lethal injection protocol would inflict cruel and unusual punishment on 
a prisoner, reasoning that “the Eighth Amendment does not guaran-
tee . . . a painless death.”251  Although Bucklew was white, the Court’s 
decision upheld lethal state violence that is disproportionately imposed 
on black men accused of killing white people.252  Like the torture rituals 
of lynching, the death penalty survives in modern America as an unciv-
ilized form of punishment because it continues to represent white dom-
ination over black people.  
2.  Not a Malfunction. — A first step to demonstrating the political 
illegitimacy of today’s carceral punishment system is finding its origins 
in the institution of slavery.  A second step is understanding that prisons, 
police, and the death penalty function to subordinate black people and 
maintain a racial capitalist regime.  Efforts to fix the criminal punish-
ment system to make it fairer or more inclusive are inadequate or even 
harmful because the system’s repressive outcomes don’t result from any 
systemic malfunction.253  Rather, the prison industrial complex works 
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effectively to contain and control black communities as a result of its 
structural design.  Therefore, reforms that correct problems perceived 
as aberrational flaws in the system only help to legitimize and strengthen 
its operation.  Indeed, reforming prisons results in more prisons.254 
3.  A Society Without Prisons. — An essential component of prison 
abolitionist theory is the principle that eliminating current carceral prac-
tices must occur alongside creating a radically different society that has 
no need for them.255  Prison abolitionists frequently define their work as 
consisting of two simultaneous activities, one destructive and the other 
creative.  “It’s the complete and utter dismantling of prisons, policing, 
and surveillance as they currently exist within our culture,” Kaba ex-
plains.256  “And it’s also the building up of new ways of . . . relating with 
each other.”257  This duality is essential to abolition both because prisons 
will only cease to exist when social, economic, and political conditions 
eliminate the need for them and because installing radical democracy is 
crucial to preventing another white backlash and reincarnation of  
slavery-like institutions in response to the abolition of current ones.258 
Moreover, the success of nonpunitive approaches developed by abo-
litionists for addressing human needs and social problems can be a com-
pelling reason to abandon current dehumanizing and ineffective  
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practices.259  Above all, it is their vision of a world without prisons that 
gives abolitionists their lodestar.  Abolitionists are working toward a 
society where prisons are inconceivable — a world where its inhabitants 
“would laugh off the outrageous idea of putting people into cages, think-
ing such actions as morally perverse and fatally counterproductive.”260  
Because the current carceral system is rooted in the logic of slavery, 
abolitionists must look to a radically different logic of human relations 
to guide their activism.261  That guiding philosophy cannot be invented 
theoretically, but must emerge from the practice of collectively building 
communities that have no need for prisons. 
Citing Du Bois’s critique of the post-Emancipation period in Black 
Reconstruction, Davis attributes the rise of prisons to the failure to in-
stitute a revolutionary “abolition democracy” that incorporated freed  
African Americans into the social order.262  Slavery could not be truly 
and comprehensively abolished without economic redistribution, equal 
educational access, and voting rights.  In Davis’s words, “DuBois . . . 
argues that a host of democratic institutions are needed to fully achieve 
abolition — thus abolition democracy.”263  Understanding that prisons 
are not primarily designed to protect people from crime, but rather to 
address human needs and social problems with punitive measures, 
opens the possibility that we can eradicate prisons by addressing these 
needs and problems in radically different ways.264 
Abolitionists, therefore, are both developing nonpunitive measures 
to deal with harm and creating new conditions to prevent harm from 
occurring in the first place, recognizing both as better approaches to 
ensuring safety and security than relying on police and prisons.   
Abolitionists address the root causes of harm by investing in  
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people’s basic needs and addressing the causes of interpersonal vio-
lence.265  For example, anticarceral feminists have begun to think 
through what prison abolition entails with respect to ending domestic 
violence.266  The multiple ways in which black women are subjected to 
punitive state control has sparked the need for a remedy to domestic 
violence that does not depend on police and prisons.  Black anticarceral 
feminists analyze and address domestic violence in light of correspond-
ing inequitable social structures; they understand intimate violence as 
inextricably connected to state violence.267  This logic recognizes not 
only that the United States incarcerates black people as a response to 
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social problems, but also that law enforcement has arrested, injured, or 
killed black victims of domestic violence who seek help from the state.268 
Rejecting the carceral paradigm, black feminist abolitionists have 
proposed community-based transformative justice responses269 that ad-
dress the social causes of violence and hold people accountable without 
exposing them to police violence and state incarceration.270  Mariame 
Kaba, for example, works on “creating new structures that will take the 
place of the current institutions that [abolitionists] want to completely 
abolish and eradicate” in part by building new solutions to private vio-
lence that “will allow people to feel safe . . . on the road towards the 
end,” which, for Kaba, “is an abolitionist end.”271  The black feminist 
strategy for addressing domestic violence and youth violence suggests 
that prison abolition can be achieved without sacrificing security from 
violence. 
Many abolition theorists, including Davis and Professor Ruth  
Wilson Gilmore, argue that creating a society without carceral ap-
proaches to addressing human needs requires radically overhauling the 
U.S. capitalist economy and replacing it with a socialist or communist 
system.272  Enslaved African labor not only fueled the U.S. capitalist 
economy, but racial slavery also created an especially brutal form of 
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capitalism.273  The U.S. capitalist system, which is governed by profit 
and market competition, has been integral to racial subordination since 
the slavery era and is antithetical to guaranteeing everyone the income, 
housing, healthcare, and education required for a society without the 
stark inequalities in well-being that fuel the prison industrial  
complex.274  Some abolitionists are implementing local social-change 
projects, based on principles of mutual aid rather than competition and 
profit, to foreshadow and move toward a society that has no need to 
cage people.275  The Black Panther Party’s social programs, including a 
free breakfast program for elementary school children, free health  
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clinics, and an educational Intercommunal Youth Institute, provide an-
other model for successful community-based services aimed at enhanc-
ing people’s well-being, not increasing corporate profits.276 
C. The Unfinished Abolition Struggle 
As prison abolitionists describe their objective as dismantling sys-
tems rooted in slavery, they often frame their work as a continuation of 
the struggle waged by black freedom fighters and abolitionists during 
the slavery era.277  In the program for its 1998 national conference, the 
Critical Resistance Organizing Committee posed the question animating 
the emerging prison abolition movement: “How can we imagine an abo-
litionism for the prison industrial complex in the way that 19th century 
activists imagined the abolition of the slave economy?”278  To be clear, 
antebellum slavery abolitionists were not prison abolitionists.  Rather, 
prison abolitionists today see continuities between the chattel slavery 
system and the prison system, as well as between the historic and cur-
rent abolition movements.  While human freedom required slavery abo-
lition then, today it requires the abolition of the prison industrial com-
plex that has replaced slavery as the bulwark of racial capitalism.  “In 
the nineteenth century, antislavery activists insisted that as long as slav-
ery continued, the future of democracy was bleak indeed,” writes  
Davis.279  “In the twenty-first century, antiprison activists insist that a 
fundamental requirement for the revitalization of democracy is the long-
overdue abolition of the prison system.”280  Prison abolitionists find in-
spiration from the likes of Sojourner Truth, Denmark Vesey, Nat Turner, 
John Brown, and Harriet Tubman, for whom “[e]nding slavery appeared 
to be an impossible challenge . . . , and yet they struggled for it any-
way.”281  Today’s prison abolitionists are the heirs to a freedom move-
ment that antislavery abolitionists began. 
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References to completing the unfinished struggles of past abolition 
movements are common in current abolitionist discourse.282  Prison abo-
litionists attribute this unfinished status to the violent evisceration of 
Reconstruction by white terrorists and its replacement with a Jim Crow 
regime that denied black people their newly won rights and preserved 
the racial capitalist power structure.283  Professor Joel Olson highlights 
three elements of the antislavery abolitionist struggle that are particu-
larly relevant to the current movement: “[the] model of the political actor 
as agitator, [the] emphasis on freedom, and [the] willingness to follow 
the radical implications of their demands.”284  For modern-day aboli-
tionists, the radical implication of taking up the longstanding demand 
for freedom is the complete eradication of the prison industrial complex. 
The centrality to prison abolition theory of the unfinished struggle 
to end slavery raises the question of the significance of the abolition 
constitutionalism that helped to guide the antebellum struggle.  If the 
U.S. Constitution was a key battleground for slavery abolitionists, 
should prison abolitionists continue to wage the freedom struggle on that 
same terrain?  If today’s prison abolitionists are the heirs to an antislav-
ery movement that forged a radically different reading of the  
Constitution, might they pursue a similarly transformative abolition 
constitutionalism for the current carceral era?  To answer these  
questions, it is helpful to interrogate the role of antebellum slavery abo-
litionists in conceiving and drafting the Reconstruction Amendments af-
ter the Civil War.  I turn now to the history of the Reconstruction  
Amendments as both a radical and a failed rewriting of the  
Constitution’s protection of slavery and the racial capitalist order. 
II. ABOLITION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
A review of the scholarly literature and popular narratives about the 
Reconstruction Amendments makes clear that there is no coherent un-
derstanding of their original aims or meaning.  Deep disputes among 
antebellum abolitionists over the original Constitution’s stance on slav-
ery presage the differences among contemporary abolitionists on the 
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meaning and utility of constitutional law.  After the Reconstruction 
Amendments were enacted, legal historians largely neglected the role 
that abolitionists played in the constitutional transformation.285  It is 
safe to say that the views of the white supremacists who gutted the  
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments have gained greater prominence 
than have the views of the slavery abolitionists who inspired the constitu-
tional amendments and of the Radical Republicans who drafted them.286 
The abolitionist soul of the Reconstruction Amendments is experi-
encing a renaissance, however.  Some constitutional scholars have re-
cently argued that the antislavery origins of the Reconstruction  
Amendments have been obscured by a revisionist historiography that 
downplays the influence and importance of the abolitionist constitution-
alism that preceded the Amendments’ passage.287  Antislavery activists 
not only chose to fight on constitutional ground, but, in the process, also 
crafted an alternative reading of the Constitution that proved highly 
influential for a period of time.288  Moreover, the fact that the  
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Constitution remains open to these varying interpretations highlights 
the potential for prison abolitionists to reclaim an abolition constitution-
alism — or construct a new one — that facilitates rather than impedes 
the completion of the freedom struggle begun by their predecessors.289 
A. The Settler-Colonial and Slavery Constitution 
The constitutional government of the United States was founded on 
the colonization of Native tribes and the enslavement of Africans.290  It 
enshrined the power and freedom of a white male elite, along with the 
ability of this elite class to restrict the power and freedom of everyone 
else.  The Constitution was built on a foundation of laws, passed in the 
colonies in the 1600s, that constructed a political hierarchy that divided 
people into racial categories with differing claims to power and privi-
lege.  For example, in 1662, the Virginia Colony imposed double pun-
ishment on Christians who “committ[ed] ffornication [sic] with a negro 
man or woman”; the statute also assigned to children born to black 
women and “got by any Englishmen” the status of their mothers — 
thereby making them enslaveable.291  Racial laws gave propertyless 
white men special entitlements over black and Native people.292  As I 
put it elsewhere, “[c]olonial landowners inherited slavery as an ancient 
practice, but they invented race as a modern system of power.”293 
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The framers made the exclusion of Africans and Native tribes from 
the democracy they established foundational to the Constitution.294  
Many of the nation’s founders were enslavers themselves.295  As white 
property holders, they had a vested interest in preserving the fledgling 
capitalist economy fueled by captive labor and racist ideology.  The orig-
inal Constitution contained no provision that ended the slave trade, no 
provision that freed enslaved Africans or prevented future enslavement, 
and no provision that protected black people from all manner of degra-
dation on account of their race.296  Although the word “slavery” appeared 
nowhere in the Constitution, several provisions explicitly enforced the in-
stitution.297  As journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones summarizes:  
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The Constitution protected the “property” of those who enslaved black peo-
ple, prohibited the federal government from intervening to end the impor-
tation of enslaved Africans for a term of 20 years, allowed Congress to mo-
bilize the militia to put down insurrections by the enslaved and forced states 
that had outlawed slavery to turn over enslaved people who had run away 
seeking refuge.298   
In short, slavery was constitutional. 
State and federal courts, including the Supreme Court, consistently 
ratified the slavery regime by interpreting key constitutional provisions 
and statutes in favor of slaveholders.299  “At no point prior to the Civil 
War did the Supreme Court significantly limit slavery or even raise se-
rious questions about its constitutionality,” writes Professor Erwin  
Chemerinsky.300  The Court’s most controversial proslavery decision, 
Dred Scott v. Sandford,301 ruled against a black man, Dred Scott, who 
had lived on free soil in Illinois and what was then the territory of  
Wisconsin and sued for his freedom in Missouri.302  Rather than point 
to fundamental principles of equality or engage in careful textual exege-
sis, the Court pointed to the nation’s coherent system of antiblack dis-
crimination and conducted a cursory examination of the Constitution to 
establish that no black person was a citizen of the United States.303  In 
his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Taney noted that, at the time the 
Constitution was drafted, “the civilized portion of the white race” uni-
versally regarded black people as “so far inferior, that they had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might 
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.”304  The Dred 
Scott decision enshrined the distinguishing feature of American racial 
slavery that categorically excluded black people from democracy: the 
belief that “black people were not merely enslaved but were a slave 
race.”305  Thus, America’s original constitutionalism was staunchly co-
lonial, white supremacist, and proslavery. 
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B. The Radical History of the Reconstruction Amendments 
A renewed interest among constitutional scholars in the abolitionist 
origins of the Reconstruction Amendments has generated important in-
sights on antebellum abolitionists’ thinking and activism regarding the 
Constitution.  Recent research has illuminated an alternative public 
meaning of the Constitution residing in “largely forgotten books, pam-
phlets, articles, resolutions, and legal briefs,” rather than on the pages of 
Supreme Court decisions.306   
The nineteenth-century movement to abolish slavery prominently in-
cluded engaging with the U.S. Constitution.  Antislavery theorizing and 
activism were essential both to developing a reading of the existing con-
stitutional text that rendered human bondage incompatible with funda-
mental constitutional principles of liberty, equality, and democracy, and 
to amending the text when those principles alone failed to end the slav-
ery system.307  The abolition struggle profoundly shaped not only the 
specific language of the Reconstruction Amendments but also the very 
meaning of those constitutional principles.308  In opposition to the pre-
vailing constitutional philosophy that upheld slavery, antislavery activ-
ists forged a radically divergent abolition constitutionalism.309  Aboli-
tionists fought for the amended Constitution to embody their radical 
constitutional vision and to install a “second founding” of the nation 
built on equal citizenship and freedom of labor.310 
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From the 1830s to the 1850s, abolitionists engaged in an intense — 
at times, acrimonious — debate over the Constitution’s stance on slav-
ery.311  On one side stood the Garrisonians, whose namesake, William 
Lloyd Garrison, called the Constitution a “covenant with death and an 
agreement with hell” because it permitted slavery.312  On the other were 
antislavery constitutionalists like Representative John Bingham,  
Lysander Spooner, and Theodore Dwight Weld, who read the  
Constitution instead as prohibiting or constraining the expansion of 
bondage.313   
Abolitionists asserted a number of grounds for their claim that the 
Constitution was an antislavery document.  First, they distinguished be-
tween the democratic principles stated in its text that repudiated the 
existence of slavery and the proslavery intent of its framers and proslav-
ery interpretations of slaveholders and judges.314  As Professor Randy 
Barnett explains, several leading abolitionists argued that the  
Constitution’s inclusive language, including that of “We the People,” 
trumped the exclusionary meanings promulgated to deny freedom to 
black people.315  In his celebrated analysis of the Constitution, The  
Unconstitutionality of Slavery, published in 1845, Spooner elaborated 
that citizenship rights should extend to black people based on the origi-
nal public meaning of the text rather than the intentions of its fram-
ers.316  Proceedings of the Convention of Radical Political Abolitionists, 
a pamphlet published to commemorate the proceedings of an 1855 abo-
litionist convention, similarly urged readers “to construe the Constitu-
tion as it reads, and not as the slaveholders pretend that it means.”317 
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Second, abolitionists argued that specific constitutional provisions 
made slavery illegal and black people citizens.  Some abolitionists ar-
gued that, regardless of the Constitution’s original provisions, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment took precedence and prohibited 
slavery.318  In an 1859 speech, Bingham, who later served as a member 
of the Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction in the Thirty-Ninth  
Congress,319 described “the rights protected by the Fifth Amendment as 
‘natural or inherent rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all 
conventional regulations.’”320  Bingham emphasized that because the 
text referred to “no person,” it “makes no distinction either on account 
of complexion or birth — it secures these rights to all persons within its 
exclusive jurisdiction.  This is equality.”321  That constitutional equality 
guarantee, Bingham noted, was not limited by “the interpolation into it 
of any word of caste, such as white, or black, male or female.”322 
Weld, a full-time antislavery activist married to abolitionist and 
women’s rights advocate Angelina Grimké, also relied on due process 
concepts to oppose slavery.323  He contested judicial protection of slave-
holders’ due process rights by observing that “[a]ll the slaves in the  
District have been ‘deprived of liberty’ by legislative acts.”324  Weld ar-
gued that if those legislative acts did not constitute due process of law, 
“then the slaves were deprived of liberty unconstitutionally, and these 
acts are void.  In that case the constitution emancipates them.”325 
Another alternative reading of the Constitution extended the concept 
of birthright citizenship to African Americans, setting the stage for the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit provision.  In her popular treatise, An 
Appeal in Favor of that Class of Americans Called Africans, published 
in 1833, feminist abolitionist Lydia Maria Child made the novel claim 
that black people were “compatriots, not foreigners.”326  Soon thereafter, 
the 1838 treatise Rights of Colored Men to Suffrage, Citizenship and 
Trial by Jury, by William Yates, became an influential authority on the 
legal status of free black people that defended their citizenship rights 
and argued against their expulsion from the United States.327 
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Even more neglected in constitutional history than these white  
abolitionists are black Americans who theorized and defended claims to 
equal citizenship.  Although the fiery orator and prominent antislavery 
activist Frederick Douglass, to whom I will turn next, remains well 
known, other African Americans whose legal arguments contributed to 
antebellum abolitionist constitutionalism have received far less atten-
tion.328  In Birthright Citizens: A History of Race and Rights in  
Antebellum America, Professor Martha Jones recounts how free black 
people living in Baltimore before the Civil War fought against the threat 
of deportation by making legal arguments in newspapers, legislatures, 
and courts that birth in the United States established their citizenship 
and guaranteed their rights.329  Black Baltimoreans also advanced this 
claim by conducting themselves like rights-bearing citizens when they 
litigated disputes over property, credit, and family autonomy in court.330 
Free African Americans’ legal challenges to exploitative contracts 
with white people before the Civil War are especially instructive.  In the 
antebellum period, black residents of Baltimore brought insolvency peti-
tions, petitions for writs of habeas corpus, petitions for debt relief, and 
challenges to apprenticeship contracts with unscrupulous whites.331  
They also sometimes served as court-appointed trustees and even testi-
fied against white parties, at a time when state law prohibited such testi-
mony.332  For example, a laborer named Charles Snell petitioned for a 
writ of habeas corpus at the Circuit Court of Baltimore City to challenge 
the indenture of his seven-year-old daughter Mary to the mother of  
police officer James Maddox.333  According to 1860 census records, Mary 
eventually returned to Snell’s custody.334   
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Thus, antebellum abolitionist activists, lawyers, and ordinary black 
people asserted a robust reading of the Constitution’s text that demon-
strated the unconstitutionality of slavery.  Through their legal scholar-
ship, public propaganda, and court claims, slavery opponents  
constructed an abolition constitutionalism based on free labor and equal 
citizenship that contradicted the dominant jurisprudence favoring  
slaveholders. 
An astounding aspect of this constitutional story is that many black 
abolitionists grounded their radical approach to citizenship and freedom 
in the U.S. Constitution itself, a text that had been written and inter-
preted to enslave them.  For instance, as a formerly enslaved person, 
Frederick Douglass envisioned an abolitionist constitution even before 
slavery was abolished.  I want to spotlight Douglass’s approach to the 
Constitution because it illuminates the tension inherent in an abolition 
constitutionalism that recognizes the animosity of constitutional law to-
ward black people while demanding constitutional recognition of black 
people’s citizenship and humanity. 
Douglass struggled mightily with whether the Constitution was a 
proslavery or antislavery document.335  Douglass saw the Constitution’s 
“radical defect” as an internal contradiction that put the document “at 
war with itself”: “Liberty and Slavery — opposite as heaven and hell — 
are both in the Constitution,” he wrote in April 1850.336  Douglass ini-
tially advocated for the Garrisonian rejection of the Constitution as a 
slaveholding document.  In 1849, he wrote: 
[T]he original intent and meaning of the Constitution (the one given to it 
by the men who framed it, those who adopted [it], and the one given to it 
by the Supreme Court of the United States) makes it a pro-slavery instru-
ment . . . [that] I cannot bring myself to vote under, or swear to support.337 
During a debate in support of this position, Douglass condemned the 
framers’ “attempt[] to unite Liberty in holy wedlock with the dead body 
of Slavery, [through which] the whole was tainted.  Let this unholy, un-
righteous union be dissolved.”338 
By mid-1851, Douglass parted with the Garrisonians and declared 
that he planned to promote the antislavery interpretation of the  
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Constitution.339  In his autobiography, Douglass describes his conversion 
to the antislavery side after years of careful consideration and abolition-
ist activism including publishing his paper, lecturing against slavery, and 
concealing fugitive slaves: 
By such a course of thought and reading I was conducted to the conclusion 
that the Constitution of the United States — inaugurated to “form a more 
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the 
common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of 
liberty” — could not well have been designed at the same time to maintain 
and perpetuate a system of rapine and murder like slavery, especially as not 
one word can be found in the Constitution to authorize such a belief.340 
Douglass applied the well-accepted method of interpreting a docu-
ment’s parts in light of the whole: “[I]f the declared purposes of an in-
strument are to govern the meaning of all its parts and details, as they 
clearly should,” he argued, “the Constitution of our country is our war-
rant for the abolition of slavery in every state of the Union.”341 Thus, 
Douglass read the Constitution as an abolitionist document at a time 
when no judge in the nation questioned slavery’s constitutionality.  To 
be clear, Douglass did not adopt the reigning constitutional meaning or 
an originalist interpretation based on the framers’ intent.342  Rather, he 
helped to construct a new abolition constitutionalism that radically de-
parted from what prevailed.343 
Douglass didn’t renounce the proslavery interpretation out of igno-
rance of its origins or its use to uphold slavery.  After all, this was the 
same activist who in 1852 delivered “the rhetorical masterpiece of  
American abolitionism”344 in Rochester’s Corinthian Hall, asking: 
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“What, to the American slave, is your 4th of July?”345  His answer was 
to damn “the hypocrisy of the nation”:  
To him, your celebration is a sham; . . . your national greatness, swelling 
vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are empty and heartless; . . . your shouts of 
liberty and equality, hollow mockery; . . . a thin veil to cover up crimes 
which would disgrace a nation of savages.346   
Recognizing black people’s forced exclusion from the Declaration’s 
promises, he told more than five hundred abolitionists in attendance, 
“This Fourth of July is yours, not mine.”347 
Rather, Douglass adopted the antislavery view because he refused to 
concede constitutional authority to slaveholders.348  He explained: “I am 
sick and tired of arguing on the slaveholders’ side of this ques-
tion, . . . although they are doubtless right so far as the intentions of the 
framers of the Constitution.”349  It was out of his political vision for an 
abolition constitutionalism, grounded in a mixture of natural law and 
constitutional principles that opposed slavery, that Douglass relin-
quished the proslavery reading of the Constitution.350  In addition, 
Douglass argued for the constitutional necessity of abolition because the 
“Slave Power” increasingly threatened to engulf even white people’s lib-
erties.  The Slave Power, a political term coined by abolitionists in the 
1830s and widely used in the 1850s, “referred not only to Southern 
whites who owned slaves but to constitutional provisions and political 
practices that gave them disproportionate power in the federal govern-
ment.”351  In 1854, Douglass warned white Americans that “[s]lavery 
aim[ed] at absolute sway” over the nation’s future.352  “It would drive 
out the school-master, and install the slave-driver, burn the school-
house, and erect the whipping-post, prohibit the Holy Bible and  
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establish the bloody slave code, dishonor free labor with its hope of re-
ward, and establish slave labor with its dread of the lash.”353  To 
Douglass, then, basic constitutional principles were antagonistic to the 
existence of slavery, and the existence of slavery was antagonistic to the 
survival of constitutional democracy. 
The hope Douglass found in the Constitution was also anchored in 
his awareness of the political work it would take to realize its antislavery 
values.  Douglass warned against the foolish belief that principles by 
themselves would change power arrangements.  “The whole history of 
the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her 
august claims, have been born of earnest struggle,” Douglass declared in 
a speech in Canandaigua, New York, on August 3, 1857.354  “If there is 
no struggle there is no progress.”355  Douglass urged violent resistance 
to the Fugitive Slave Act, telling abolitionists they “ought to say to 
Slaveholders that they are in danger of bodily harm if they come here, 
and attempt to carry men off into bondage”356 and predicting that “two 
or three dead slaveholders will make this law a dead letter.”357  Douglass 
saw the 1861 outbreak of the Civil War — what he later called the “abo-
lition war”358 — as ultimately deciding “which of the two, Freedom or 
Slavery, shall give law to this republic.”359  Thus, Douglass at once 
reimagined the Constitution’s principles as opposed to slavery, de-
nounced the nation’s abysmal failure to abide by them, and recognized 
the physical and political battle it would take to abolish slavery in  
practice. 
Douglass ultimately may have put too much faith in the amended 
Constitution’s ability to guarantee black people’s freedom once slavery 
ended.  In her 1998 essay From the Prison of Slavery to the Slavery of 
Prison: Frederick Douglass and the Convict Lease System, Davis faults 
Douglass for centering his post-Emancipation advocacy on the right to 
vote rather than on opposing convict leasing’s evisceration of blacks’ 
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nascent political power.360  Still, Douglass’s evolving engagement with 
both constitutional philosophy and radical political activism offers  
important insights on the potential for the revival of abolition constitu-
tionalism in the present era. 
C. The Reconstruction Constitution 
In 1865, Congress enacted the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude, except as 
punishment for crime, throughout the United States.361  Slavery’s defeat 
was met immediately by a terrorist effort to return newly freed blacks 
to servitude and reinstate white rule.  President Abraham Lincoln’s re-
placement, President Andrew Johnson, a white-supremacist former 
slaveholder, rejected Radical Republicans’ vision for Reconstruction 
and supported the rights of southern states.362  President Johnson  
subscribed to the view that enslaved people had conspired with their 
enslavers to oppress non-slaveholding whites, and he cast black people’s 
political advancement in opposition to the common white man’s 
rights.363  President Johnson quickly began pardoning ex-Confederates 
and returning confiscated and abandoned land to slaveholders.364   
Instead of getting title to the land they occupied, as they deserved both 
as reparations and as reward, freed black people were forced into wage 
servitude for the white landowners.365  “How many black men and 
women were beaten, flogged, mutilated, and murdered in the first years 
of emancipation will never be known,” writes Professor Leon Litwack 
in Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery.366  After  
sabotaging the process, President Johnson declared Reconstruction com-
plete when Congress returned from recess in December 1865.367   
President Johnson also attempted to sabotage the Freedmen’s Bureau, 
an agency of the War Department established by Congress in March 
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1865 to provide education, aid, land, and protection to newly freed 
blacks and white refugees.368  Although Congress overrode his veto of 
an 1866 bill extending the Bureau’s work for two years,369 the Bureau’s 
efforts to distribute land to southern blacks were thwarted by white  
terroristic thefts of black people’s property and President Johnson’s res-
toration of property to whites.370 
The Radical Republicans responded to the crisis by passing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 over President Johnson’s veto and enacting the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 to extend to the formerly enslaved, as 
well as to any person born in the United States, the guarantee of  
citizenship.371  The language of the Fourteenth Amendment can be 
traced to specific speeches and writings of leading antislavery advocates 
who developed an abolition constitutionalism in the preceding dec-
ades.372  Most of these theorists were also intensely engaged in political 
activism and had been key players in the Liberty Party, which eventu-
ally became the Republican Party.373  Radical Republican leaders, like 
Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson in the Senate and James Ashley and  
Thaddeus Stevens in the House, urged incorporating their vision of slav-
ery eradication and free labor in the rewritten Constitution’s text.374 
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64 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 133:1 
The abolitionist Constitution was forged, as well, by ordinary black 
folks who abandoned plantations, served in the Union Army, and  
demanded recognition of their equal citizenship.375  After 1867, four mil-
lion formerly enslaved people grabbed the opportunity Emancipation 
afforded them to create their own economic, social, and political lives 
independent of white domination.376  They gathered their family  
members,377 established farms and businesses, and ran for public  
office.378  Black Americans elected to southern legislatures helped to in-
stall egalitarian state constitutions, enact civil rights legislation, and  
establish public education.379  Jones argues that, in the period surround-
ing the Civil War, the rights of African Americans were substantiated 
not only by Congress’s enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but also by “a view of rights as secured 
through their performance.”380  “Free African Americans became rights 
holders when they managed to exercise those privileges that rights hold-
ers exercised.  And often they did so in ways that local authorities were 
bound to respect and enforce,” Jones explains — “[t]hey traveled be-
tween the states, they gathered in religious assemblies, they sued and 
were sued, testified, and secured their persons and property before the 
law.”381  Thus, by resisting white domination and acting like citizens, 
black people have secured greater freedom apart from official recogni-
tion of their rights, thereby changing the Constitution’s meaning to en-
compass their freedom. 
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The Reconstruction Constitution, however, was limited in numerous 
crucial ways.  Although Radical Republicans like Ashley, Stevens, 
Sumner, and Wilson pushed to incorporate the abolition constitutional-
ism advanced by antislavery activists, they were forced to compromise 
their ideals and accept more moderate versions of the Amendments in 
order to achieve enough votes for enactment.382  For example, Sumner 
introduced a Thirteenth Amendment that prohibited slavery without 
exception, providing that “[e]verywhere within the limits of the United 
States, and of each State or Territory thereof, all persons are equal before 
the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave.”383  As I will 
discuss in more detail below, however, the exception for punishment of 
people convicted of crimes, which was contained in the enacted text, 
supported new forms of racial subjugation and labor exploitation that 
obliterated the Amendment’s abolitionist ideals. 
Stevens reluctantly voted for the watered-down text of the  
Fourteenth Amendment, passionately expressing his deep disappoint-
ment in its final wording, which departed dramatically from his aboli-
tionist vision: 
 In my youth, in my manhood, in my old age, I had fondly dreamed 
that . . . no distinction would be tolerated in this purified Republic but what 
arose from merit and conduct.  This bright dream has vanished “like the 
baseless fabric of a vision.”  I find that we shall be obliged to be content 
with patching up the worst portions of the ancient edifice, and leaving it, 
in many of its parts, to be swept through by the tempests, the frosts, and 
the storms of despotism.384 
Stevens explained that he acquiesced in the agenda of his moderate col-
leagues because, living “among men and not among angels,” he had 
failed to persuade them.385  “Mutual concession, therefore, is our only 
resort, or mutual hostilities.”386  Senator James Grimes concurred: “It  
is not exactly what any of us wanted; but we were each compelled to  
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surrender some of our individual preferences in order to secure  
anything . . . .”387 
Although the Thirteenth Amendment ended the Constitution’s pro-
tection of chattel slavery, it “did not resolve the issue of the newly freed 
slaves’ political status.”388  The text itself, both in its guarantee of state 
protection and in its grant of political power, fell short of providing the 
necessary provisions to secure the rights of black people against political 
terror.389  Nor did it ban specific means of black disempowerment, such 
as voter-qualification tests, convict leasing, and peonage.390   
Further, while the Reconstruction Amendments changed the racial 
definition of citizenship that Chief Justice Taney relied on in denying all 
black people — whether enslaved or free — equal status with white 
people, they failed to accord black citizens equal political power.391  In 
the racial order, black people remained members of a separate and infe-
rior race.  White abolitionists themselves had differing views about the 
implications of slavery’s end and black people’s citizenship.392  Even the 
celebrated Stevens assured his fellow congressmen that equality in civil 
rights “does not mean that a negro shall sit on the same seat or eat at 
the same table with a white man.”393 
No weakness in the Reconstruction Amendments is reviled more by 
prison abolitionists than the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception for 
“punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly  
convicted.”394  This clause is commonly interpreted to mean that a crim-
inal conviction deprives individuals of protection against slavery and 
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involuntary servitude.395  Many prison abolitionists believe the crime 
exception was deliberately added to permit the reenslavement of black 
people by convicting them of crimes.396  As discussed in Part I, begin-
ning with prison chain gangs and convict leasing, the Punishment 
Clause facilitated the expansion of prisons as a form of state subordina-
tion of black people and forced exploitation of black labor.397 
Interpreting the Punishment Clause as negating slavery’s abolition, 
however, neglects the explicit opposition by the Amendment’s  
Republican drafters to such an “absurd construction,”398 which would 
allow southern states to reenslave African Americans “‘[u]nder the  
pretense’ of the Punishment Clause.”399  In a compelling analysis of  
congressional debates surrounding the Amendment, legal historian  
Professor James Gray Pope demonstrates that Republican members of 
Congress vehemently opposed convict leasing and forced labor as a mis-
use of the Punishment Clause and thus a violation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment — with words that sound strikingly similar to those of 
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prison abolitionists today.400  Representative Burton C. Cook of Illinois, 
for example, decried the passage of vagrancy laws “which, under the 
pretense of selling these men as vagrants, are calculated and intended 
to reduce them to slavery again.”401 
Pope argues that Republicans’ conception of the Thirteenth  
Amendment as a “regime shift in constitutional law,” which not only 
abolished slavery but also eliminated practices that denied “practical 
freedom” and instituted a free labor ethos, meant that they “read the 
Amendment’s prohibitory clause broadly and its exception narrowly.”402  
The consensus among historians that the Thirteenth Amendment ap-
proved convict leasing, based on the dominant post-Reconstruction 
reading,403 contradicts the views expressed by its framers and denies  
the abolition constitutionalism that animated the Amendment’s  
enactment.404 
The debate over the Thirteenth Amendment leaves unanswered the 
question of why its drafters included the Punishment Clause at all.   
Professor Scott Howe, a criminal law scholar, argues that the  
Republican congressmen were well aware of the plain meaning of the 
text as an authorization to enslave people convicted of crimes and abuse 
them in the same way enslaved people were abused prior to the Civil 
War.405  Howe points out that there was little discussion of the  
Punishment Clause language during the debate even after Sumner  
vehemently objected to its inclusion and explicitly noted that “there is 
an implication from those words that men may be enslaved as a punish-
ment of crimes whereof they shall have been duly convicted.”406  To 
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Howe, Congress’s silence regarding Sumner’s objection and the adop-
tion of the clause with the objectionable language meant “there was 
clarity that it allowed slavery.”407 
In debates surrounding the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
however, the Republican congressmen directly stated their aim to pro-
tect emancipated blacks from white supremacist violence and labor  
exploitation.408  Moreover, the congressional Republicans explicitly op-
posed convict leasing and took action to stop it by passing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, providing that black citizens would be subject to the 
same “punishment, pains, and penalties” as white citizens.409 
Thus, both the abolition constitutionalism that inspired the  
Thirteenth Amendment and the words and actions of its radical framers 
suggest we should read the Punishment Clause quite narrowly.410   
Antislavery activists and Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress ve-
hemently objected to interpreting the clause as a license for convict leas-
ing.411  The historical evidence suggests they left in the Punishment 
Clause to permit continuation of the custom of sentencing people con-
victed of crimes to hard labor and did not anticipate criminal  
punishment would become a mechanism of reenslavement.412  Moreo-
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ver, interpreting the clause today as license to convert slavery into im-
prisonment violates the aim of nineteenth-century abolitionists to free 
enslaved people.  Abolition constitutionalism does not permit a reading 
of the Thirteenth Amendment that facilitates the very enslavement the 
Amendment aimed to abolish.  Nevertheless, abolitionists’ efforts were 
quashed by white supremacist terror that wiped out emancipated 
blacks’ economic and political foothold, leaving them at the mercy of 
the emerging carceral regime.413  Although it was not intended to pro-
vide for convict leasing, the Thirteenth Amendment provided insuffi-
cient protection to black citizens from being exploited, tortured, and 
killed in the system of bondage that replaced chattel slavery. 
Antislavery rebellion, resistance, and activism succeeded in forcing 
radical changes to the Constitution.  Influenced heavily by the abolition 
movement and its constitutionalism, Congress passed amendments that 
ended chattel slavery and extended citizenship to freed blacks.  Yet  
activists like Frederick Douglass failed to achieve the ideals of freedom 
and democracy envisioned by the abolition constitutionalism they forged 
in antislavery struggle.  Does this mean abolition constitutionalism is 
futile?  It is important to remember that Douglass’s reading of the  
Constitution did not depend on its framers’ intent or the dominant pub-
lic or judicial interpretation of its text.  Abolition constitutionalism was 
not defeated by the Thirteenth Amendment’s Punishment Clause, how-
ever Congress intended its meaning, or by white supremacist terror.   
Instead, the antislavery movement used abolition constitutionalism as a 
tool to press its claims and a guide to envision the free and democratic 
society it struggled for the nation to become. 
Antislavery activists’ abolition constitutionalism suggests a useful 
methodology for interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments today.  
First, this interpretative methodology embraces the Reconstruction 
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Amendments’ constitutional imperatives to end enslaving systems, pro-
vide equal protection against state and private violence, and install full 
citizenship.414  The antebellum abolitionists’ aim was to eradicate com-
pletely the institution of racial slavery, which made black people the 
property of others who had the legal power to control their lives and 
exploit their labor.  Second, an abolitionist methodology identifies sys-
temic oppression by evaluating modern institutions’ antecedents in slav-
ery and other freedom-denying systems, as well as their current repres-
sive impact.  Third, it seeks to effect the structural changes required to 
achieve the Amendments’ freedom and democracy aims.  Abolishing 
slavery meant guaranteeing everyone’s human right to freedom — to be 
free from domination by state or private masters, to be able to control 
one’s own life and labor.  Abolishing slavery also required equal protec-
tion from private or state violence that threatened to force people into 
subjugated statuses.  Finally, abolishing slavery required granting to for-
merly enslaved people the full ability to participate as citizens in the 
nation’s reconstructed democracy.  With this methodology in mind, I 
turn to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. 
D. The Court’s Anti-Abolition Jurisprudence 
Every advance toward black liberation since the Civil War ended 
has been met with formidable political and judicial backlash.415  Critical 
race scholar Professor Derrick Bell observed that the Reconstruction 
Era’s constitutional compromise with respect to black people’s freedom 
reverberates through contemporary adjudications of civil rights viola-
tions “in which the measure of relief is determined less by the character 
of harm suffered by blacks than the degree of disadvantage the relief 
sought will impose on whites.”416  Bell’s writings, which within legal 
scholarship are some of the most piercing critiques of constitutional hy-
pocrisy, became increasingly pessimistic about the chances for racial jus-
tice in America.417  He pointed to white citizens’ persistent refusal to 
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abdicate their racial domination at the sacrifice of black people’s 
rights.418  Despite decades devoted to civil rights protest and litigation 
based on constitutional guarantees, the majority of black Americans saw 
their economic and political conditions worsen as the Court reinforced 
institutionalized forms of subordination.419  In the end, Bell proposed 
that we approach the Constitution with “Racial Realism,” based on the 
realization that “Black people will never gain full equality in this  
country.”420 
How can we reconcile Bell’s sobering assessment of constitutional 
law as inevitably denying freedom to black people with an abolition 
constitutionalism that envisions their future freedom?  Some guidance 
might be found in the thinking of an earlier abolitionist.  Similarly to 
Bell, Frederick Douglass acknowledged the proslavery intent of both the 
white framers who drafted the Constitution and the white judges who 
interpreted it.421  Douglass was also aware of white southerners’ iron-
clad resolve to preserve the Slave Power and believed it would take 
armed struggle to overcome it.422  At the same time, Douglass refused 
to be bound by an understanding of the Constitution that supported 
slavery.423  He recognized that court-made doctrines that maintained 
white supremacy were not constitutionally mandated and could be  
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2019] THE SUPREME COURT — FOREWORD 73 
overturned by a counter-constitutionalism that affirmed freedom and  
democracy.424 
Racial Realism counsels against any faith in the moral power of the 
Constitution alone to dismantle the prison industrial complex.425  Yet 
this conclusion need not preclude activists from imagining an alternative 
constitutionalism as part of a movement to abolish prisons.  It is the 
commitment to building a radically different society, one that has elim-
inated carceral systems and the racial capitalist order they support, that 
makes an abolition constitutionalism realistic.  This mash-up of Racial 
Realism and abolitionist vision, along with its interpretative methodol-
ogy, forms a framework for evaluating the Court’s anti-abolition  
jurisprudence. 
1.  Constitutional Counterrevolution. — After the Civil War, the U.S. 
Supreme Court took the side of the anti-abolitionists.426  In doing so, it 
contributed to a “constitutional counterrevolution”427 that robbed  
African Americans of their nascent political gains, reinstalled white su-
premacist rule, and reinforced the racial capitalist structure of labor ex-
ploitation.428  The Court adopted the reading of the Reconstruction 
Amendments espoused by Democrats who supported the violent termi-
nation of radical Reconstruction rather than the meaning expressed by 
the Republicans who drafted the Amendments.429  In a series of  
decisions, beginning with the Slaughter-House Cases430 in 1873, the 
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more insight into the purposes of the laws and Amendments of Reconstruction than those who 
actually enacted them”); Pope, supra note 286 (manuscript at 27–28) (arguing that the Supreme 
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 430 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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Court developed an anti-abolition jurisprudence that preserved white 
capitalist domination and shaped constitutional law for the next cen-
tury.431  The Justices interpreted the Reconstruction Amendments  
narrowly to bar white state majorities from passing explicit slave laws 
but left their power to restrict black people’s freedom untouched.432 
The Court also “crippled” the federal government’s power to enforce 
the Reconstruction Amendments to protect blacks from white terror, 
speeding the collapse of Reconstruction in the South.433  In United 
States v. Cruikshank,434 the Court overturned convictions on federal 
charges of three white men who participated in the Colfax Massacre, a 
mob attack on a Louisiana courthouse resulting in the murders of dozens 
of black citizens.435  The Supreme Court held that the indictments, 
brought under the Enforcement Act of 1870,436 failed to allege the  
defendants’ conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
conduct was performed by private individuals and not state actors.437  
“The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment prohibits a State from depriving any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this 
adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another,” the Court 
concluded.438  By requiring state action, the Court left southern blacks 
without federal protection from whites who sought to strip them of their 
citizenship rights through violent intimidation.439  The Court’s  
definition of unconstitutional state action was diametrically opposed to 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s aim — to give equal protection to citizens 
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 431 See id. at 67–82; FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME COURT’S RETREAT FROM  
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 438 Id. 
 439 Huhn, supra note 435, at 1077 (arguing that the Court’s decision in Cruikshank prevented the 
federal government from protecting the rights of black citizens and “signaled open season on blacks 
and other racial minorities”). 
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against private violence that forced them into subjugation.440  As  
Professor Robin West points out, “[t]he ‘state action,’ . . . which is the 
object of the Amendment, is the breach of an affirmative duty to protect 
the rights of citizens to be free, minimally, of the subordinating, enslav-
ing violence of other citizens.”441  Instead, the Court interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment as primarily shielding businesses from state reg-
ulation of contractual labor relations through “liberty of contract,”  
rather than shielding black people from exploitation and discrimina-
tion.442  In this way, the Justices converted the free labor aspiration of 
the Reconstruction Amendments into a shield for white capitalists to 
exploit the labor of a subjugated racial caste.  Thus, the Court created 
a state action doctrine that permitted the government to shirk its  
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect citizens equally, leaving eman-
cipated blacks and, subsequently, other marginalized people vulnerable 
to the violent obliteration of their freedom and reinforcement of an un-
equal power structure. 
2.  The Court’s Current Anti-Abolition Doctrines. — A dominant 
view of constitutional progress holds that the Civil Rights Era and the 
Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education443 ushered 
in a new constitutional regime.444  The abolitionist struggle, however, 
remains unfinished.  Beginning with Bell’s Racial Realism, critical race 
scholars have soundly demolished the victory narrative by exposing the 
embedded nature of racial inequality in legal institutions and the Court’s 
complicity since Brown in preserving that inequality.445  Racism is  
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“institutionalized.”446  Centuries of official white supremacy produced 
discriminatory laws, policies, and practices that privilege white people 
and disadvantage people of color.447  Colonialism, slavery, and Jim Crow 
built legal structures that produce unequal outcomes without the need 
for race-specific laws or prejudiced decisions of individual state 
agents.448  Residential segregation, for example, structures the lives of 
most black people to make them more vulnerable to surveillance, pro-
filing, and punishment by government agents.449  But the Court has 
failed to account for the systemic forms of racism that persist despite the 
gains of the civil rights movement.450  Indeed, the Court’s jurisprudence 
has been anti-abolitionist.  Three of the Court’s key anti-abolition doc-
trines are especially relevant to upholding the carceral punishment sys-
tem: colorblindness, the discriminatory purpose requirement, and fear 
of too much justice. 
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(a)  Colorblindness. — Colorblindness is a conservative strategy that 
shields white privilege through a rationalization that appears race- 
neutral on its face.451  It emerged after the civil rights movement for-
mally ended Jim Crow in the South and de jure segregation in the 
North.452  In response, “[a new] white backlash movement intent on 
crushing black empowerment and preserving white dominance latched 
on to the concept of colorblindness as an ideological tool of retrench-
ment.”453  As sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva notes in his classic  
Racism Without Racists, “[m]uch as Jim Crow racism served as the glue 
for defending a brutal and overt system of racial oppression in the pre–
Civil Rights era, color-blind racism serves today as the ideological  
armor for a covert and institutionalized system in the post–Civil Rights 
era.”454  Colorblind theory argues that because society has conquered 
racism and people of color and white people have full equality, social 
policies should not take account of race.455 
Over the last several decades, the majority on the Supreme Court 
came to embrace a colorblind political ideology.456  Instead of inquiring 
whether a state’s policy supports white supremacy, as it did in Loving v. 
Virginia457 to strike down antimiscegenation laws,458 the Court has ap-
plied strict scrutiny to invalidate race-based government efforts aimed 
at eliminating the vestiges of slavery and Jim Crow.459  A series of Court 
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decisions struck down race-conscious measures to desegregate 
schools,460 implement affirmative action programs,461 and enforce  
voting rights462 as violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice 
Thomas has articulated the colorblind perspective, which equates  
official Jim Crow segregation with state efforts to end its legacy.  In 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña,463 concurring with the majority’s 
holding that a government incentive program to diversify federal con-
tracts was subject to strict scrutiny,464 Justice Thomas described a 
“‘moral [and] constitutional equivalence’ between laws designed to  
subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race 
in order to foster some current notion of equality.”465  He concluded that 
“[i]n each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.”466  A 
decade later, in a 5-4 decision striking down voluntary plans to desegre-
gate elementary schools in Seattle, Washington, and Jefferson County, 
Kentucky, the Court reiterated the position that the Fourteenth  
Amendment requires the government to be colorblind by paying no  
attention to race.467
  
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of 
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,” Chief Justice Roberts  
declared.468 
According to this view, both white supremacist and antisegregation-
ist racial classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny because of the 
equally inherent invidiousness of both forms of state action and the im-
portance of the Court’s consistency in addressing them.  In addition, the 
Court’s scrutiny is based on an assumption that the problem the Equal 
Protection Clause is concerned with is state attention to race rather than 
state support for racism.469  Based on this flawed reasoning, the Court 
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2019] THE SUPREME COURT — FOREWORD 79 
concludes that the proper way to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is 
to subject any racial classification by the government to strict scrutiny, 
regardless of the objective — that is, that the state should remain color-
blind.470  By appealing to formal racial equality, the Justices issue  
rulings that appear to be neutral and fair when they actually not only 
ignore the material harms inflicted by systems that are structured by 
white supremacy, but also shield those systems from efforts to dismantle 
them.  The colorblind approach to the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
foundly contravenes the abolitionist meaning that animated the  
Amendment’s enactment.  The antislavery activists who inspired the 
Equal Protection Clause affirmatively sought to eradicate the Slave 
Power — the system of chattel slavery and the private and public struc-
tures that maintained it.471  It is inconsistent with the abolitionist intent 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to equate efforts to end white supremacy 
with efforts to preserve white supremacy.   
Moreover, by equating “invidious” and “benign” racial classifica-
tions,472 the Court badly misconstrues the relevance of racial categories 
to institutionalized racism.  Racial categories were invented to construct 
and maintain a white supremacist regime built on racial slavery and 
capitalism, and those categories continue to help govern systems in 
which racism has become embedded.473  It is how racial categories are 
used — whether to support racism or contest it — that matters to their 
political significance.  Colorblind logic only makes sense in an alternate 
reality where the history of racialized slavery, the structures that were 
put in place after the Civil War to reinstate white rule, and the persis-
tence of institutionalized racism since Reconstruction never happened.  
As Justice Ginsburg noted, dissenting in the affirmative action case 
Gratz v. Bollinger474: 
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“[T]o say that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil rights 
have been mostly about freedom from racial categorization rather than free-
dom from racial oppressio[n] is to trivialize the lives and deaths of those 
who have suffered under racism.  To pretend . . . that the issue presented in 
[Bakke] was the same issue in [Brown] is to pretend that history never hap-
pened and that the present doesn’t exist.”475 
Colorblindness depends on the delusion of baseline racial equality, mak-
ing any distinction on the basis of race inherently inequitable. 
The Court has extended its anti-abolitionist colorblind approach be-
yond school desegregation, affirmative action, and voting rights to  
ignore the role of policing in subjugating black communities.476  Despite 
nationwide protests against police violence; reams of empirical studies 
demonstrating stark racial disparities in police stops, arrests, harass-
ment, and killings; and constant displays of police abuse captured on 
bystanders’ cameras and circulated widely on social media,477 the  
Supreme Court continues to issue decisions that are completely oblivious 
to this reality.478  This reality of racialized policing entails more than a 
race-based statistical difference in how police treat people.  Rather, po-
lice enforce a carceral grip on entire communities that impinges on res-
idents’ everyday lives, imposing a perpetual threat of physical assault 
and degradation, jeopardizing their opportunities to participate in the 
political economy, and suffocating their freedom.479  As Professor Ekow 
N. Yankah recently commented: “The Court’s studied indifference has 
led to one of the more bizarre tensions in modern American political life: 
we are all aware of how deeply race infuses our criminal justice system, 
and yet, the law gives us few ways to properly recognize and contextu-
alize its impact.”480  Colorblindness in cases involving police is not just 
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a matter of overlooking numerical disparities; it is a matter of ignoring, 
and thereby supporting, monumental racial subjugation whose  
eradication was the very object of the abolitionist activism that drove 
constitutional change. 
Two recent Supreme Court cases involving police surveillance illus-
trate the Court’s practice of loosening constitutional limits on policing 
practices and insulating police from constitutional redress without tak-
ing account of devastating impact this practice has on black and brown 
communities.481  Although these cases were decided under the Fourth 
Amendment and did not consider Reconstruction Amendment concerns, 
they reflect a colorblind disregard of the effect gutting Fourth  
Amendment protections will have as police gain ever-greater power to 
reign over marginalized communities.  Thus, colorblind jurisprudence 
regarding the role of police in maintaining the racial order helps to ob-
scure the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment’s freedom objective 
and requirement that the state equally protect people from the very 
kinds of enslaving violence and degradation that police inflict. 
The Court’s 2014 decision in Heien v. North Carolina482 involved 
the constitutionality of a technique police routinely use to stop cars in 
order to search them.  In Heien, an officer on patrol noticed Maynor 
Javier Vasquez driving and observed that he “looked ‘very stiff and 
nervous’”;483 he then began following Vasquez and eventually pulled 
him over for driving with a broken tail light.484  The Court had already 
permitted such pretextual car stops in Whren v. United States,485 hold-
ing that police do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stop 
cars — regardless of their motivation — as long as they have a legal 
right to pull the car over.486  The officer in Heien became suspicious 
when he saw another man, Nicholas Heien, lying in the backseat.487  In 
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the course of searching the car, the officer found a bag containing co-
caine.488  The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed with Heien that 
the evidence seized from his car should be suppressed because state law 
only required one working tail light, making the officer’s stop invalid.489  
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the good 
faith exception for police stops applied to mistakes of law as well.490  
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.491  Writing for the Court, Chief  
Justice Roberts equated mistake of fact with mistake of law to reach a 
seemingly logical ruling.492  In so doing, he failed to consider the effect 
on people of color of stretching police officers’ ability to stop and search 
people to situations where there is no legal right to make the stop in the 
first place.493 
Justice Sotomayor, the lone dissenter, castigated the majority for 
“further eroding the Fourth Amendment’s protection of civil liberties in 
a context where that protection has already been worn down.”494   
Describing traffic stops as “invasive, frightening, and humiliating  
encounters,”495 she warned: “Giving officers license to effect seizures so 
long as they can attach to their reasonable view of the facts some rea-
sonable legal interpretation (or misinterpretation) that suggests a law 
has been violated significantly expands [their] authority.”496  While  
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent did not explicitly invoke the disparate racial 
impacts facilitated by the Court’s doctrine, her deep-seated distrust of 
excessive police authority resonates with the realities of racial inequity 
she discusses in her future jurisprudence. 
In another Fourth Amendment case decided two years later, Justice 
Sotomayor directly confronted and condemned the Court’s avoidance of 
racism in policing.  Utah v. Strieff497 involved a Salt Lake City police 
officer who conducted surveillance of a house he suspected was the site 
of drug activity.498  He followed respondent Edward Strieff from the 
house, stopped him, and requested to see his identification, which re-
vealed an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation.499  When the of-
ficer arrested and searched Strieff, he discovered “methamphetamine 
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and drug paraphernalia.”500  The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the 
Fourth Amendment required the evidence seized to be suppressed be-
cause the officer had no legal justification for stopping Strieff and thus 
the search was illegal.501  But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, allowing 
the evidence’s admission despite the unlawfulness of the initial stop, rea-
soning that “the evidence the officer seized as part of the search incident 
to arrest is admissible because the officer’s discovery of the arrest war-
rant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evi-
dence seized incident to arrest.”502  The Court’s opinion showed no 
awareness of what yet another constitutional license for police to make 
unlawful stops “on a whim or hunch”503 would mean for black and 
brown people already systematically subjected to discriminatory 
stops.504  Indeed, the Court took pains to portray the circumstances as 
“isolated,” with “no indication that this unlawful stop was part of any 
systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”505 
Justice Sotomayor launched into a searing indictment of the Court’s 
colorblindness.  As in her Heien dissent, she contested the Court’s non-
chalant treatment of police stops, noting the power police can exert over 
individuals and the ubiquity of outstanding warrants that now can serve 
as excuses for that power’s unlawful imposition.506  She highlighted the 
outlandish amount of discretion the Court granted an officer “to stop 
you for whatever reason he wants — so long as he can point to a pre-
textual justification after the fact.  That justification . . . may factor in 
your ethnicity, where you live, what you were wearing, and how you 
behaved”;507 in other words, if in the officer’s mind “you look like a 
criminal.”508  Justice Sotomayor excoriated the Court for minimizing the 
potential harms this discretion to discriminate could cause: “Even if you 
are innocent, you will now join the 65 million Americans with an arrest 
record and experience the ‘civil death’ of discrimination by employers, 
landlords, and whoever else conducts a background check.”509 
Then Justice Sotomayor moved to the most remarkable part of her 
dissent: her explication of why the Court’s widening grant of power to 
police to make pretextual stops systematically dealt the greatest blow to 
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the freedom of people of color.  Citing influential and poignant analyses 
of racial oppression by Michelle Alexander, W.E.B. Du Bois, James 
Baldwin, and Ta-Nehisi Coates,510 Justice Sotomayor discussed the im-
portance of judicial recognition of the pervasive repression black and 
brown people experience in their encounters with the police: 
For generations, black and brown parents have given their children “the 
talk” — instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your 
hands where they can be seen; do not even think of talking back to a 
stranger — all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to 
them . . . .  By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double conscious-
ness, this case tells everyone . . . that an officer can verify your legal status 
at any time.  It says that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse 
the violation of your rights.  It implies that you are not a citizen of a de-
mocracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.511 
Justice Sotomayor admonished the Court, insisting that confronting 
racialized carceral control is crucial for freedom and democracy: “We 
must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted 
by police are ‘isolated.’ . . . They are the ones who recognize that un-
lawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our 
lives.  Until their voices matter too, our justice system will . . . be any-
thing but.”512 
The contrast between the majority’s jurisprudence and Justice  
Sotomayor’s dissenting voice in both Heien and Strieff highlights the 
anti-abolitionist repercussions of the dominant colorblind approach and 
offers brilliant insight into the difference abolition constitutionalism 
makes.  The Court’s decisions in these cases disregard the unequal and 
repressive effects of broadening police officers’ power to stop and search 
people without constitutional restraint.  In contrast, Justice Sotomayor 
frames her reasoning around a recognition that police currently prop up 
a racialized carceral regime that unjustly controls life in black and 
brown communities; she focuses on the severe harms this repression  
inflicts on people residing there; and she bases her decision on the con-
stitutional objective of advancing freedom and democracy.  Because pre-
textual stops give police greater ability to impose their antifreedom and 
antidemocratic rule over black and brown people, an abolition constitu-
tionalism requires that courts interpret the Fourth Amendment in light 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose and history to eliminate such 
practices, not to expand police officers’ power to engage in them.  In 
contrast to the Court’s anti-abolitionist stance, Justice Sotomayor’s un-
derstanding that the carceral state subjects people to a form of racialized 
control that denies their freedom and democratic citizenship — and 
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therefore must be curtailed — reflects the values of antislavery aboli-
tionists that undergird the Reconstruction Amendments. 
(b)  Discriminatory Purpose Requirement. — Related to the Court’s 
colorblind approach is its individualized understanding of racism.  The 
Court requires that plaintiffs seeking to prevail on Fourteenth  
Amendment claims prove that state agents treated them differently on 
account of their race, and did so with an intent to discriminate.  The 
Court’s 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis513 held that a law’s dis-
parate impact on different races cannot by itself establish an equal pro-
tection violation.514  Instead, there must be evidence of discriminatory  
purpose — a smoking gun that reveals the racial animus the offending 
police officer, prison guard, or legislator harbored.515 
Both aspects of this framing of racism — biased perpetrators  
discriminating against individual victims — mischaracterize how insti-
tutionalized racism, including carceral punishment, works to uphold the 
racial order.516  First, the Court’s focus on the rights of individual vic-
tims of racial discrimination obscures the systemic control the prison 
industrial complex exercises over entire marginalized communities.517  
Constitutional wrongs are framed with regard to a “rights-bearing indi-
vidual, not . . . a member of a racialized community that has been sub-
jected to conditions that make him/her a prime candidate for legal  
repression,” writes Angela Y. Davis.518  Adjudicating an individual 
rights violation — either by dismissing it or redressing it — still leaves 
the carceral system to operate unscathed while giving a false sense of 
judicial fairness. 
Second, requiring proof of discriminatory purpose treats racial bias 
as a system malfunction.  As discussed in Part I, the criminal punish-
ment system has functioned since the slavery era to keep black people 
in a subordinated political status.  Because the system is structured to 
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target and disadvantage black people, its oppressive impact does not 
require its agents deliberately to harm black people out of prejudice 
against them.  Moreover, requiring black defendants to demonstrate dis-
criminatory intent assumes discrimination against them is exceptional 
rather than the normal way carceral punishment operates.  For instance, 
despite overwhelming evidence presented in McCleskey v. Kemp519 that 
race affects the administration of capital punishment, the Court refused 
to strike down McCleskey’s death sentence.520  Instead, the question the 
Justices posed was whether sentencing McCleskey himself to death con-
stituted a discriminatory misuse of the death penalty — an aberrational 
abuse of discretion, unexplained discrepancy, or explicit animus against 
him.521  The problem with this approach is that discriminatory death 
sentencing is not a system malfunction.  The death penalty survives as 
a legacy of slavery and Jim Crow because it still helps to preserve an 
unequal racial order.  Even when claims of individual rights violations 
are won, these victories do more to make it appear that the system has 
been fixed than to move toward its eradication. 
Moreover, the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence imposes incon-
sistent burdens of proof with respect to white plaintiffs’ reverse discrim-
ination claims and nonwhite plaintiffs’ race-based police profiling 
claims.  The Court first articulated the strict scrutiny standard for dis-
crimination based on race and national origin in Korematsu v. United 
States,522 upholding the constitutionality of the U.S. government’s for-
cible internment of Japanese Americans during World War II,523 and 
signaling the potentially repressive nature of its Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence.524  Since then, the Court has imposed a high burden of 
proof on government efforts to redress historical racism, requiring that 
the government prove a compelling interest in order to defeat plaintiffs’ 
claims.  In its affirmative action opinions, a majority of the Court has 
applied the exacting strict scrutiny test on behalf of white complainants 
to overturn race-conscious measures designed to overcome past discrim-
ination in employment, schools, and government contracts.525  By con-
trast, the Supreme Court has required that victims of state segregation, 
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profiling, or punishment on the basis of race prove discriminatory gov-
ernment purpose — in other words, shifting the burden of proof onto 
the plaintiffs of color.526 
In her Supreme Court Foreword, Professor Reva Siegel traced the 
Court’s anti-abolitionist evolution with a comparative history of dis-
crimination claims in affirmative action and racial profiling cases.527  
According to Siegel, “the Court has restricted judicial oversight of mi-
nority claims as it intensified judicial oversight of majority claims.”528  
This shift in standards radically transformed Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence from the traditional United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.529 framework, based on a recognition of the disempowerment of ra-
cial minorities,530 into “a form of judicial review that cares more about 
protecting members of majority groups from actions of representative 
government that promote minority opportunities than it cares about 
protecting ‘discrete and insular minorities’ from actions of representa-
tive government that reflect ‘prejudice.’”531  Thus, the Court typically 
strikes down race-conscious affirmative action measures as racially  
biased while upholding ostensibly race-neutral law enforcement prac-
tices that repress communities of color.532 
It should be obvious that a constitutional jurisprudence that denies 
marginalized communities protection from state violence while affirma-
tively shielding white people from antidiscrimination measures is  
diametrically opposed to the equal protection values abolitionists ad-
vance.  The smoking gun test replicates the same disregard of institu-
tionalized racism reflected in colorblindness doctrine.  The Court fails 
to see that tackling racism head-on requires explicit attention to race, 
and that institutionalized racism can proceed without any need for  
expressions of racist intent.  To make matters worse, conflating racial 
discrimination with racial bias gives states a ploy to easily evade consti-
tutional or civil rights scrutiny: the Court has held that proof of race-
neutral reasons can excuse state action that has a discriminatory  
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impact.533  As with colorblindness, the Court’s misunderstanding of the 
relationship between race and racism produces a jurisprudential stand-
ard that is anti-abolitionist. 
Two voting rights cases decided in the 2017 Term illustrate how  
requiring proof of discriminatory purpose sanctions state efforts to 
maintain white rule and denies democratic citizenship to people of color.  
Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute534 considered the statutory va-
lidity of Ohio’s practice of purging certain voters from the state’s voting 
list.535  After mailing a verification card to voters who had not voted for 
two years and thus may have moved out of state, Ohio removed from 
the voting rolls those who did not return the card and did not vote in 
the next four years.536  The Court held the scheme to be in line with the 
National Voter Registration Act537 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote 
Act538 (HAVA), which restrain states from removing voters because they 
failed to vote.  The Court considered the failure to vote to be acceptable 
under the NVRA as a proxy for whether a voter had moved away and 
thus could be removed from the voter rolls, as long as failure to vote 
was not the only factor considered.539  Justice Breyer argued in dissent 
that using failure to vote as a means to identify voters to purge was in 
fact exactly what the NVRA prohibited.540  In protecting the Ohio purg-
ing plan, the Court remained totally unconcerned about the history of 
racist voter suppression that states achieved with similar ploys and the 
discriminatory impact Ohio’s plan would have by depressing voter turn-
out among already-marginalized groups.541 
As she did in Strieff,542 Justice Sotomayor condemned the Court’s 
decision for contravening the Constitution’s democratic values by ignor-
ing structural racism.  Noting that “[c]oncerted state efforts to prevent 
minorities from voting and to undermine the efficacy of their votes are 
an unfortunate feature of our country’s history,” Justice Sotomayor  
reminded the Court of Jim Crow tactics, strikingly similar to Ohio’s 
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procedure, to disenfranchise eligible voters by expelling them from reg-
istration lists.543  Justice Sotomayor also castigated the Court for ignor-
ing the disempowering consequences Ohio’s purge had already had for 
“minority, low-income, disabled, and veteran voters.”544  Justice  
Sotomayor relied on amicus briefs filed by a number of social justice 
organizations to detail the disproportionate impact the Ohio procedure 
had on these voters and the ramifications for diluting their political  
influence.545  She cited findings from one county that “‘African- 
American-majority neighborhoods in downtown Cincinnati had 10% of 
their voters removed due to inactivity’ since 2012, as ‘compared to only 
4% of voters in a suburban, majority-white neighborhood.’”546 
Justice Sotomayor concluded with a call to political activism to end 
discriminatory state interference in the vote: “Communities that are dis-
proportionately affected by unnecessarily harsh registration laws should 
not tolerate efforts to marginalize their influence in the political process, 
nor should allies who recognize blatant unfairness stand idly by,” she 
declared.547  “Today’s decision forces these communities and their allies 
to be even more proactive and vigilant in holding their States account-
able and working to dismantle the obstacles they face in exercising the 
fundamental right to vote.”548 
The Justices in the majority dismissed Justice Sotomayor’s argument 
as “say[ing] nothing about what is relevant in [the] case” and “miscon-
ceived.”549  But this dismissal rested on their own misconception of  
racism as individualized racial bias.550  For the Court, the undeniable  
historical and empirical evidence that Ohio’s voter purge continued a 
longstanding pattern of discriminatory disenfranchisement was unim-
portant because “Justice Sotomayor [did] not point[] to any evidence in 
the record that Ohio instituted or . . . carried out its program with dis-
criminatory intent.”551 
Justice Sotomayor’s disagreement with the Court’s majority contin-
ued in Abbott v. Perez,552 a case involving a Texas redistricting plan 
challenged as a racial gerrymander.553  The Court upheld the parts of 
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the plan that harmed minority voters because there was insufficient ev-
idence of the legislators’ discriminatory motivation,554 while striking 
down the plan in one district where the Court found that it unconstitu-
tionally used race to benefit Latinx voters.555  Here, we see the  
anti-abolitionist pattern Siegel identified: the Court strikes down as  
unconstitutional race-conscious remedies for past institutional racism as 
it affirms the constitutionality of racialized state repression by requiring 
proof of biased intent.556  Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for 
ignoring “overwhelming”557 evidence of discrimination and mischarac-
terizing the lower court’s analysis of the state’s history of minority dis-
enfranchisement.558  And she stressed that the Court’s anti-abolitionist 
doctrine that shields state mechanisms to preserve white domination is 
the antithesis of Fourteenth Amendment democratic objectives: 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act secure for all voters in our country, regardless of race, the 
right to equal participation in our political processes.  Those guarantees 
mean little, however, if courts do not remain vigilant in curbing States’ 
efforts to undermine the ability of minority voters to meaningfully exercise 
that right. . . . The Court today does great damage to that right of equal 
opportunity.  Not because it denies the existence of that right, but because 
it refuses its enforcement.559 
The Reconstruction Amendments impose a constitutional duty on 
the Court to abolish systems that reinstate slavery, to protect citizens 
equally from private and state incursions on their basic freedoms, and 
to support democratic citizenship for everyone.  Justice Sotomayor’s  
dissents powerfully spotlight how the Court’s colorblind and discrimi-
natory intent doctrines breach that duty, while simultaneously offering 
insights on what an alternative jurisprudence guided by abolition  
constitutionalism might look like. 
(c)  Fear of Too Much Justice. — The Supreme Court’s anti- 
abolitionist jurisprudence is also animated by a desire to avoid the rad-
ical change an abolition constitutionalism would require.  Suppose,  
instead of being colorblind, the Court took account of pervasive racism 
in criminal law enforcement?  Suppose, instead of requiring evidence of 
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racial motivation, it confronted the devastating impact of carceral insti-
tutions on communities of color?  Suppose a majority of Justices not 
only ruled in line with Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinions in Heien, 
Strieff, Husted, and Perez, but also applied this reasoning to other claims 
of constitutional violations in policing, surveillance, sentencing, and 
prison conditions?  Such a series of Supreme Court decisions would de-
liver a tremendous blow to the prison industrial complex.  Although 
Court decisions alone will not abolish prisons, they can weaken many 
of the practices, such as discriminatory police stops, that help to rein-
force and expand them.  But the Court has shied away from this type 
of systemic change, going so far as to deny constitutional relief based in 
part on the potential repercussions such relief would have on the stabil-
ity of the criminal punishment system.560  In other words, the Justices 
sometimes refuse to find that specific carceral practices are unconstitu-
tional because they fear such a ruling would require “too much  
justice.”561 
Fear of too much justice is patently visible in the Court’s death pen-
alty decision McCleskey v. Kemp.  In that case, Warren McCleskey chal-
lenged his death sentence for armed robbery and murder on the grounds 
that capital punishment in Georgia violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments because it was administered in a racially discriminatory 
manner.562  To back up this claim, McCleskey presented rigorous  
empirical evidence that race affected the risk of being sentenced to death 
in Georgia.563  He relied on the Baldus Study, a statistical analysis of 
over 2000 Georgia murder cases in the 1970s that found that defendants 
convicted of killing whites were more than four times as likely to receive 
the death penalty as defendants convicted of killing blacks, and that 
black defendants accused of killing whites had the highest risk of  
receiving the death penalty.564 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, held that statistical evi-
dence that race significantly affected capital punishment in Georgia was 
irrelevant to the constitutionality of McCleskey’s sentence.565  Reversing 
McCleskey’s sentence would require proof that it resulted from con-
scious, deliberate “discriminatory purpose” on the part of government 
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decisionmakers involved in the case.566  Thus, the Court employed the 
anti-abolitionist doctrines discussed above: it remained colorblind, dis-
missing empirical evidence that race mattered significantly to the ad-
ministration of the death penalty — both in the greater value placed on 
white victims’ lives and the higher risk of execution imposed on black 
men whose victims were white — and it required proof of discrimina-
tory intent instead of relying on the irrefutable evidence of the decisive 
impact institutionalized racism had on capital punishment in Georgia. 
The opinions in McCleskey reveal another salient aspect of the 
Court’s anti-abolitionist jurisprudence, for both majority and dissenting 
Justices acknowledged that the race of victims and defendants mattered 
to capital punishment.567  The Court declined to endorse the anti- 
abolitionist suggestion of some scholars that the death penalty’s racial 
disparity could be corrected by executing more killers of black  
victims.568  Instead, the Court had a different anti-abolitionist perspec-
tive: the Justices worried that finding unconstitutional discrimination in 
McCleskey’s case would require abolishing the death penalty altogether 
and would threaten other criminal punishment practices with similar 
evidence of racial disparities.  As Justice Powell reasoned, “McCleskey’s 
claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the 
principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”569  Thus, the 
Court recognized that stark racial disparities were so prevalent in crim-
inal punishment that, if proof of disparate racial impact sufficed to 
prove a constitutional violation, nearly all aspects of criminal punish-
ment might be challenged as unconstitutional.   
Justice Powell feared that the Court’s recognition of racially dispar-
ate impact as a constitutional violation “would undermine the presump-
tion of legitimacy that maintained the state criminal apparatus.”570  As 
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Professor Aya Gruber points out, Justice Powell previously had ex-
pressed this fear in his dissenting opinion in Furman v. Georgia,571 
which temporarily struck down the death penalty: 
The root causes of the higher incidence of criminal penalties on “minorities 
and the poor” will not be cured by abolishing the system of penalties.  Nor, 
indeed, could any society have a viable system of criminal justice if sanc-
tions were abolished or ameliorated because most of those who commit 
crimes happen to be underprivileged.572 
Justice Powell recognized that a constitutional jurisprudence that ad-
dressed the disparate impact of carceral punishment on marginalized 
groups would require abolishing those punishments, but he rejected 
abolition by attributing the disparities to those groups’ criminal propen-
sities resulting from social disadvantage rather than to the way the state 
structures carceral systems to punish them disproportionately.573  As the 
McCleskey decision illustrates, the Court’s anti-abolition doctrines work 
to preserve the legitimacy of racialized state systems whose repressive 
impact on marginalized communities would otherwise call for their  
abolition. 
E. Flowers v. Mississippi 
Flowers v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court’s most recent application 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to a criminal procedure issue, provides 
an apt context for further examining the contemporary significance of 
abolition constitutionalism.  When his case reached the Supreme Court, 
Flowers had been tried for capital murder six times by the same white 
prosecutor, Doug Evans.574  Over the course of six trials, Evans used 
peremptory challenges to strike forty-one of forty-two prospective black 
jurors.575  The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the first two of 
Flowers’s convictions for prosecutorial misconduct and reversed his 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 571 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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third conviction on the basis of a Batson violation.576  In the next two 
trials, jurors were unable to reach a verdict.577  The Mississippi Supreme 
Court upheld Flowers’s conviction in the sixth trial.578 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision hinged on a single issue: whether 
Evans violated Flowers’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding a 
black woman from the jury in the sixth trial.579  More than two decades 
after Flowers entered death row,580 the Court overturned his conviction 
in a 7-2 decision.581 
Although the Court ruled in Flowers’s favor, analyzing its reasoning 
from an abolitionist perspective reveals that its interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause nevertheless adopted the anti-abolitionist  
doctrines discussed above.  In what ways did the Court fail to apply the 
abolition constitutionalism that generated the Fourteenth  
Amendment and what difference would the Court’s adherence to that 
paradigm have made to Flowers’s fate and to the carceral practices that 
led to his convictions? 
1.  Justice Kavanaugh’s Compromise. — Justice Kavanaugh’s discus-
sion about whether Evans violated Flowers’s rights got off to a promis-
ing start by reviewing the historical origins of the Fourteenth  
Amendment’s prohibition of racial discrimination in jury selection.582  
Noting that the Equal Protection Clause was “[r]atified in 1868 in the 
wake of the Civil War,” Justice Kavanaugh quoted the Slaughter-House 
Cases’ statement of the Clause’s abolitionist objectives — “the freedom 
of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, 
and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the  
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion 
over him.”583  The opinion pointed also to the Civil Rights Act of 
1875,584 which “made it a criminal offense for state officials to exclude 
individuals from jury service on account of their race,”585 as well as the 
Court’s decision in Strauder v. West Virginia586 striking down a West 
Virginia statute declaring only whites could serve on juries.587  Justice 
Kavanaugh reiterated the importance of jury service to black people’s 
citizenship: “Other than voting, serving on a jury is the most substantial 
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opportunity that most citizens have to participate in the democratic  
process.”588 
Next, Justice Kavanaugh described how prosecutors have used the 
peremptory challenge as a covert device to deny black citizens the right 
to be jurors and recognized the “cold reality of jury selection” that  
peremptory challenges help prosecutors more than they do black  
defendants.589  The leading case Batson v. Kentucky,590 which guided 
Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion, affirmed protections against racial  
discrimination in jury selection by placing constitutional limits on pros-
ecutors’ use of peremptory strikes to exclude African Americans from 
juries.591  Batson retained the Washington v. Davis discriminatory intent 
requirement, but pronounced a new standard for meeting it with  
circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory pattern, holding that a  
defendant “may make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimina-
tion by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an 
inference of discriminatory purpose.”592  The burden then shifts to the 
prosecutor to demonstrate that “permissible racially neutral selection 
criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.”593 
While Batson’s expansion of ways to prove discriminatory purpose 
to include a prosecutor’s discriminatory pattern may seem “revolution-
ary,”594 it has proven “toothless”595 at preventing discriminatory jury 
strikes because judges routinely accept prosecutors’ pretextual race- 
neutral excuses for them.596  Justice Kavanaugh saw through Evans’s 
transparent ploys to evade Batson by selecting one black juror as sub-
terfuge and questioning prospective black jurors more than whites to 
build a false case for nondiscriminatory reasons for striking them.597  
Taking account of “[t]he State’s relentless, determined effort to rid the 
jury of black individuals,” the Court found sufficient evidence to suggest 
that “the State wanted to try Flowers before a jury with as few black 
jurors as possible, and ideally before an all-white jury,” adding: “We 
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cannot ignore that history.”598  The majority opinion made it clear that 
the freedom to serve on juries has been important to black citizenship 
since Reconstruction and that white-controlled legislatures and legal 
systems have been intent on thwarting it. 
The Court reversed Flowers’s conviction based on its acknowledg-
ment of a history of racial discrimination in jury selection and of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s objective to protect black people’s right to 
jury service.  In this regard, the Flowers opinion is less anti-abolitionist 
than the opinions regarding police stops,599 voting rights,600 and the 
death penalty601 discussed above.  Yet the Court’s reasoning falls far 
short of embracing abolition constitutionalism.  
Although the Flowers Court explicitly acknowledged that discrimi-
natory jury selection violates the Fourteenth Amendment,602 its opinion 
lacked the features of the abolition constitutionalism that animated the 
Equal Protection Clause.603  Missing from the Court’s opinion is any 
discussion of the white supremacist logic behind keeping black people 
off juries, including the reason why West Virginia enacted the 1873 law 
at issue in Strauder allowing only white people to be jurors, and why 
prosecutors so routinely and relentlessly exclude black jurors from cap-
ital trials of black defendants.604  While attending to black people’s in-
dividual right to serve on juries and acknowledging that the ultimate 
goal of Evans’s relentless exclusion of black individuals from the jury 
was to create an all-white jury,605 the Court did not address the systemic 
role of all-white juries in preserving white domination of criminal pun-
ishment.  Justice Kavanaugh recognized that all-white juries are prob-
lematic, but characterized the problem as the harm that individual rogue 
prosecutors inflict on individual black citizens whom they wrongfully 
exclude from juries.  This formulation ignores the way all-white juries 
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have historically functioned as a legal institution to perpetuate racial 
subordination. 
Examining the background of Flowers’s conviction beyond jury  
selection helps to illuminate Evans’s determination to empanel an all-
white jury.  A stunning investigative podcast, In the Dark, uncovered 
numerous problems in the police investigation and subsequent trials.  
Even though there was no evidence directly linking Flowers to the 
crimes,606 the white police investigator singled him out as the only main 
suspect after a few months of investigation and set about building a case 
against him.607  The podcast also highlighted misstatements made by 
Evans to the jury,608 state witnesses who were clearly not credible,609 
forensic science that called into question the expert testimony of the 
State’s ballistics analysts,610 a gun near the crime scene that went miss-
ing,611 and testimony from two jailhouse informants who said they lied 
under oath because of deals made with Evans.612  With an all-white 
jury, Evans had a far better chance of convicting a black man accused 
of killing three white people, despite the lack of evidence against him.  
The racial danger inherent in jury selection isn’t that black jurors will 
side with guilty black defendants.  The danger is that white jurors will 
convict black defendants regardless of their guilt or innocence and  
refuse to convict white people who inflict violence on blacks.613  The 
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violence the Equal Protection Clause protects against is the violence 
against black people that is furthered or excused by the all-white jury. 
By misidentifying the relationship between jury selection and white 
supremacy, the Court in Flowers went off track.  Justice Kavanaugh’s 
opinion did nothing to invalidate all-white juries as violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s antislavery ideals.  To the contrary, Justice 
Kavanaugh made it clear that the Court’s aim was the opposite — to 
maintain the current jury selection system.  First, Justice Kavanaugh 
stressed repeatedly that the Court’s intervention in jury selection was 
exceptional and limited by the egregious pattern of racial discrimination 
in Flowers’s particular case.614  He emphasized the extraordinary extent 
of racial discrimination in the trials, stating that it was only the accu-
mulation of Evans’s multiple instances of misconduct that sufficed for 
a constitutional violation.  “We need not and do not decide that any one 
of [the] four facts [showing discrimination] alone would require rever-
sal,” Justice Kavanaugh wrote.615 
Justice Alito wrote a brief concurring opinion simply to underscore 
that the only reason he disagreed with the Mississippi Supreme Court’s 
affirmance of Flowers’s conviction was that “this is a highly unusual 
case.”616  The message sent by both the majority and concurring opin-
ions is that prosecutors may continue to create all-white juries using 
peremptory challenges and excuse them with race-neutral pretexts as 
long as they don’t do it as blatantly as Evans did.  Indeed, as Justice 
Thomas noted in dissent, Evans himself (or a substitute prosecutor) is 
free to try Flowers a seventh time617 — and to assemble an all-white 
jury in order to secure a death sentence. 
Second, Justice Kavanaugh implied that the decision to intervene in 
this extraordinary case was based on the need to make the system  
appear legitimate.  Discussing Batson, Justice Kavanaugh pointed out 
that a significant motivation for that decision was to “enhance public 
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.”618  In other 
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words, in applying Batson to Flowers’s case, the Court merely fixed an 
exceptional glitch in the system that allowed a wayward prosecutor to 
veer too far from the norm and required a correction so that the system 
could proceed as usual. 
Finally, by affirming Batson’s focus on discriminatory intent,619 the 
Court permitted the continued prosecutorial use of race-neutral pretexts 
for peremptory challenges in order to produce all-white juries.  Justice 
Kavanaugh insisted that the Court’s decision made no change in the 
legal standard: “[W]e break no new legal ground.  We simply enforce 
and reinforce Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this 
case.”620  Thus, aware of the persistent constitutional problem posed by 
all-white juries, the Court took no new steps to solve it. 
The Court’s opinion bears all the anti-abolitionist methods that char-
acterize post–Civil Rights Era constitutional jurisprudence.621  By  
focusing on black people’s individual civil right to serve on juries, the 
Court ignored the systematic use of all-white juries in preserving white-
dominated carceral punishment.  By requiring proof of discriminatory 
intent on the part of prosecutors, it upheld their ability to assert race-
neutral pretexts for striking black prospective jurors.  By reversing 
Flowers’s conviction because the prosecutor’s extraordinary discrimina-
tion amounted to a system malfunction, it appeared to have solved the 
problem peremptory challenges posed in Flowers’s case without any 
need to change the jury selection system.  The majority compromised 
abolitionist ideals for fear of the justice those ideals demanded —  
abolishing the state’s use of all-white juries to condemn black defend-
ants to death.  Despite alluding to the Reconstruction Amendments’ 
abolitionist objectives, the Court’s opinion is actually anti-abolitionist. 
2.  Applying Abolition Constitutionalism to Flowers. — We should 
applaud the reversal of Flowers’s unjust conviction.  But we should ask 
why it took six trials and a divided Supreme Court decision to halt, at 
least temporarily, such an egregious pattern of prosecutorial abuse.  How 
could a majority of justices on the Mississippi Supreme Court and two 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices have determined there was no constitu-
tional violation in the face of such glaring discrimination?  Why, despite 
the Court’s finding of blatant bias, hasn’t Curtis Flowers been released 
from Parchman State Prison?622  Why is Doug Evans free to try Flowers 
again for capital murder and to continue to use peremptory challenges 
to exclude black jurors?  An abolition constitutionalism would address 
all these questions. 
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Abolition constitutionalism would dig deeper into the historical rela-
tionship of jury selection, race, and white supremacy to understand the 
significance of juries for antebellum abolitionists.  As an initial matter, 
abolishing slavery was entwined with the question of juries and jury 
selection because abolition meant ending enslavers’ juries.  Under the 
slavery system, only white people were entitled to serve on juries.623  
Enslaved people had no legal rights at all: they were denied the ability to 
bring legal claims, to testify in court against white people, or to be jurors.624  
Slavery thus eliminated the authority of black people to judge criminal  
culpability and simultaneously stripped them of the right to have their cul-
pability fairly judged.  In short, the all-white juries of the slavery system 
were a mechanism used by whites to uphold the system of slavery.  An 
abolition constitutionalism would therefore view all-white juries as poten-
tial violations of the Thirteenth Amendment’s eradication of slavery.625 
Next, an abolition constitutionalism would pay careful attention to 
how abolitionists and Radical Republicans viewed juries and where  
juries fit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections.  Although the 
right to a jury trial had been a central aspect of citizenship since the 
colonial era, the federal fugitive slave laws made juries especially salient 
to abolitionists.626  Specifically, juries were critical to abolitionists’ ef-
forts to thwart the threat fugitive slave laws posed to free blacks and 
formerly enslaved blacks who escaped to freedom.627  For example, 
black people who were accused of being fugitives had no right to contest 
the allegation in court and prove they were born free or had been eman-
cipated.628  A large number of abolitionists therefore hoped to sabotage 
the laws’ general implementation, and all at least endeavored to “protect 
free blacks from being kidnapped and falsely claimed as fugitives.”629 
A major battle over the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 centered on an 
unsuccessful abolitionist campaign to include a provision requiring jury 
trials in cases where alleged fugitive slaves were returned to slavehold-
ers.630  On October 3, 1850, the abolitionist paper the Emancipator & 
Republican condemned the first “slave catching” proceeding in New 
York that returned an alleged fugitive slave to bondage without a jury 
trial: “It is the first arrest under the new law.  The poor slave was not 
allowed to open his mouth.  The proceedings were summary and quick, 
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 623 See Colbert, supra note 613, at 21–22. 
 624 See id. at 18–22. 
 625 See id. at 108 (“There is a link between the all-white jury and the badge of slavery that denied 
African-Americans recourse to legal justice. . . . The all-white jury’s origins are clearly traceable to 
the institutionalization of slavery . . . .”). 
 626 See Forman, supra note 613, at 899–909. 
 627 See id. at 899. 
 628 Id. at 900. 
 629 See id. at 899. 
 630 See id. at 902–09. 
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and a freed man once more became a slave.  There is a cold hearted 
cruelty about this proceeding that chills the blood.”631  For many  
abolitionists, the failure to require a jury trial in fugitive slave cases 
represented the encroachment of the Slave Power into northern states 
and a violation of states’ rights.632 
Some abolitionists responded by calling for northern juries to nullify 
the law by refusing to convict both northerners charged with crimes for 
protecting fugitives and fugitives charged with crimes for resisting  
enslavement.633  At an abolitionist meeting at Boston’s Faneuil Hall,  
William Spooner declared: “The law will be resisted, and if the fugitive 
resists, and if he slay the slave hunter, or even the marshal, and if he 
therefor be brought before a jury of Massachusetts men, that jury will 
not convict him.”634  For abolitionists, then, juries were critical to efforts 
to resist enslavement and stop the expansion of the slavery system. 
During the Reconstruction period, juries embodied another crucial 
dimension of abolitionist work.  With the reinstatement of the white 
supremacist regime in the South, all-white juries became an instrument 
of white terror.635  Maintaining the slavery-era rule that only white peo-
ple were entitled to serve on juries was a way for the Jim Crow state to 
reenslave newly freed blacks.  As Professor James Forman summarizes: 
“All-white juries punished black defendants particularly harshly, while 
simultaneously refusing to punish violence by whites, including Ku Klux 
Klan members, against blacks and Republicans.”636  Rather than aban-
don juries, congressional Republicans responded to their repressive use 
in the South by providing for full participation by black citizens on  
juries.  Congress passed legislation to guarantee the rights of blacks to 
serve on juries and barred from eligibility for jury service anyone who 
had conspired to deny black persons their civil rights.637  The concern 
of abolitionists and Radical Republicans with the role all-white juries 
played in supporting the racial order they sought to abolish should also 
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 631 Id. at 907 (quoting Slave Catching in New York, EMANCIPATOR & REPUBLICAN, Oct. 3, 
1850, at 3). 
 632 Id. at 908. 
 633 Id. at 909. 
 634 Id. (citing Speech of William Spooner, on Taking the Chair in Faneuil Hall, Nov. 6th, 1850, 
EMANCIPATOR & REPUBLICAN, Nov. 14, 1850, at 4); see also Paul Butler, Essay, Racially Based 
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 702–03 (1995). 
 635 See Forman, supra note 613, at 914–16. 
 636 Id. at 909–10.  
 637 See Civil Rights Act (Ku Klux Klan Act) of 1871, ch. 22, § 5, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (codified as 
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2012)) (requiring prospective jurors take an oath, under threat of 
perjury, that they have never conspired to deprive other citizens of their civil rights); Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, 336–37 (providing that no citizen may be disqualified from 
jury service “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” id. at 336). 
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shape our interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate for 
equal protection.638 
The history of abolitionists’ approach to the jury as both an anti-
slavery and proslavery entity suggests that abolition constitutionalism is 
attentive to the relationship juries continue to play in either dismantling 
or promoting white supremacy.  At issue in Flowers was the prosecuto-
rial use of all-white juries as a systematic instrument of racist carceral 
punishment.639  An abolitionist approach to the Equal Protection Clause 
would protect black defendants like Flowers from the unequal imposi-
tion of capital punishment by all-white juries. 
At a minimum, this approach would rescind the Washington v. Davis 
requirement that defendants produce evidence of discriminatory in-
tent.640  The institutionalized practice of empaneling all-white juries to 
deny black people equal protection does not rely on the prejudiced mo-
tivations of individual prosecutors, and contesting this denial of equal 
protection should not depend on proving prosecutors’ motivations.  
Ending the discriminatory intent rule would also do away with validat-
ing peremptory challenges that have a discriminatory impact as long as 
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 638 See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) (describing the threat historically 
posed by all-white juries to “the promise of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and to the integrity of the 
jury trial”); Forman, supra note 613, at 909–10. 
 639 See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238–41 (2019).  In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Thomas pointed to the defense attorney’s conduct during voir dire, noting she used exclusionary 
techniques similar to Evans.  See id. at 2260–61 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas also noted 
the mistakes made by Flowers’s counsel and emphasized the fact that the defense and prosecution 
asked a “similar number of questions to the jurors they peremptorily struck.”  Id. at 261.  During 
oral argument, Justice Thomas asked a question for the first time in three years: whether Flowers’s 
lawyer struck any potential jurors and what race they were.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 
57, Flowers, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (No. 17-9572); Adam Liptak, Clarence Thomas Breaks a Three-Year 
Silence at Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2UMRRQC 
[https://perma.cc/UD5W-5VPW].  Justice Sotomayor pointed out there was only one black juror 
remaining after Evans struck all the rest.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 57.  Just as Justice 
Thomas has wrongly equated government race-conscious efforts to address institutionalized racism 
with Jim Crow laws to maintain white supremacy, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 
200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), he has failed to 
see the distinction between state exclusion of black jurors aimed at creating all-white juries and 
individual defendants’ attempts to counter jury discrimination.  Last Term, Justice Thomas as-
serted yet another false equation in his concurring opinion in Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana 
and Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019).  See id. at 1784, 1792–93 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
Justice Thomas suggested that states may be constitutionally permitted to ban abortions sought 
because of the race, sex, or disability of a fetus because such bans “promote a State’s compelling 
interest in preventing abortion from becoming a tool of modern-day eugenics.”  Id. at 1783.  By 
equating abortion rights with eugenics, Justice Thomas ignored how abortion bans and eugenicist 
policies both seek to control reproductive decisionmaking for repressive political ends.  See  
ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 77, at 3–7. 
 640 See 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
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prosecutors can provide race-neutral reasons.641  Changing the meaning 
of discrimination from racial bias to racist impact would stop the cha-
rade Batson generated in allowing prosecutors to continue to empanel 
all-white juries based on pretextual race-neutral explanations.642  In ad-
dition, an abolition constitutionalism would develop alternative doc-
trines for testing the constitutionality of jury composition based on  
evidence of systemic discrimination rather than individual prosecutorial 
intent.643   
This analysis suggests, moreover, that an abolition constitutionalism 
would consider ending peremptory challenges altogether.  In dissent, 
Justice Thomas correctly pointed out that black defendants can use per-
emptory challenges to “strik[e] potentially hostile white jurors,”644 so 
Batson may inevitably deprive black defendants of this tool against 
prejudiced deliberations.  But, as shown in Flowers’s six trials and in 
countless other criminal trials of black defendants, prosecutors’ ability 
to use peremptory challenges to rig juries against black defendants far 
outweighs black defendants’ use of juror strikes to create a fair trial.645  
The main threat to black defendants is not the “bad apple” visibly hos-
tile juror but the way juries made up of ordinary white people tend to 
reach unjust convictions.646  Both the majority and dissenting Justices 
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 641 See id. at 241.  By finding race-neutral excuses for striking blacks from the jury, Justice 
Thomas erased the overwhelming evidence from Flowers’s trials that Evans wanted to generate an 
all-white jury and was very successful at it.  Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2261–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 642 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986). 
 643 Devlon-Ross, supra note 604 (describing the Racial Justice Act passed in North Carolina in 
2009 as “a radical approach to ending discriminatory jury selection by allowing defendants to use 
statistical evidence of racial bias in capital-murder trials throughout North Carolina and the region 
in order to claim racial bias in their own particular capital-murder trials”); see Editorial, They Were 
Freed from Death Row.  Republicans Put Them Back., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019) 
https://nyti.ms/2Pbt1vt [https://perma.cc/2M4T-JAUV] (criticizing North Carolina’s Republican 
legislature for repealing the Racial Justice Act in 2013); see also Colbert, supra note 613, at 32–39 
(underscoring how the Thirteenth Amendment’s framers intended “the amendment’s guarantee of 
freedom [to mean] more than merely freeing the slaves from bondage,” id. at 36). 
 644 See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 645 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: 
A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 96–100 (2001) (conducting a study of 
comparative effectiveness of prosecutors and defense counsel in the use of peremptories in capital trials 
in Philadelphia and documenting the “greater effectiveness of the Commonwealth in excluding its 
prime targets [young black men and women] from the juries that were finally seated,” id. at 100).  For 
a discussion of abolitionist organizing strategies to shrink the resources and power of the prosecuting 
office, see Abolitionist Principles & Campaign Strategies for Prosecutor Organizing, COMMUNITY 
JUST. EXCHANGE, https://www.communityjusticeexchange.org [https://perma.cc/U6PE-BWF4]. 
 646 The Court recently considered a case involving a “bad apple” juror who made racist com-
ments about the defendant’s Mexican heritage during jury deliberation.  See Peña-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017).  In a 5-3 decision, the Court held the Sixth Amendment right 
to a fair trial requires an exception to the rule against impeaching jurors “where a juror makes a 
clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal 
defendant.”  Id. at 869.  The Court limited the exception to statements showing that the racial 
stereotype or racial animus was “a significant motivating factor” in a juror’s decision to convict, 
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in Flowers examined the prosecutor’s actions only for conduct indicating 
a belief that black jurors would be “partial to the defendant because of 
their shared race”647 — a false assumption rejected by Batson.  They 
did not consider the reality that white jurors historically have presumed 
the guilt of black defendants because of racism.648 
Finally, an abolition constitutionalism would recognize that Evans’s 
interest in an all-white jury was to secure the execution of Flowers  
regardless of his culpability for the crime.649  An abolitionist reading of 
the Constitution would not permit the Court to allow Flowers to un-
dergo another capital trial after reversing his conviction.  Rather, the 
state’s dogged campaign to obtain and uphold Flowers’s death sentence 
is an opportunity to revisit the constitutionality of capital punishment 
and to abolish it.650  As discussed in section I.B.1(c), the death penalty 
can be traced back to the gruesome punishments inflicted on enslaved 
people and the spectacle lynchings carried out during the Jim Crow era.  
State executions only survive today because they continue to represent 
white domination over black people.  Even if the Supreme Court inval-
idated all-white juries, the death penalty would still function as a form 
of racialized subjugation.  Prison abolitionists understand capital pun-
ishment as a key aspect of the prison industrial complex that contributes 
to the enforcement of racial subordination and support for racial  
capitalism.651  This understanding helps clarify why state executions 
should cease altogether.  Abolitionists would link the prosecutor’s use of 
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noting “[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting aside the 
no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry.”  Id. 
 647 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; see Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241; id. at 2269 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 648 See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 613, at 22 (explaining how white juries were inclined to convict 
black defendants because they were black); see also Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race 
in Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017, 1048–49 (2012) (finding that while “conviction rates for 
black and white defendants are similar when there is at least some representation of blacks in the 
jury pool . . . in the absence of such representation, black defendants are substantially more likely 
to be convicted,” id. at 1048). 
 649 The Court found that Evans intentionally sought to empanel an all-white jury.  Flowers, 139 
S. Ct. at 2246 (“The State’s relentless, determined effort to rid the jury of black individuals strongly 
suggests that the State wanted to try Flowers before a jury with as few black jurors as possible, and 
ideally before an all-white jury.”)  Though it is theoretically possible that Evans himself cared about 
Flowers’s culpability, all-white juries have been historically used as a tool of racial violence and 
racial intimidation to such an extent that commentators have explored “the inherent injustice of the 
all-white jury.”  Colbert, supra note 613, at 4 & n.6; see also Forman, supra note 613, at 915–16 
(discussing the historical importance of securing the right for black people to sit on juries).  It seems 
exceedingly unlikely, then, that Evans sought an all-white jury for any other purpose. 
 650 The Court has questioned the constitutionality of capital punishment in the past and should do 
so again.  See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599–600 (1977) (holding that the death penalty for rape 
violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (striking down the death penalty as unconstitutional as applied). 
 651 See McLeod, Grounded Justice, supra note 91, at 1216–17 (describing a “death-sentencing 
regime that impacts African Americans and white defendants differently on the basis of their race”); 
supra pp. 40–42. 
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unscrupulous tactics, including convening all-white juries to condemn 
Flowers to death for killing three white people, to the slave executions 
and lynching that were the death penalty’s predecessors.  In addition to 
reversing Flowers’s conviction and requiring states to take steps to dis-
mantle the all-white jury system, an abolition constitutionalism would 
abolish the death penalty. 
III. TOWARD A NEW ABOLITION CONSTITUTIONALISM 
We can see constitutional history after the Reconstruction  
Amendments as a contest — in legislatures, courts, and the streets — 
over interpreting the Amendments as either moving toward or retreating 
from slavery’s eradication.  Because we can read the Reconstruction 
Constitution as incorporating the abolition constitutionalism of antislav-
ery activists,652 we should reciprocally interrogate both the  
Constitution’s relevance to today’s prison abolition movement and the 
movement’s relevance to interpreting the Constitution’s provisions.  Just 
as antebellum abolitionists broke from the dominant interpretation of 
the Constitution as a proslavery document,653 so too prison abolitionists 
need not be shackled to the prevailing constitutional jurisprudence in 
advancing the unfinished freedom struggle. 
Engaging the relationship between prison abolition and the  
Reconstruction Amendments, as well as the abolition constitutionalism 
that inspired them, raises several generative questions.  Can we apply 
prison abolitionist theories to the Constitution’s text not only to con-
demn it but also to use it instrumentally to achieve abolitionist objec-
tives?  Can we advocate for a reading of the Constitution that both 
aligns with the abolition constitutionalism advanced by antislavery  
activists and attends to contemporary forms of white supremacy and 
racial capitalism?  In the process, might today’s abolitionists imagine a 
new abolition constitutionalism that helps to chart the path toward a 
society without prisons? 
A. Approaching the Constitution Instrumentally 
One reason some prison abolitionists eschew any reliance on the  
Reconstruction Constitution to make claims or envision change is that 
they see the text itself as accommodating slavery.  Many abolitionists 
explicitly condemn the Thirteenth Amendment’s Punishment Clause for 
allowing the reenslavement of black people by incarcerating them for 
committing crimes.654  “One of the big reforms that sold us out was the 
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 652 See supra pp. 54–64. 
 653 See supra pp. 54–55. 
 654 See sources cited supra note 396. 
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Thirteenth Amendment” is a common accusation among prison aboli-
tionists.655  The Reconstruction Constitution “just modified” slavery; it 
did not abolish it.656 
According to this view, the Thirteenth Amendment was part and 
parcel of the white supremacist backlash against Emancipation.  Its very 
text contained the seeds of reinstating the formerly enslaved to servitude 
from the moment Congress enacted it.  Congress gave the impression of 
radically incorporating black people into citizenship when in fact it was 
preparing a way to legally deny them their rights.  “The Thirteenth 
Amendment ensnares as it emancipates,” Professor Joy James writes.657  
“In fact, it functions as an enslaving anti-enslavement narrative.”658  The 
symbolic power of the Reconstruction Constitution as an abolitionist 
text that installed freedom thus adds to the Constitution’s ability to sus-
tain a false narrative of the United States as a bastion of freedom and 
equality.659  Embracing such a document would therefore only contrib-
ute to its anti-abolitionist performance.  Thus, although many prison 
abolitionists describe their work as continuing the struggle antebellum 
freedom fighters and abolitionists began, they frame it in opposition to 
the Reconstruction Constitution.660 
A second reason some prison abolitionists reject the Constitution is 
that they view the entire U.S. legal system as subordinating black people 
and preserving the racial capitalist order.661  This position relies not so 
much on the Amendments’ precise language as on the political role the 
Constitution, as a central part of the state’s legal apparatus, plays in 
upholding the carceral regime.  According to these theorists, states use 
the law to perpetuate their own institutions, and constitutional change 
within formal legal processes occurs only to maintain the look of legiti-
macy.662  If abolition work can only be completely effective “without 
involving the state,”663 there may be no role for the Constitution to play.  
Indeed, the very project of abolition constitutionalism could be anti-
abolitionist. 
James combines both these points by explaining how the  
Reconstruction Amendments helped to place the state in opposition to 
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 655 Profiles in Abolition, supra note 19, at 5:05. 
 656 Id. at 5:16. 
 657 James, Democracy and Captivity, supra note 37, at xxii. 
 658 Id. 
 659 See, e.g., Rana, supra note 343, at 267 (arguing that the Constitution’s powerful symbolism 
has prevented Americans from appreciating the country’s colonial origins). 
 660 See sources cited supra note 37. 
 661 Muntaqim, supra note 37, at 7 (arguing for a view of the “judicial process as part of a gov-
ernmental pogrom to repress dissent to racism . . . [that] continues a long process of racial injustice 
built into our nation’s [C]onstitution through the original sanctioning of slavery”). 
 662 Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 476–79 (2018). 
 663 Meiners, supra note 37. 
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the abolition of white supremacy.664  She contrasts the abolition democ-
racy advanced by black radicals with the “advocacy democracy”  
promoted by a “U.S. conservative-centrist-progressive” political system 
that “works for reforms with an anti-black racism that structured de-
mocracy’s evolution.”665  James connects the founding of the nation to 
the Reconstruction Amendments, understanding both as part of a  
continuum of anti-abolitionist developments: “an anti-abolitionist revo-
lutionary war that blocked the expansion of the 1772 Somerset ruling 
(emancipating a black slave brought to Britain from colonial America); 
an anti-abolitionist 13th [A]mendment that codifies slavery to prison; 
an anti-abolitionist 14th [A]mendment that transfers black political per-
sonhood (and social standing) to corporations.”666 
Moreover, the courts, which have been the traditional venue for 
making constitutional claims, are the very state agents that have evis-
cerated efforts to install a more radical Constitution and have been  
hostile to an abolitionist approach.667  Radicals of color have criticized 
the presumption in constitutional theory that “minorities are best pro-
tected with national oversight, rights-based frameworks, and judicial 
solicitude.”668  For this reason, many abolitionists have repudiated U.S. 
constitutional rights altogether and instead contest U.S. carceral policies 
without reference to rights or as violations of international human 
rights.669  Even claims that rested in part on the U.S. Constitution have 
primarily relied on international human rights law, such as the petition 
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 664 See James, Democracy and Captivity, supra note 37, at xxviii–xxix. 
 665 James, 7 Lessons, supra note 42. 
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 667 See supra section II.D, pp. 71–93; cf. Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 TEX. 
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 669 See Akbar, supra note 662, at 447; Ajamu Baraka, Malcolm X and Human Rights in the Time 
of Trumpism: Transcending the Master’s Tools, THE ABOLITIONIST, Spring 2017, at 15, https:// 
abolitionistpaper.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/abby-27-english-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/LB45-
DWXJ] (arguing that human rights are a “de-colonial fighting instrument”); Isaac Onitveros, Not 
Without a Fight: The San Francisco 8, THE ABOLITIONIST, Spring 2007, at 5, 10, https:// 
abolitionistpaper.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/abolitionist-issue-6-spring-2007-english.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/6SER-CY4Z] (noting that Black Panthers contextualized U.S. human rights violations 
within a larger international human rights context). 
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brought to the United Nations by the Civil Rights Congress in 1951 that 
charged the U.S. government with racism and genocide.670 
This Foreword takes seriously the question whether engaging with 
the Constitution, which from its installation has served settler- 
colonialism, slavery, and racial capitalism, can be useful to an abolition-
ist movement.  As discussed in Part II, the dominant reading of both the 
original Constitution and Reconstruction Amendments has been anti- 
abolitionist.671  There are good reasons, however, for prison abolitionists 
to engage abolition constitutionalism.  First, it is significant that the 
original Constitution that incorporated slavery was rewritten to abolish 
it in response to a hard-fought freedom struggle.  Many antislavery  
activists, like Frederick Douglass, professed an alternative reading of 
the Constitution — an abolition constitutionalism.672  We can see the  
Reconstruction Amendments as a compromised embodiment of the un-
finished revolution for which abolitionists today continue to fight.  Like 
antebellum abolitionist theorizing, prison abolitionism can craft an  
approach to engaging with the Constitution that furthers radical change. 
Second, prison abolitionists acknowledge that building a prisonless 
society is a long-term project involving incremental achievements.  As 
Critical Resistance puts it, abolition “means developing practical strate-
gies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real 
and that lead us all to believe that things really could be different.”673  
Some of those steps will entail engaging with the state.674  In demanding 
state action that promotes prison abolition, abolition activists can use 
constitutional provisions instrumentally to assert and sometimes win 
their claims. 
Finally, prison abolitionists need not let the Constitution compromise 
their principles or aspirations.  While taking inspiration from antislavery 
abolitionists, we can approach the Constitution differently.  For exam-
ple, although the Radical Republicans opposed chattel slavery and con-
vict leasing, they did not abolish imprisonment as a punishment for 
crimes.  Today’s prison abolitionists are dealing with a different  
beast — the prison industrial complex and other modern carceral logics, 
supported by advanced forms of racial capitalism.  There are also new 
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 670 CIVIL RIGHTS CONG., WE CHARGE GENOCIDE vii (William L. Patterson ed., Int’l  
Publishers 1970) (1951); see DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 79 (discussing 
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 673 What Is the PIC? What Is Abolition?, supra note 21. 
 674 Harsha Walia & Andrew Dilts, Dismantle and Transform: On Abolition, Decolonization, and 
Insurgent Politics, 1 ABOLITION 12, 14–15 (2018). 
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theories that explain and contest modern modes of carceral punishment, 
including black radical philosophy, critical race theory, black feminist 
theory, and intersectionality.675  Davis frames prison abolition as a  
continuation of the antislavery movement, but she notes an important 
distinction between the two: “[T]he abolition of slavery was accom-
plished only in the negative sense,” she writes.676  “In order to achieve 
the comprehensive abolition of slavery — after the institution was ren-
dered illegal and black people were released from their chains — new 
institutions should have been created to incorporate black people into 
the social order.”677  Prison abolitionists can affirm the aim of antebel-
lum abolitionists to radically dismantle the institution of slavery and 
also demonstrate, with the benefit of historical hindsight and sustained 
abolitionist theorizing, that this objective requires abolishing prisons  
altogether by replacing them with new institutions that incorporate 
black people fully into a free society. 
The goals of freedom and equal citizenship have been “the heart of 
black Americans’ fidelity to the Constitution.”678  In a previous analysis 
of black people’s approach to the Constitution, I distinguished between 
a presumption of inherent loyalty to the Constitution and the instrumen-
tal use of the Constitution to achieve a more important objective.679  I 
argued that black people have historically expressed fidelity to the  
Constitution because it offers “practical advantages” to their struggle for 
equal citizenship.680  Under this instrumental approach, equal citizen-
ship does not arise from the Constitution; it precedes it.  The  
Constitution is not the standard of justice we should faithfully uphold; 
equal citizenship is.  We know what democracy means not by immersing 
ourselves in the Constitution’s language but by imagining what it would 
mean for black people to be treated like free and equal human beings.  
The purpose of constitutional fidelity is to insist that constitutional in-
terpretations abide by this higher standard of justice.  “In short, fidelity 
is a means, not an end, and it is a means to an end that is more funda-
mental than the Constitution.”681  Abolition constitutionalism, unlike 
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 675 See, e.g., CARRUTHERS, supra note 26, at 8–12 (discussing black queer feminist theory);  
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 445, at 3–11 (discussing critical race theory); Akbar, supra 
note 662, at 412–13 (discussing radical racial justice movements); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the 
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 1241, 1242–44 (1991) (discussing the intersectionality of racism and sexism); see also sources 
cited supra note 32. 
 676 DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 95. 
 677 Id.; cf. supra pp. 62–63 (discussing the unsuccessful Freedmen’s Bureau). 
 678 Roberts, Blacks’ Fidelity, supra note 38, at 1762. 
 679 Id. 
 680 Id. 
 681 Id.; cf. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Ninth Chronicle: Race, Legal Instrumentalism, and the 
Rule of Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 388 (1994) (advocating for “[l]egal instrumentalism,” an  
approach that treats law as “a tool that is useful for certain purposes and at certain times”). 
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other constitutional fidelities, aims not at shoring up the prevailing con-
stitutional reading but at abolishing it and remaking a polity that is 
radically different. 
Prison abolitionists can follow this tradition by instrumentally using 
the Constitution to build a society based on principles of freedom, equal 
humanity, and democracy — a society that has no need for prisons.  In 
this section, I explore how prison abolitionists might instrumentally use 
the Constitution to make persuasive arguments for change and to 
achieve nonreformist abolitionist reforms that would eradicate or shrink 
discrete components of the carceral punishment system, mitigate the suf-
fering caused by carceral conditions, and create the conditions needed 
for a society without prisons.  I also consider the possibility that, in the 
process, prison abolitionists might imagine a new constitutionalism 
based on the society they are working to create.  In other words, a new 
abolition constitutionalism would not serve to sustain and improve the 
U.S. state and its carceral systems.  Rather, it would serve to guide and 
govern a society in the making where prisons are obsolete. 
1. Holding Courts and Legislatures to an Abolitionist Reading. — 
Black Panther Party activist and author George Jackson, a leading fig-
ure in the prison abolition movement,682 called for “the gracious, sensi-
tive, brainy types . . . to hold the legal pigs to the strictest interpretation 
of the Constitution possible.”683  Surely Jackson wasn’t upholding the 
U.S. Constitution as a beacon for a radical movement or expressing faith 
in judges to apply it for the sake of black freedom.  Indeed, he was 
forced into the courtroom he then used as a platform to put American 
justice on trial.684  But Jackson didn’t throw out the Constitution either.  
Rather, Jackson was deploying it strategically as a legal, ideological, and 
rhetorical tactic to expose the hypocrisy of his imprisonment and the 
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 682 See BERGER, CAPTIVE NATION, supra note 18, at 91–95; DAVIS, ABOLITION  
DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 21. 
 683 Letter from George Jackson to Fay Stender (Mar. 31, 1970), in JACKSON, supra note 18, at 
231.  The Black Panthers similarly emphasized legal accountability by confronting police officers 
harassing a black man and demanding, law books in hand, that the “pigs” abide by the letter of the 
law.  David Ray Papke, The Black Panther Party’s Narratives of Resistance, 18 VT. L. REV. 645, 
674–75 (1994). 
 684 See BERGER, CAPTIVE NATION, supra note 18, at 92; see also Haywood Burns, Can a Black 
Man Get a Fair Trial in this Country?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 12, 1970, at 46, 
https://nyti.ms/1Glxvi4 [https://perma.cc/6GL9-SDPN] (“[M]any revolutionary defendants have 
ceased to look upon the courtroom as an arena in which a contest for and against their exoneration 
is waged, but rather as a platform to expose the failings of the legal system, to educate and politicize 
a larger public — to indict the system.”); Joyce M. Bell, Kangaroo Court: The Black Power Move-
ment and the Courtroom as a Site of Resistance (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library) (arguing that in the 1970s Black Power defendants and their lawyers used 
courtrooms as sites of resistance to expose and condemn the normative legitimacy of the political 
order and legal system). 
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prison system’s reenslavement of black people.685  Jackson’s demand for 
the “strictest interpretation of the Constitution possible”686 might be 
seen as holding courts to the abolitionist reading of the Constitution en-
visioned by the antislavery activists who inspired the Reconstruction 
Amendments.687 
Beginning in the 1960s, prisoners have asserted legal claims based 
on the Constitution to challenge their incarceration and the conditions 
of their confinement.688  The 1964 case Cooper v. Pate,689 which held 
that prisoners could bring constitutional challenges against prison offi-
cials in federal court,690 fueled a prisoners’ rights movement that relied 
largely on civil rights lawsuits.691  According to Professor Robert T. 
Chase, incarcerated people immediately took advantage of the oppor-
tunity to bring constitutional claims: “[T]he number of prisoners’ rights 
suits dramatically increased from 218 in 1966 to almost 18,477 in 1984.  
Between 1970 and 1996 the number of prisoner civil rights lawsuits 
leaped an astonishing 400 percent.”692  Prison activists in the 1960s and 
1970s mobilized around the prisons-as-slavery metaphor, but did not see 
it as reason to reject using constitutional provisions as a means to ad-
vance their activism.693 
The prisoners’ rights movement achieved a major victory in the class 
action lawsuit Ruiz v. Estelle,694 filed in 1972, which sought numerous 
changes in the Texas prison system, including alleviating overcrowding, 
improving health care, increasing access to attorneys, and ending the 
practice of having prisoners act as guards, which had created a system 
of sexual violence within prisons.695  In 1980, two years after the trial 
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 685 On the concept of prisons as slavery in black prison radicalism, see BERGER, CAPTIVE  
NATION, supra note 18, at 177–222. 
 686 Letter from George Jackson to Fay Stender (Mar. 31, 1970), in JACKSON, supra note 18, at 231. 
 687 See Bell, supra note 684, at 10–12 (describing the courtroom strategy of “righteous contempt” 
that Black Power defendants and their lawyers used to “challenge[] the legitimacy of the court and 
court officers,” id. at 10).  In 1970, defendants in People v. Shakur, popularly known as the Panther 
21, wrote a memo to presiding Judge Murtagh contesting his threat to hold them in contempt and 
asking: “How can we be in contempt of a court that is in contempt of its own laws?  How can you be 
responsible for ‘maintaining respect and dispersing justice’ when you have dispensed with justice, and 
you do not maintain respect for your own Constitution?”  Letter from the Panther 21 to Judge Murtagh 
(Mar. 7–21, 1970), in THE BLACK PANTHERS SPEAK 210 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1970). 
 688 See Robert T. Chase, We Are Not Slaves: Rethinking the Rise of Carceral States Through the 
Lens of the Prisoners’ Rights Movement, 102 J. AM. HIST. 73, 73–74 (2015).  For additional sources 
on the prisoners’ rights movement, see sources cited supra note 18. 
 689 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam). 
 690 Id. at 546. 
 691 Chase, supra note 688, at 77. 
 692 Id. 
 693 See id. (describing prisoners’ use of the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments); 
id. at 80–83 (describing the prisons-as-slavery organizing principle). 
 694 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), 
amended in part, vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 695 Id. at 1275–77, 1292, 1295–97, 1297 n.64, 1307, 1367. 
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began — making it “at that time the largest and longest civil rights case 
in the history of American jurisprudence”696 — Chief Judge Justice 
found the Texas prison system unconstitutional.697  However, in the dec-
ades since Ruiz, the Texas prison system has continued to cage increas-
ing numbers of people under conditions that have not changed dramat-
ically.698  The history of instrumental litigation of constitutional claims 
by the prisoners’ rights movement demonstrates both the utility of mak-
ing constitutional law part of abolitionist activism and the inadequacy 
of relying on legal institutions to create and enforce  
effective remedies. 
Prison abolitionists still frequently make constitutional arguments 
from behind bars.699  Many prisoners writing in the publications of  
Critical Resistance, including its journal, The Abolitionist, state their 
claims in the language of constitutional rights.  They have argued, for 
instance, that the parole system violates the Due Process Clause,700 or 
that prosecutors’ exclusion of black people from juries violates the Sixth 
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 696 Chase, supra note 688, at 79. 
 697 Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1383–84; see also JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON 
TRIAL 7–9 (2014) (discussing the 2011 Supreme Court case Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), 
which declared conditions in California prisons unconstitutional and imposed a population cap on 
the state prison system). 
 698 PERKINSON, supra note 52, at 4; id. at 325–26 (describing how conditions within the prison 
at issue in Ruiz “remained abysmal” nearly twenty years after Judge Justice’s ruling, id. at 326).  In 
1999, Ruiz came before the court again, and Judge Justice found that the prison’s practices still 
amounted to “systemic constitutional violations.”  Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 888 (S.D. 
Tex. 1999), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Ruiz v. United States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 699 See generally, e.g., MUMIA ABU-JAMAL, JAILHOUSE LAWYERS (2009) (compiling writings 
from individuals incarcerated in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries describing resistance from 
within the carceral system, including through civil rights suits).  On contemporary prison writings, 
see MUMIA ABU-JAMAL, WRITING ON THE WALL: SELECTED PRISON WRITINGS OF MUMIA 
ABU-JAMAL (Johanna Fernández ed., 2015) (collecting the extensive writings of a death row pris-
oner on the carceral system’s effects within and outside of prison); FOURTH CITY: ESSAYS FROM 
THE PRISON IN AMERICA 1 (Doran Larson ed., 2013) (presenting “the widest sampling to date of 
first-person, frontline witness to the human experience of mass incarceration in the United States”); 
FROM THE PLANTATION TO THE PRISON: AFRICAN-AMERICAN CONFINEMENT LITERA-
TURE (Tara T. Green ed., 2008) (collecting essays that examine African American confinement lit-
erature); IMPRISONED INTELLECTUALS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL PRISONERS WRITE ON LIFE, 
LIBERATION, AND REBELLION (Joy James ed., 2003) (compiling letters from prison and other 
writings critiquing the carceral system); PRISON WRITING IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (H. 
Bruce Franklin ed., 1998) (sampling writings by twentieth-century American prisoners describing 
the oppressive nature of the prison experience); THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS: (NEO)SLAVE NAR-
RATIVES AND CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS, supra note 37, at xiii (collecting “writings 
by modern and contemporary imprisoned authors” critiquing the violent and exploitative carceral 
system).  
 700 See Pablo Agrio, Attainder in California: Alive and Well, THE ABOLITIONIST, Summer 2006, 
at 4, https://abolitionistpaper.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/abolitionist-issue-4-summer- 
2006-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T3X-K9XU] (arguing that California’s practice of categorically 
withholding parole violates due process rights). 
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Amendment.701  They have encouraged citizens to learn and understand 
their full rights under the Constitution,702 and have supported suing prison 
officials for constitutional violations.703  For these prison activists, assert-
ing their constitutional rights constitutes both a pragmatic use of legal tools 
to win release or change carceral conditions and an empowering rhetorical 
demand for legal recognition.704  As George Jackson’s appeal to “brainy 
types”705 suggests, lawyers and legal scholars can play an important role in 
helping to articulate and present the demands of people subjected to car-
ceral punishment for strict adherence to the Constitution’s abolitionist  
directives — even when they anticipate failure.706 
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 701 See Demontrell Miller, Juries and “Justice,” THE ABOLITIONIST, Spring 2017, at 13, 
https://abolitionistpaper.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/abby-27-english-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
9FBE-E4CV] (arguing that the exclusion of black people from juries violates the Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury).  
 702 See Letter to the Editor, THE ABOLITIONIST, Winter 2006, at 11, https:// 
abolitionistpaper.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/abolitionist-issue-5-winter-2006-english.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/YL8S-RME6] (calling for activists to “read and understand the State and Federal Consti-
tutions” so that people know their rights).  In 1970, the striking prisoners at California’s Folsom 
State Prison issued a “Manifesto of Demands and Anti-Oppression Platform” that declared: “In our 
peaceful efforts to assemble in dissent as provided under the nation’s United States Constitution, 
we are in turn murdered, brutalized, and framed on various criminal charges because we seek the 
rights and privileges of all American people.”  BERGER, CAPTIVE NATION, supra note 18, at 1 
(quoting The Folsom Prisoners Manifesto of Demands and Anti-Oppression Platform, in IF THEY 
COME IN THE MORNING . . . : VOICES OF RESISTANCE 74 (1971); see also Miller, supra note 701 
(arguing that the Black Panther Party was correct that “[i]f the [C]onstitution was applied  
‘honestly’ . . . the prisons would not be so filled with Black bodies and Black suffering”). 
 703 See, e.g., Sitawa Nantambu Jamaa et al., Statement of California Prisoner Representatives on 
Second Anniversary of Ashker v. Brown Settlement, THE ABOLITIONIST, Winter 2018, at 2, 
https://abolitionistpaper.files.wordpress.com/2018/07/abby_issue_28_eng_color-web.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RAH4-7ANW] (celebrating civil rights suit settlement and calling for ongoing work); 
Quinnell Avery Johnson III, An Interface for Politically Minded Prisoners, The  
ABOLITIONIST, Fall 2018, at 14, https://abolitionistpaper.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/abby_ 
30_eng-reduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FY7-7NGT]  (discussing his pro se § 1983 lawsuit and the 
utility of using shared constitutional violations as a way to unite and politicize prisoners). 
 704 Cf. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 6–8 (1991) (discussing 
how constitutional law can be used to highlight unnoticed aspects of racially complex problems); 
Crenshaw, supra note 450, at 1364–66 (arguing that rights rhetoric was politically effective as an 
“organizing feature of the civil rights movement,” id. at 1365).  
 705 Letter from George Jackson to Fay Stender (Mar. 31, 1970), in JACKSON, supra note 18, at 231. 
 706 For example, in the 1970s, the National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL) served as the 
“legal arm of the revolution” by representing radical black defendants such as Angela Davis, Assata 
Shakur, and prisoners in the Attica Rebellion.  Bell, supra note 684, at 1.  NCBL attorneys also 
participated in amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court in the landmark affirmative action case, 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  Id.  NCBL explained its role 
in the preamble to its 1968 constitution: “Where the Black revolution requires the development of 
unique and unorthodox legal remedies to insure the effective implementation of the just demands 
of Black people for legal, economic and social security and protection, we must aid it.”  Declaration 
of Commitment and Concern, NAT’L CONF. BLACK LAW., https://www.ncbl.org/?page_id=1377 
[https://perma.cc/A6K6-T2RT]; cf. ALEC KARAKATSANIS, USUAL CRUELTY: THE COMPLICITY 
OF LAWYERS IN THE CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM 146–47, 160 (2019) (blaming the emergence 
of the prison industrial complex in part on the failure of lawyers to vigorously defend the constitu-
tional rights of criminal defendants).  On the significance of failure to abolitionist struggle, see  
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2.  Nonreformist Abolitionist Reforms. — Prison abolition is a long-
term project that requires strategically working toward the complete 
elimination of carceral punishment.  No abolitionist expects all prison 
walls to come tumbling down at once.  Yet abolitionist philosophy is 
defined in contradistinction to reform: reforming prisons is diametrically 
opposed to abolishing them.707  Efforts to improve the fairness of car-
ceral systems and to increase their efficiency or legitimacy only 
strengthen those systems and divert attention from eradicating them.  
How can abolitionists take incremental steps toward dismantling pris-
ons without falling into reformist traps?  Prison abolitionists resolved 
this quandary with the concept of “non-reformist reforms — those 
measures that reduce the power of an oppressive system while illumi-
nating the system’s inability to solve the crises it creates.”708  By engag-
ing in nonreformist reforms, abolitionists strive to make transformative 
changes in carceral systems with the objective of demolishing those sys-
tems rather than fixing them.709  They recognize that these reforms alone 
are inadequate; indeed, achieving these piecemeal changes in the prison 
industrial complex reveals the necessity of its total eradication.  To be 
abolitionist, reforms must shrink rather than strengthen “the state’s ca-
pacity for violence.”710 
In addition, nonreformist reforms must facilitate the goal of building 
a society without prisons.  As migrant justice activist Harsha Walia ex-
plains, “[a]rguably every reform entrenches the power of the state be-
cause it gives the state the power to implement that reform.  But from 
an ethical orientation towards emancipation, I think a guiding question 
on non-reformist reforms is: Is it increasing the possibility of free-
dom?”711  A critical test for engaging with the U.S. Constitution is 
whether there are particular ways an abolition constitutionalism facili-
tates — rather than constrains — imagining a society where prisons are 
obsolete. 
In using the Constitution to support legal changes that move toward 
abolition, prison abolitionists can consider a variety of forums.  Courts 
are not the only venues where abolitionists can make constitutional 
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Andrew Dilts, Justice as Failure, 13 LAW CULTURE & HUMAN. 184, 190 (2017) (describing justice 
“as failure and as an ongoing practice of freedom conditioned by that failure”). 
 707 See sources cited supra note 17.  
 708 Berger, Kaba & Stein, supra note 45. 
 709 See Walia & Dilts, supra note 674, at 15; see also McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 
supra note 30, at 1616; McLeod, Grounded Justice, supra note 91, at 1207–18. 
 710 Berger, Kaba & Stein, supra note 45; see also Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Police “Reforms” You 
Should Always Oppose, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 7, 2014), https://truthout.org/articles/police-reforms-you-
should-always-oppose [https://perma.cc/XL8K-HR58]. 
 711 Walia & Dilts, supra note 674, at 15. 
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claims and forge an abolition constitutionalism.712  Like the judiciary, 
Congress and state governments are bound by the Constitution,713 and, 
should those bodies adopt an abolitionist reading of the Constitution, 
they would have substantial power to enact the changes that interpre-
tation would require.714  Indeed, the Thirteenth Amendment itself  
empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, anticipating the inade-
quacy of case-by-case judicial eradication of slavery.715 
Abolition constitutionalism could support many of the nonreformist 
reforms in which prison abolitionists and other activists are already en-
gaged, including efforts to stop prison expansion by opposing prison 
construction or shutting down prisons that already exist;716 end police 
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 712 Cf. SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE 
NEW RIGHT 3–5 (2014) (examining the role of administrative agencies as venues for constitutional 
civil rights activism); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
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 714 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Congress); id. art. I, § 8 (enu-
merating many of the powers of Congress); id. amend. XIII, § 2 (granting Congress “power to  
enforce [the Thirteenth Amendment] by appropriate legislation); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting  
Congress similar power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 285, 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“The powers 
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lawmakers typically may support the Constitution’s mandates using their general police power un-
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 715 See Darrell A.H. Miller, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Regulation of Custom, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1835, 1841 (2012); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 
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into effective legislation.”); Tsesis, Civil Rights Approach, supra note 288, at 1777 (“[T]he  
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 716 See Berger, Kaba & Stein, supra note 45; see also, e.g., About Us, NO NEW JAILS NYC, 
https://nonewjails.nyc [https://perma.cc/BTY4-5FTF]; Shut Down Berks Campaign, JUNTOS, 
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stop-and-frisk practices;717 eliminate the requirement of money bail to 
release people charged with crimes;718 repeal harsh mandatory  
minimums, even for violent crimes;719 give amnesty to individual pris-
oners, including political prisoners and prisoners believed to have killed 
in self-defense;720 and decriminalize drug use and possession and other 
nonviolent conduct.721  To the extent that such practices perpetuate slav-
ery in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress, state  
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that activists played in pressuring the governor to grant clemency); Hundreds March in Philly to 
“Free Mumia Now!,” WORKERS WORLD (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.workers.org/2019/04/30/ 
hundreds-march-in-philly-to-free-mumia-now [https://perma.cc/D7V8-7T83] (describing a rally cel-
ebrating court victory for incarcerated prison abolition activist Mumia Abu-Jamal). 
 721 See Berger, Kaba & Stein, supra note 45 (“[A]bolitionists have been at the forefront of the 
[campaign for] decriminalization of drug use.”); see also, e.g., Jasmine Garsd, Should Sex Work Be 
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legislatures, and city assemblies, as well as courts, are empowered by 
the Federal Constitution722 and state constitutions723 to enact these non-
reformist reforms. 
Prison abolitionists have also organized to hold police and other law 
enforcement agents accountable for violence and rights violations.  One 
of their major victories is the Reparations Ordinance, passed by the  
Chicago City Council on May 6, 2015.724  The ordinance was a long-
delayed response to the Chicago Police Department’s systematic inflic-
tion of torture and other forms of violence against African American 
suspects under the command of Jon Burge.725  After decades of agita-
tion, the activists won a package of measures, including monetary  
compensation for the living survivors, tuition-free education at the City  
Colleges for survivors and their families, and a public memorial.726   
Mariame Kaba calls the Reparations Ordinance “an abolitionist docu-
ment” because it “did not rely on the court, prison, and punishment  
system[s] to try to envision a more expansive view of justice.”727  The 
activists deliberately refused to seek criminal prosecution of the officers 
involved or civil damages against the City of Chicago.728  Instead, they 
pressured the City Council to redress their claims through a radically 
democratic process, led by survivors and grassroots organizers and oc-
curring outside formal legal institutions, that included street protest, 
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Decriminalized? Some Activists Say It’s Time, NPR (Mar. 22, 2019, 2:43 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/03/22/705354179/should-sex-work-be-decriminalized-some-activists-say-
its-time [https://perma.cc/P4MH-S7X7] (highlighting activists’ efforts to decriminalize sex work); 
Invest-Divest, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/invest-divest 
[https://perma.cc/4SGA-L35X] (calling for decriminalization of drug offenses and prostitution  
offenses as a racial justice issue). 
 722 See sources cited supra notes 713–714 and accompanying text. 
 723 See Goodwin, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 174, at 983–87 (discussing the potential 
enactment of state “legislation to ban slavery, including for conviction of a crime,” id. at 983). 
 724 Chicago, Ill., Substitute Resolution R2015-256 (May 6, 2015); see also Natalie Y. Moore, Pay-
back, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 30, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject. 
org/2018/10/30/payback [https://perma.cc/S8C4-ZBVM]. 
 725 See supra p. 24.  
 726 Chicago, Ill., Substitute Resolution R2015-256 (May 6, 2015); see McLeod, Envisioning  
Abolition Democracy, supra note 30, at 1627 (discussing the five million dollars in reparations for 
survivors); Roberts, Torture, supra note 86, at 243–44 (discussing the ways in which police torture 
has been used to reinforce racial hierarchies); CHI. TORTURE JUST. MEMORIALS, 
https://www.chicagotorture.org [https://perma.cc/J24W-QDWK].  
 727 Dan Sloan, A World Without Prisons: A Conversation with Mariame Kaba, LUMPEN MAG. 
(Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.lumpenmagazine.org/a-world-without-prisons-a-conversation-with- 
mariame-kaba [https://perma.cc/J33M-YTHU]. 
 728 See McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, supra note 30, at 1613.  Some survivors did 
file civil lawsuits against Burge.  See, e.g., Sam Roberts, Jon Burge, Ex-Commander in Chicago 
Police Torture Cases, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2OGhZK7 
[https://perma.cc/SF2Y-9ADB]. 
118 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 133:1 
partnership with international human rights organizations, and media 
education.729 
3.  Treating the Symptoms While Ending the Disease. — While  
complete prison eradication is the ultimate goal of the abolitionist pro-
ject, before that aim comes to fruition abolitionists might consider invok-
ing the Constitution instrumentally to mitigate the harms inflicted  
by carceral punishment.  As law student, activist, and former prisoner 
Angel Sanchez puts it, abolitionists must treat prison like a “social cancer:  
we should fight to eradicate it but never stop treating those affected  
by it.”730 
The Thirteenth Amendment could facilitate a number of  
nonreformist reforms.  For example, abolitionists might consider taking 
up the constitutional arguments put forth by numerous scholars  
who have posited that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits exploita-
tive treatment of incarcerated people.731  Legal scholars have also  
made strong constitutional arguments against the shackling of incarcer-
ated people during labor and delivery732 and against solitary  
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 729 See McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, supra note 30, at 1624–26; G. Flint Taylor, 
The Long Path to Reparations for the Survivors of Chicago Police Torture, 11 NW. J. L. & SOC. 
POL’Y 330, 341–47 (2016); Joey L. Mogul, The Struggle for Reparations in the Burge Torture Cases, 
RACE RACISM & L., https://racism.org/index.php/articles/law-and-justice/criminal-justice-and- 
racism/134-police-brutality-and-lynchings/2005-the-struggle-for-reparations-in-the-burge-torture-
cases [https://perma.cc/J2X5-HWHY]. 
 730 Angel E. Sanchez, In Spite of Prison, in Developments in the Law — Prison Abolition, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 1650, 1652 (2019). 
 731 See, e.g., Ghali, supra note 170, at 610 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment, properly 
interpreted, does not preclude prisoners from litigating claims of sexual slavery); Raghunath, supra 
note 412, at 398 (arguing that consistency with Fifth and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires 
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit involuntary servitude for all but “those 
inmates who . . . have been . . . sentenced” to forced labor); Marion, Note, supra note 412, at 215 
(arguing that the current “system of private, unpaid use of labor [in private prisons] too closely 
resembles the slave system that the Thirteenth Amendment sought to abolish” to be constitutionally 
permissible, despite the Amendment’s exception for criminal punishments).  Numerous legal schol-
ars have applied the Thirteenth Amendment to contest a variety of unjust state and private insti-
tutions and practices, including abortion restrictions, domestic violence, worker exploitation, and 
racial gerrymandering, on the grounds that they constitute prohibited forms of involuntary servi-
tude or badges of slavery.  See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment 
Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480, 483–84, 486–93 (1990); Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond 
Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 207, 251–53 (1992); Patricia Okonta, Note, Race-Based Political Exclusion and Social 
Subjugation: Racial Gerrymandering as a Badge of Slavery, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 254, 
257 (2018); see also Pope, supra note 286 (manuscript at 2). 
 732 See Ocen, supra note 187, at 1287–310; see also CAROLYN SUFRIN, JAILCARE: FINDING 
THE SAFETY NET FOR WOMEN BEHIND BARS 7–8, 51–54, 234 (2017) (relating the constitutional 
history of access to medical treatment in prisons); Alexandria Gutierrez, Sufferings Peculiarly Their 
Own: The Thirteenth Amendment, in Defense of Incarcerated Women’s Reproductive Rights, 15 
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 117, 155–67 (2013) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment 
protects incarcerated women’s right to abortion). 
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confinement.733  Efforts to end the collateral consequences of incarcera-
tion, such as restrictions on voting rights, exclusion from public housing 
and other government benefits, and imposition of monetary sanctions, 
can also find support in the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of  
slavery.734  Professor William Carter lays out a framework for defining 
modern badges and incidents of slavery that looks to “the connection 
the group to which the plaintiff belongs or that Congress seeks to protect 
has to the  institution of chattel slavery” and “the connection the  
complained of injury or proscribed condition has to the institution of 
chattel slavery.”735  Thus, when numerous “racialized policies,” including 
those inflicted as a result of a criminal conviction, create “a permanent 
caste distinction of . . . magnitude and impermeability . . . [they] amount 
to a badge or incident of slavery.”736  Systematic exclusion of former 
prisoners from labor and housing markets,737 for example, deprives 
them of full rights of citizenship, amounting to an incident of slavery.738  
Notably, Congress has the authority to pass legislation under the  
Thirteenth Amendment to end practices that were instituted after the 
Civil War to reinstall white supremacy, such as monetary sanctions, 
forced prison labor, and felon disenfranchisement.739 
4.  Creating the Conditions for a Society Without Prisons. — Finally, 
prison abolitionists are dedicated to working within carceral society to 
“build models today that can represent how we want to live in the fu-
ture” and to start creating a radically different society where prisons are 
unimaginable.740  We can use constitutional support to demand the 
building blocks needed for this construction project — for example,  
legislation that transfers funds currently devoted to carceral systems, 
such as police, prisons, detention centers, and foster care, to community-
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 733 See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 115, 116–17 (2008) (arguing that prolonged solitary confinement “constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment and violates the due process rights of prisoners,” id. at 117). 
 734 See William M. Carter, Jr., Class as Caste: The Thirteenth Amendment’s Applicability to Class-
Based Subordination, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 813, 825–27 (2016); Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, The 
Ironic Promise of the Thirteenth Amendment for Offender Anti-Discrimination Law, 17 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1173–77 (2013).  See generally THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY 
AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (Alexander Tsesis 
ed., 2010) (collecting essays about the Thirteenth Amendment’s historical foundations and its rele-
vance to contemporary legal landscapes). 
 735 Carter, supra note 734, at 825. 
 736 Id. 
 737 See Ifeoma Ajunwa & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Combating Discrimination Against the  
Formerly Incarcerated in the Labor Market, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1385, 1394 (2018). 
 738 Cf. Henderson, supra note 734, at 1173–77. 
 739 See id. at 1173; see also, e.g., Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST. (May 31, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration- 
efforts-florida [https://perma.cc/A2UU-T7PP] (describing Florida’s constitutional amendment to  
restore voting rights to citizens with former felony convictions).  
 740 What Is the PIC? What Is Abolition?, supra note 21. 
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based efforts to meet people’s needs and resolve social conflicts nonvio-
lently.  Alexander Lee, founder and director of the Transgender, Gender 
Variant & Intersex Justice Project, argues that prison abolitionists will 
have to form “prickly coalitions” with people outside the movement who 
are engaged in providing “housing, healthcare, and other essentials [that] 
are the basis from which a world without prisons will be made  
possible.”741  Such coalitions that help to build a new society can be 
guided by abolitionist constitutional principles and requirements.742 
B. Imagining a Freedom Constitutionalism 
Abolitionists always have their eyes set on a future they are in the 
process of creating.  At the very same time they are deconstructing struc-
tures inherited from the past, they are constructing new ones to support 
the future society they envision.  Abolitionists are engaged in a collective 
project of radical speculative imagination — what Rodríguez calls 
“[i]nsurgent abolitionist futurity.”743  If anything, it is the innovative ra-
ther than the destructive that marks abolitionist thinking.  We should 
understand abolition not as the “elimination of anything but . . . as the 
founding of a new society.”744  The relationship between prison abolition 
and the Constitution, then, should be seen less as the condemnation of 
our existing abolition constitutionalism and more as the genesis of a  
new one. 
A new abolition constitutionalism could seek to abolish historical 
forms of oppression beyond slavery, including settler colonialism, patri-
archy, heteronormativity, ableism, and capitalism, and strive to disman-
tle systems beyond police and prisons, including foster care, regulation 
of pregnancy, and poverty.745  It could extend beyond the United States’ 
borders to challenge U.S. deportation policies and U.S. imperialism and 
to connect to freedom struggles around the world.746  The purpose of a 
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 741 Lee, supra note 260, at 112. 
 742 See, e.g., West, supra note 408, at 146, 154–55 (arguing that the abolitionist history of the 
Equal Protection Clause includes the “subsidiary” right “to be free of those conditions which, if 
unchecked by the state, generate separate sovereignties, including, at least, a right to be free of 
private violence and extreme material deprivation” and that “the state has an affirmative duty to 
protect our natural rights to physical security and economic participation,” id. at 146). 
 743 Rodríguez, supra note 29, at 1607. 
 744 Moten & Harney, supra note 258, at 114. 
 745 See, e.g., DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 41 (linking the growing female 
incarceration rate to the “disestablishment of the welfare system”); Dorothy Roberts & Lisa Sangoi, 
Black Families Matter: How the Child Welfare System Punishes Poor Families of Color, THE  
APPEAL (Mar. 26, 2018), https://theappeal.org/black-families-matter-how-the-child-welfare- 
system-punishes-poor-families-of-color-33ad20e2882e [https://perma.cc/VP2F-AEF3] (discussing 
foster care abolition).    
 746 See BEYOND WALLS AND CAGES: PRISONS, BORDERS, AND GLOBAL CRISIS 1–15 (Jenna 
M. Loyd et al. eds., 2012) (highlighting the connections between immigration and penal policies); 
MARTHA D. ESCOBAR, CAPTIVITY BEYOND PRISONS: CRIMINALIZATION EXPERIENCES OF 
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new abolition constitutionalism would not be to improve the U.S. state 
but to guide and govern a future society where prisons are unimagina-
ble.  Its objective could extend beyond abolishing particular systems to 
establishing freedom for all — a new freedom constitutionalism. 
As antebellum abolitionists and civil rights activists showed, consti-
tutional meaning is shaped by social and political action outside of  
traditional forums and separate from Supreme Court decisions.747  
Prison abolitionist praxis emphasizes the need to decentralize power  
currently residing in privileged institutions in order to empower com-
munities most vulnerable to state violence to make change in nontradi-
tional forums and spaces.748  How that vision will be made real — as a 
transformed interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, as an amendment 
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LATINA (IM)MIGRANTS 4 (2016) (describing the “expansion of the carceral society beyond the ter-
ritorial boundaries of the U.S. nation-state”); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing 
Immigration Prisons, 97 B.U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2017) (arguing that immigration imprisonment 
should be abolished); Wolff, supra note 181, at 1008–21 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment 
prohibits U.S. firms from exploiting slave labor in the global economy).  I have argued that prison 
abolition will envision a radically different relationship between technology and politics, one that 
ends prediction as a way of foreclosing social change by collapsing the future into past inequality.  
See Roberts, Digitizing, supra note 78, at 1727 (“Abolitionist forecasting technologies must facilitate 
envisioning a future that doesn’t replicate the past.”). 
 747 See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 667, at 1620 (noting that the “Fight for $15” movement “high-
lights the centrality of social and political action to constitutional law”); see also JACK M. BALKIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 1–16 (2011); 
TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 7 (2011) (“What would the story of the mid-twentieth-century 
struggle for civil rights look like if legal historians de-centered the U.S. Supreme Court . . . and 
instead considered the movement from the bottom up?  The answer . . . [is] a picture . . . in which 
local black community members acted as agents of change — law shapers, law interpreters, and 
even law makers.”); MARK ENGLER & PAUL ENGLER, THIS IS AN UPRISING: HOW NONVIO-
LENT REVOLT IS SHAPING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY xvii (2016) (explaining the potential 
power of nonviolence “as a method of political conflict, disruption, and escalation”); JONES, supra 
note 327, at 12 (describing how free black people in Baltimore “secured [constitutional] rights 
through their performance”); Mark Tushnet, Social Movements and the Constitution, in THE  
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 241, 241 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015) (ex-
amining how “social movements have affected the Constitution’s development and interpretation”). 
 748 See Joy James, Preface: American Archipelago, in WARFARE IN THE AMERICAN HOME-
LAND: POLICING AND PRISON IN A PENAL DEMOCRACY xii (Joy James ed., 2007) (referring to 
the search for “‘home’ — a democratic enclave, communities of resistance, a maroon camp”); James, 
7 Lessons, supra note 42 (criticizing reforms that “do not decentralize power or custodial care” and 
instead rely on “privileged structures[] that historically create, manage, tabulate, or ameliorate cri-
ses”); see also Blackhawk, supra note 290, at 1798 (noting that “public law scholars have begun to 
identify non-rights-based or structural forms of protection for minorities like federalism, unions, 
and petitioning”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1291 (2012) (defining 
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to the existing text,749 or as an alternative charter for freedom that  
extends beyond the bounds of the U.S. state750 — is yet to be seen. 
CONCLUSION 
This Foreword makes the case for revitalizing abolition constitutional-
ism by engaging the ideas and activism of antebellum slavery abolitionists 
with those of twenty-first-century prison abolitionists.  I argue that, despite 
the dominant anti-abolition constitutionalism, scholars and activists 
should consider the abolitionist history of the Reconstruction Amendments 
as a usable past to help move toward a radical future.  Today’s activists 
can deploy the Constitution’s abolition provisions instrumentally to fur-
ther their aims and, in the process, construct a new abolition constitution-
alism on the path to building a society without prisons.  In this way, the 
prison abolition movement can reinvigorate abolition constitutionalism.  
In turn, prison abolitionists’ rethinking of constitutional meaning can fur-
ther the struggle to create a more humane, free, and democratic world. 
In arriving at this conclusion, I grappled with the tension between 
two approaches to abolition constitutionalism.  On the one hand, there 
is good reason to renounce the Constitution because constitutional law 
has been critical to upholding the interests of the racial capitalist regime 
while advancing legal theories that justify its inhumanity.  On the other 
hand, there is utility in demanding that the Reconstruction Constitution 
live up to the liberation ideals fought for by abolitionists, revolutionar-
ies, and generations of ordinary black people.  As they must with respect 
to so many aspects of abolition consciousness, those who are building a 
society without prisons must engage dynamically with this tension.   
Abolitionists can craft an abolition constitutionalism that both condemns 
the dominant jurisprudence that legitimizes the carceral state and makes 
constitutional claims strategically to help dismantle carceral systems.  In 
the process, abolitionists might imagine a new freedom constitutionalism 
to guide and govern the radically different society they are creating. 
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 749 See, e.g., Goodwin, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 174, at 982–83 (discussing an amend-
ment which would strike the Punishment Clause from the Thirteenth Amendment); Jeannie  
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